Gender diversity and financial implications: endogeneity issues and critical mass of females on corporate boards. by Ong, Lee Lee
Bond University
DOCTORAL THESIS
Gender diversity and financial implications: endogeneity issues and critical mass of
females on corporate boards.
Ong, Lee Lee
Award date:
2019
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. May. 2019
 
 
 
 
Gender Diversity and Financial 
Implications:  
Endogeneity Issues and Critical Mass of Females  
on Corporate Boards 
 
 
Lee Lee ONG 
 
 
Submitted in total fulfilment of the degree of   
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
July 2018 
 
Bond Business School 
Associate Professor Simone Kelly and Professor Keitha Dunstan 
  
This research was supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program 
Scholarship 
 I 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the relationship between board gender diversity and 
company financial performance in Australia’s ASX200 public listed companies 
from 2008 to 2015. It finds the conflicting findings in previous board gender 
diversity and company financial performance studies are caused by the 
endogeneity concerns and prior inadequate attempts to address the causality 
relationship. This study employs a comprehensive range of econometric 
techniques to demonstrate the confounding impacts of endogeneity. It highlights 
the consequences of previously applied econometric techniques in examining the 
causal relationship of a gender-diverse board on company financial performance. 
A novel external instrumental variable that fulfils both relevancy and exogeneity 
tests is used with dynamic GMM estimation that is robust to all potential source of 
endogeneity. This study shows no evidence that female board representation has 
any negative effects on company financial performance, as measured by Tobin’s 
Q. This indicates that the significant correlations between board gender diversity 
and company financial performance as suggested by the OLS and fixed effects 
estimations are spurious as they fail to fulfil the strictly exogeneity assumptions 
between the dynamic nature of board characteristics and company financial 
performance measures. The inadequate attempts to address the endogeneity 
problems may lead to a spurious and biased inference of the relationship between 
the variables. The findings of this study show that board gender diversity has no 
significant relationship with company financial performance. Partitioning the 
sample into progressive increment of female board representation also suggests 
there is no negative or adverse impact on company financial performance. The 
evidence suggests that increasing the number of female board members does not 
reduce company financial performance. In the absence of significant relationship 
between board gender diversity and company financial performance, this study 
does not provide strong support to the Australian authorities to impose mandatory 
gender quotas in the public listed companies.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
The fundamental concern in boardroom gender diversity and company financial 
performance studies is the existence of endogeneity issue in determining the 
causal relationship. Despite extensive literature in examining the relationship 
between gender-diverse boards and company performance, the endogenous 
nature of board gender diversity and company financial performance has limited 
our understanding on how, why and when gender-diverse boards affects company 
performance. For example, companies choose board structure that suits the 
nature of the business and industry, and at the same time companies that perform 
better also attract directors with certain characteristic. In relation to board gender 
diversity, is it the company’s choice to appoint female directors to suit the business 
operation that enhances company financial performance or female directors 
choose to join the boards of the more successful companies? In this instance, it is 
difficult to establish a causality link between the board structure and the company 
performance. Gippel, Smith and Zhu (2015) suggest the most effective way to 
study the causal relationship in accounting and finance studies is by way of natural 
experiment. However this approach is challenging, as the opportunity for natural 
experiments to occur is rare in corporate governance study.  The relationship 
between board structure and company financial performance can be explained by 
an empirical study that is not confounded by the endogeneity issue. 
 
The endogenous nature of the corporate governance measures and company 
financial performance limits our understanding of the relationship between the 
variables. The three main endogeneity concerns in governance and performance 
literature are unobserved company-level heterogeneity, simultaneous causality 
bias and dynamic endogeneity between the variables in the model specification 
(Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012). This study applies various econometric 
techniques to demonstrate how the endogeneity problem leads to spurious and 
bias inference of the relationship between board gender diversity and company 
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performance. Following the suggestion by Pindado and La Torre (2004) that the 
most effective solution to control an endogeneity problem is by applying an 
external instrumental variable. The aim of this study is to introduce a valid and 
relevant external instrumental variable to remove the confounding effect between 
board gender diversity and company performance. This study believes that there 
is a positive association of the pool of female talent in a same area based on 
locality theory (Bouwman, 2012). Therefore, the representation of local female 
councillors is believed to have a positive influence on the experienced and skilled 
females to excel to the corporate boards. The selected external instrumental 
variable, the proportion of local female councillors, is economically relevant as 
shown in the relevancy F-test, indicating that the local female councillors is 
positively correlated to the proportion of females on boards. Furthermore, Hansen 
J-test confirms the validity of the selected external instrumental variable that is 
exogenous and uncorrelated to company performance. With the identification of 
the optimal external instrumental variable that is valid for GMM specification, this 
study applies the most appropriate dynamic Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation to examine the relationship between board gender diversity and 
company financial performance. The dynamic GMM model is robust to all forms of 
endogeneity concerns and is well specified based on Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions and Arellano-Bond test of auto-correlation.  
 
The findings of this study identified that the major sources of endogeneity in the 
relationship of board gender diversity and company financial performance arise 
from simultaneous causality, unobserved heterogeneity and the dynamic 
relationship of past performance on board structure. Board gender diversity has 
neither positive nor negative implications on company financial performance. The 
significant negative correlations as suggested in OLS estimations are spurious 
inference due to endogeneity issues. The findings also suggest that board gender 
diversity will not cause any decrease in company’s capacity to create value as 
measured by Tobin’s Q. The examination of female board representation based on 
Kanter’s critical mass (1977b) classification reveals that the relationship between 
board gender diversity and company financial performance could be non-linear. In 
the absence of significant relationships between board gender diversity and 
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company financial performance, this study does not provide strong support to the 
Australian authorities to impose mandatory gender quotas in the public listed 
companies. This is aligned with Ahern and Dittmar’s (2012) study on Norway’s 
gender quota legislation that lead to an adverse effect on company value. 
Economic theory of equilibrium also argues that if board structure of a company is 
at its optimal level, implementing gender quota may lead to a sub-optimal board 
that is detrimental to the company financial performance (Gippel et al. 2015).  
 
1.1 Overview Of Corporate Governance And Board Gender Diversity In 
General 
The role of corporate governance has lead to contentious and intensive debates 
especially after the collapse of high profile corporations at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century and post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. Corporate 
failures such as Enron and WorldCom in the U.S., HIH Insurance and OneTel in 
Australia in 2001 resulted in the review of the corporate governance system 
around the world and the call for better and more effective corporate governance. 
The fundamental function of corporate governance is to ensure that management 
acts in the best interest of the stakeholders through a variety of mechanisms. The 
duty of the board of directors is to achieve efficient and better governance with 
effective strategic decision-making and monitoring function. This requires strong 
cooperation and effective teamwork among the board members. In principle, 
effective corporate governance will ensure the efficient use of company’s internal 
and external resources to improve shareholders’ returns. In this instance, well-
structured corporate governance should have positive impacts on company 
financial performance. The governance structure that affects company financial 
success can be classified as the internal and external mechanism. The board 
composition, executive compensation and ownership of managers fall under the 
internal mechanism of corporate governance; while institutional ownership, 
leverage level, market outlook and strategic direction of the company are 
considered as the external mechanism of the corporate governance. Hence, 
corporate governance structure and company financial performance are jointly 
determined.  
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Board composition concerning gender diversity is currently under intense debates 
globally, where governments around the world have taken initiatives to improve 
female board representation. Corporations are also facing political and societal 
pressure to address gender equality issues. The under-representation of females 
on corporate boards has gained considerable international attention amongst 
policymakers and corporations. Both authorities and institutions have taken 
necessary measures to respond to the increasing demand for female board 
representation. Authorities and institutional diversity requirements can be 
classified into two categories: a hard law through a regulatory mandate by 
legislation or a soft law through highly recommended best practices (Ben-Amar, 
Francoeur, Hafsi, & Labelle, 2013).  
 
The first country that implemented mandatory rules and regulations to legislate 
board gender quotas is Norway, who leads the international policy to enact the 
mandatory law and to impose gender quotas in 2003. Under the gender diversity 
requirement, all Norwegian public listed companies are required to achieve a 
minimum of forty percent of female directors quota by 2008. Spain followed 
Norway’s gender reform and enacted the gender diversity law in 2007 and 
mandated all public listed companies to increase female board representation to 
forty percent by 2015. Many countries in the European continent have also 
followed this corporate board gender reform and imposed the corporate gender 
requirements1.  
 
On the other hand, some countries choose to implement a soft approach and 
provide guidance in recommending a non-binding gender target to improve female 
participation on the corporate boards. The countries that provide guidance on 
boardroom gender recommendation without imposing mandatory gender quota, to 
name a few, are Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In 
the U.K., the Higgs Report  (2003) recommended that board diversity enhances 
board effectiveness in decision making and encourage company to improve board 
gender diversity from professional group where females are well represented.                                                         
1 Refer Appendix 1 on boardroom gender quotas laws and corporate governance recommendations by country. 
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Subsequently, in 2011, the U.K. government-backed Davies Review has set a 
non-binding gender target at twenty-five percent of female board representation of 
FTSE 100 companies by 2015.  In Australia, the Australian Stock Exchange 
Corporate Governance Council has also recommended boardroom gender 
diversity policy based on the “comply-or-explain” provision. The European 
Commission also proposed a minimum of forty percent of female non-executive 
directors for companies listed on the European boards by 2020. The initiative for 
the legislative requirements and corporate governance best practice 
recommendations on gender policy are based on the perception that board gender 
diversity affects the corporate governance structure and board dynamics in a 
positive manner. The increasing representation of females on boards has 
disrupted the norms of the traditional male-dominated boards. Females are now 
being sought for board positions to comply with the legislation and corporate 
governance guidelines  (Sheridan, Ross-Smith, & Lord, 2014) .  
 
Despite the government and institution’s intervention on board gender policy, 
females are still under-represented on the corporate boards. According to the 
latest update statistics by lSS QualityScore  (Azhar, Martens, Papolis, & Sancho, 
2017) , a study based on thirty countries over five continents, female board 
representation remains below twenty percent in 2016 globally. Another global 
board diversity review based on the public listed companies of forty-four countries 
from 2012 to 2016 also indicates that the progress in board gender diversity 
remains slow. The review shows that female directors only represent nineteen 
percent of the directorships (EgonZehnder 2017), an improvement of only five 
percent over the four years period. Countries in Western Europe show the most 
significant improvement in board gender diversity over the years from 2012 to 
2016. The average female board representation has increased from 18.5% in 
2012 to 26.2% in 2016 globally. Amongst the Western European countries, those 
implemented mandatory gender quotas are regarded as the diversity champions. 
Norway, being the top on the list, has forty percent of female board representation 
on the public listed companies. This is followed by France, Sweden, Finland, and 
Italy with female board representation ranged between thirty and thirty-seven 
percent. In the U.S., despite being the pioneer in promoting boardroom gender 
 6 
diversity, female board representation remains stagnant. In this instance, female 
directors in the U.S. hold only twenty percent of the board seats amongst the 
Fortune 500 companies in 2016  (Deloitte, 2017).  
 
The global statistics on boardroom gender diversity  (EgonZehnder, 2017)  shed 
some light on the progress of female board representation from the introduction of 
mandatory gender quotas and voluntary recommendation by the government. 
However, there are cases where regulations may not be effective in advancing 
female directors on the corporate boards. For example, in Germany and Spain, 
females represent only twenty-eight and twenty-one percent respectively as at 
2016, still fall short of the mandatory quotas of thirty percent. The under-
representation of females on boards is due to lack of enforcement from the 
authorities despite there is a mandatory requirement in place. In addition, females’ 
progression onto corporate boards also encounters social, political and cultural 
challenges. This is particularly true in the boardroom of companies in the Asia 
region. Female board representation in Asia is well below the global progress 
where females represent only eight percent of the board directorships. Among the 
countries in the study, the proportion of female directors in China, Japan, and 
South Korea are well below one percent. This is due to the deep-rooted traditional 
cultural and societal attitude towards females remain the primary barrier for their 
advancement onto the top management and corporate boards.    
 
In view of the global governance initiatives in promoting boardroom gender 
diversity, the emerging empirical studies in the area of effective board composition 
concerning gender diversification have also gained researchers’ attention.  These 
empirical studies attempt to examine what are the implications of having more 
gender-diverse boards and whether the gender diversity policy is in line with the 
government’s intention in promoting female board representation. Many studies 
hypothesise the benefits associated with board gender diversity to organisational 
level, where female directors contribute in delivering new perspectives  (Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003) , effective communication (Almazan & Suarez, 2003) , more 
independence board structure that enhance monitoring and effective board 
strategic control  (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Gul, Hutchinson, & Lai, 2013) , 
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enhances company financial performance and image by providing more legitimacy 
to diverse stakeholders (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) .  
 
Another stream of literature examines the effective number of female board 
representation that influences company performance. These studies apply 
Kanter’s critical mass theory and posit that female representation on boards can 
only produce a positive and sustainable effect when female directors reach a 
critical mass of boardroom representation  (Joecks, Pull, & Vetter, 2013; Kanter, 
1977b; Strydom, Au Yong, & Rankin, 2017) . In general, previous studies suggest 
a critical mass of thirty percent or a minimum of three female directors on boards 
is the tipping point for female directors to make practical contributions to the 
boardroom discussions and board dynamics that positively impact the company 
performance. However, the latest statistics of the global gender diversity analysis 
(EgonZehnder, 2017) indicates that the average female directors on boards in 
2016 is about two directors2, suggesting that with the current increment rate of 
female board representation, boards will only achieve the critical mass of three 
female directors by 2021. This is an optimistic prediction as most of the countries 
that reached the critical mass of female board representation are in the developed 
nations with gender policy in place. Two-third of the countries in the study have not 
achieved the critical mass of female board representation and there is minimal 
gender priority and agenda. Furthermore, majority of the female population are 
residing in the countries with social, political and cultural challenges that may slow 
down the progress. 
 
1.2 Corporate Governance And Board Gender Diversity In The Australian 
Context 
Given the snapshot of the global corporate boardroom gender diversity, this study 
explicitly focuses on the boardroom gender diversity in the Australian context and 
investigates the implications of board gender diversity on company financial 
performance. We begin this section by presenting a brief introduction on the 
                                                        
2 Refer Appendix 2 on the 2016 Global Board Gender Diversity Analysis – Average female directors on board by 
diversity champions. Retrieved from https://www.egonzehnder.com/gbda 
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Australian corporate governance system. This is followed by a general discussion of 
gender diversity in Australia that leads to the questions raised in view of the current 
boardroom gender diversity phenomena. The final part of this section demonstrates 
how these questions can be answered and the contributions of this study. 
 
1.2.1 Australia Corporate Governance Structure in General 
Consistent with the framework of corporate governance, corporate boards in 
Australia are responsible and accountable for governing and overseeing the 
overall strategic direction and top management function of companies. Public 
listed companies in Australia are highly regulated by the Corporation Act (2001) 
and the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listing rules. Principle 5 in the ASX 
listing rules required that all public listed companies to establish written policies 
and procedures that are designed to ensure compliance with the ASX listing 
requirements. The senior management team together with the board of directors 
are responsible and accountable for the compliance requirements. Despite being 
one of the world’s leading countries in establishing the corporate governance 
structure and listing requirements, the Australian corporate environment cannot 
avoid from the corporate failures in the early twenty-first century. Prominent listed 
companies such as HIH Insurance, OneTel, Harris Scarfe and Ansett Airlines 
collapse in 2001 due to weak corporate governance, unsustainable business 
strategy, aggressive financial reporting and poor auditing (Monem, 2011). These 
corporate failures have reinforced the Australian corporate governance landscape  
(Mirshekary, Yaftian, & Cross, 2005)  and emphasise the importance of good 
corporate governance practices and structure. In the case HIH Insurance, a Royal 
Commission was established to investigate the reasons and the circumstances of 
the failure. The Royal Commission report stated that the primary reason for the 
failure of HIH Insurance was due to poor management and lack of integrity in the 
internal processes and systems. There is due to lack of attention and 
accountability from the senior management and board of directors (Treasury, 
2003). As a result of the Royal Commission findings on HIH’s collapse, the 
Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council (herein refer to as 
The Council) has established the Principles of Good Governance and Best 
Practice Recommendations in 2003 to further enhance the corporate governance 
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standards of public listed companies. The Council's recommendations cover a 
wide range of corporate governance charters, including board roles, 
responsibilities and composition; code of conduct of board of directors; financial 
reporting and continuous disclosure; risk management framework and directors 
remuneration framework. 
 
To summarise the corporate governance landscape in Australia, the Corporation 
Act (2001) and the ASX listing rules provide the mandatory requirements for the 
companies while the Australian Security Investment and Commission's (ASIC) 
policy and The Council's recommendations provide guidance, obligations and 
disclosure requirements for public listed companies. Under ASX listing rules 
4.10.3, all public listed companies are required to benchmark their corporate 
governance practices against The Council’s best practice recommendations. 
Although the ASIC's policy and The Council's recommendations are non-
mandatory in basis, they supplement the ASX listing rules in governing the affairs 
of public listed companies.  
 
In addition to the mandatory legislation and the guidelines and recommendations, 
the charter of a company’s corporate governance framework also encompasses 
the rules, regulations and policies of a company. While the public listed companies 
have the flexibility to implement their own set of corporate governance policies, 
The Council adopts "if not, why not" approach when the companies do not 
conform to the recommendations. This approach requires that all public listed 
companies to inform the stakeholders as to what extent the company followed The 
Council's recommendations and to identify and provide reasons for not following. 
In this instance, the institutions and both internal and external stakeholders play an 
important role in shaping the governance attributes of an organization that 
influences a company’s corporate governance structure. An effective governance 
framework encompasses corporate governance charters, determines the codes of 
conducts and policies of the boards, helps to enhance a company’s strategic 
performance and to ensure conformance with company’s internal constitutions as 
well as external regulations and laws.  
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1.2.2 Gender Diversity In Australia 
Females in Australia have been actively involved into domains that traditionally 
were dominated by male counterparts. Lifting female participation in the Australian 
workforce has been a significant national productivity plan. The collaborative 
approach between the Australian's regulatory bodies and the non-government 
organisations (NGOs) plays an important role in encouraging and promoting the 
advancement of females’ participation in the workforce as well as senior executive 
position and leadership roles in the corporate environment. In 2012, the Workplace 
Gender Equality Act (2012) was introduced to replace the Equal Opportunity for 
Women in the Workplace Act (1999).  This newly enacted Act focuses on 
addressing the gender inequalities in the Australian workforce by promoting and 
improving gender equalities for both genders. Under this Act, all non-public sector 
employers with 100 or more employees must submit an annual report to the 
Workplace Gender Equality Agency (WGEA) benchmarked against the six gender 
equality indicators3.  
 
The Australian government regulatory bodies and NGOs’ promote gender equality 
in the workforce and advancing capable female employees onto the senior 
executive and top management level in the corporation. Workplace Gender 
Equality Agency (WGEA) also works toward dismantling the cultural and structural 
barriers that limit women’s capability to participate in workforce and progress in 
leadership roles to achieve gender equality. There is a considerable volume of 
information and statistics available that shows the increment of females’ 
participation in the workplace has improved substantially since the 1980s.  46.9% 
of all employees comprise of females workforce, and women made up to 36.8% of 
full-time employees and 68.6% of part-time employees (WGEA, 2018). Females 
also compare favourably to men regarding education attainment in Australia. 
WGEA's 2017 statistics show that 39.9% of females aged between 25-29 have 
achieved a minimum of bachelor degree compared with 30.9% of males in the 
same age group. In the population aged between 15-64, 5.9% of females have 
attained a postgraduate degree, slightly higher than their counterparts at 5.8%. 
This indicates that females have significant human capital and education                                                         
3 Refer Appendix 3: Six gender equality indicators 
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background to contribute towards the workforce as well as have the potential and 
capability to be promoted onto the leadership role and be qualified to be directors 
on the corporate boards. The report on females on leadership also indicates that 
females have consistently advanced in all categories of managerial roles since 
2013 and females representing 38.4% of the overall managerial position in 20164. 
 
The advancement of females in the workforce at the senior executive roles and the 
leadership level has gathered considerable momentum and increased the appetite 
for participation increment on corporate boards. One of the NGOs that play an 
important role in promoting and advancing female participation on corporate 
boards is the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD), a non-profit 
corporate governance association. The AICD offers professional advice to its 
members and supports its members by providing career development and 
mentoring programs to encourage more females to be board ready and to 
advance to corporate board membership. The ASX and the AICD play an active 
role in advancing females on corporate boards by providing mentoring and 
scholarship programs to encourage females to undertake formal training to be 
qualified as directors on the corporate boards. Commonwealth and state 
governments have also set up a registry for females who are interested in joining 
government boards. Another membership-based NGO, Women on Boards (WOB), 
offers a supportive service to their member who is seeking for corporate boards 
position to register their details and organise seminars and workshops to enhance 
the board-based knowledge. WOB also publishes the information about 
companies in search of female directors and emphasises gender diversity as an 
objective.  
 
Similar to the boardroom gender diversity scenario around the world, despite the 
efforts of the Australian regulatory bodies and the NGOs in promoting females’ 
advancement onto the corporate boards, female board representation remains 
low. The issue of low representation of females on corporate boards in Australia 
has received special attention of the ASIC and The Council. In July 2010, The                                                         
4 Refer Appendix 4: Women in Leadership statistics. Extract from WGEA’s report on Australia’s gender equality 
scorecard.  
 12 
Council introduced the diversity recommendations in response to the Australian 
Government’s Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee's report on issues 
concerning "Diversity on Board of Directors". The first version of diversity 
recommendations5 was introduced in The Council’s amended second edition of 
the “Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 2010”. In general, 
the diversity recommendations can be classified into three sections: 
Recommendations 3.2 and 3.5 concerning the diversity policy and reporting; 
Recommendation 3.3 concerning the measurable objectives; and 
Recommendation 3.4 concerning gender diversity metrics. These 
recommendations suggest that all public listed companies to establish a 
measurable gender diversity policy to improve board gender diversity, and 
adopted the self-regulated disclosure approach on board’s diversity disclosure 
requirement to explain if it has deviated from the set objectives. Although it is not a 
statutory requirement and no mandatory disclosures are required, all Australian 
public listed companies are recommended to disclose their gender diversity policy 
in their annual report commencing 2011. Companies that elect not to adopt these 
gender diversity recommendations are required to provide an explanation based 
on the “if not, why not” principle. In 2014, under the third edition of The Council’s 
“Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations”, the diversity 
recommendation 6  has been relocated from Principle 3; under the subheading 
“ethical and responsible decision-making”; to Principle 1, under subheading “lay 
solid foundations for management and oversight”. This relocation indicates that 
The Council recognises that diversity should be a critical component for 
companies to establish effective management rather than just as an ethical 
recommendation. 
 
The initiative of these government authority bodies and NGOs provide supportive 
data and enhance the understanding of the diversity issue in the workforce. The 
datasets of the WGEA and the AICD provide the most comprehensive information                                                         
5 Refer Appendix 5: Principle 3 of The Council’s 2010 Gender diversity recommendations in the “Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations” 
6 Refer Appendix 6: Principle 1 of The Council’s 2014 Diversity Recommendations. Retrieved from 
http://www.asx.com.au/regulation/corporate-governance-council.htm 
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of gender equality in the Australian workplace and the public listed companies in 
the ASX. These datasets provide a standardised performance assessment and 
comparison across industries in Australia. Business and policymakers are able to 
benchmark both occupational gender gaps that exist amongst industries as well as 
females in the leadership role and management levels. This allows a high-level 
understanding of gender equality in the workplace and encourages the 
management to put in place long-term measures to address inequalities and low 
representation of females at the higher level of the organization and the board 
level. The AICD’s report on the appointees’ qualifications of directors between 
2014 and 2017 in the ASX200 boards 7 reveals that female directors possess 
higher qualification than male directors. The report shows that all female directors 
hold formal qualification compared to 94.8% of male directors. 37% of female 
directors possess postgraduate qualification compared to 31% of male directors 
and 26.1% of female directors are MBA holders compared to 21.8% of male 
directors.  
 
The efforts of the government bodies together with the support from the NGOs 
have encouraged females’ advancement onto the corporate boards and created 
an immediate reaction with the greater appointment of female directors on the 
ASX200 boards. Figure 1.1 shows that the appointment of female directors on the 
ASX200 boards from 2009 to 2017. The number of female directors appointed 
onto the ASX200 boards has increased from 10 in 2009 to 56 and 68 in 2010 and 
2011 respectively. This is an increment of 460% in 2010 from 2009 base level, and 
another further increment of 120% in 2011. The appointment of female directors 
has dropped to the low of 37 appointees in 2013 but again has gradually increased 
and reached the highest number of 79 appointees in 2016. In relative terms, the 
appointment of female directors represents 25% and 28% of the total new 
appointees in 2010 and 2011 respectively. However, the rapid increments of the 
appointment of female directors have decreased to 22% in 2012 and 2013. The 
number of new appointment of female directorship has achieved another spike in 
2016, representing a total of 44% of new appointments.                                                         
7 Statistics extract from AICD’s web-site at http://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/advocacy/board-diversity/statistics  
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Despite the striking increment in new appointments of female directorship in the 
ASX200 since The Council’s best practice gender diversity recommendations, the 
percentage of female directors on ASX200 boards remains low and well below the 
best practice target of forty percent8. Figure 1.2 presents the proportion of female 
directors on the ASX200 boards from 2009 to 2017. The statistics show that 
although the number of female directors in the ASX200 has increased from 65 
before the recommendation to 84 between July and December 2010, it 
represented only 10.7% of the total board directorship on the ASX200 in 2010. 
The increment of the proportion of female board representation is rather slow and 
only achieved to its peak of 26.7% as at March 20179. The latest AICD’s report 
shows that there are 14 companies in the ASX200 have no females on boards and 
only 70 companies in the ASX200 have reached 30% target of female board 
representation (AICD, 2017). This indicates that the remarkable increment in 
newly appointment of female directors of the ASX200 has only a minor impact on 
actual female representation across the entire ASX200. It also signifies that the                                                         
8 This benchmark is in accordance to AHRC’s 2010 blueprint on gender diversity and equality recommendations. 
9 This statistics is extracted from the live data in the AICD’s web site retrieved from: 
http://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/advocacy/board-diversity/statistics 
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appointment of female directors in corporate boards do not reflect the gender 
workforce and education attainment’s statistics. Females are under-represented 
on the corporate boards and remain largely excluded from board positions. Male 
counterparts continue to dominate the ASX200 boards and overshadow the 
increment of new female directorship.    
 
 
 
The statistics demonstrate that Australia has a long way to go in achieving the 
world benchmark of forty percent female representation on corporate boards. 
McKinsey (2007) in their report "Women Matter" stated that corporate culture plays 
an important role in advocating gender diversity of a company. They suggested 
that top management's commitment to gender diversity should be on the top list of 
strategic agenda. They termed this effort as "the ecosystem of measures" where 
the top management commits to closely monitor the implementation of gender 
policy progress and develop programs that encourage females to excel in the 
leadership position. Not unless the company and the board are made accountable 
to implement the diversity policy, it is very difficult to change the general 
perception within the company and gain acceptance of female leadership in the 
senior executive positions and representation on boards. 
 
The voluntary and best practice recommendations employed by The Council can 
be a slow process for the public listed companies in Australia to achieve gender 
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diversity targets, either at the suggested critical mass of thirty percent or the most 
common gender quota benchmark in the Scandinavian nations of forty percent. In 
view of the international trend in implementing quota legislation and progress 
towards setting best practice targets, is a mandatory gender quota the more 
effective way to improve female board representation to achieve gender diversity 
targets? Subsequent to The Council’s gender diversity recommendation in 2010, 
the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) proposed a gender equality 
blueprint for both the public and private sectors. Recommendation 7 of the 
blueprint suggests that the Australian government should legislate all public listed 
companies to achieve the minimum of forty percent of female board representation 
within the 5-year period 10 . They further recommended that if this mandatory 
gender diversity target is not achieved within the specified time frame, penalties 
should be imposed. The AHRC’s recommendations contribute towards The 
Council’s gender diversity voluntary approach by quantifying the measurable 
objectives to set a forty percent quota as the board gender target that is consistent 
with international practices. The AHRC suggests that setting quantifiable targets is 
an effective way to benchmark Australian public listed companies’ gender diversity 
policy and progress in comparison to other nations.  
 
On the other hand, the AICD opposed setting a gender quota on public listed 
companies boards. However, in 2013, the newly appointed chairman of the AICD, 
Elizabeth Proust, has indicated that if female representation on the ASX200's 
boards does not achieve the thirty percent benchmark, the realistic option to 
improve female representation on boards is by way of imposing mandatory 
legislation. She also indicates that thirty percent of female board representation is 
the desire target for companies listed on the ASX. The AICD is committed to 
improve boards gender diversity and has called for all the ASX200 boards to 
achieve thirty percent of female representation on boards by the end of 2018. In 
2014, the Australian Council of Superannuation Investors (ACSI) also announced 
their investment policy in the ASX200 companies and suggested the gender target 
for female board representation at thirty percent to be achieved by 2017. The                                                         
10 Refer Appendix 7: Extract of the Australian Human Rights Commission’s recommendations on gender diversity and 
equality. 
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ACSI recognises that properly structured boards should comprise of directors with 
diverse backgrounds to enhance boards’ effectiveness in decision-making. They 
also announced to vote against the re-election of directors for companies with poor 
board gender diversity.  
 
1.3 Empirical Studies Concerning Boardroom Gender Diversity In Brief 
The optimistic remarks and perceptions of the government bodies and the NGOs 
in claiming that increased board gender diversity is associated with improve 
workforce participation at all levels and positively impacts the economy and 
company financial performance have not been supported conclusively in the 
academic studies. Previous empirical studies suggest mixed evidence between 
female’s participation on corporate boards and company financial performance, 
including assertions of positive correlations between board gender diversity and 
performance, negative correlations or no significant impact of gender-diverse 
boards on performance. The main reason that leads to the inconclusive findings of 
previous empirical studies is due to the methodological concern on endogeneity 
issue and theoretical assumption of linear correlation between board gender 
diversity and company financial performance.  
 
In Australia, empirical study that examines boardroom gender diversity and 
performance is less developed compared to the U.S and other developed 
countries in the European region. Appendix 8(a) tabulates the previous empirical 
studies that use the Australian data to examine the relationship between board 
gender diversity and company financial performance while Appendix 8(b) presents 
the Australian study in another area of corporate governance. The Australian 
studies prior to the twenty-first century are primarily descriptive, focusing mainly on 
describing the board characteristics, board size and board composition  (Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003) . The findings of the Australian sample also suggest a similar 
result to the existing empirical studies of other countries that yield no general 
consensus on the relationship between board gender diversity and company 
financial performance. This study posits that two main issues needed to further 
clarify in examining the relationship between board gender diversity and company 
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performance, the methodological concern and the theoretical concern. We will 
further elaborate these concerns in the following section. 
 
1. 4 Motivations and Objectives of the Study 
This study is motivated by the governance reform proposal implemented by many 
countries based on the contention that gender diversity on corporate boards 
improves company financial performance. In Australia, The Council and the 
proponent for board gender diversity NGOs are of the view that companies with 
gender-diverse boards could improve their overall performance. These institutional 
influences have put pressure on companies to comply with the requirements to 
increase female representation on their boards. Furthermore, there is no general 
consensus based on the economic argument on the gender-diverse boards from 
previous empirical studies. It is important for both the government policymakers 
and the governance of the companies to understand the actual implications of 
having gender-diverse boards. If the boardroom structure and composition are at 
its internal equilibrium, forcing companies to change the boardroom structure to 
comply with the required legislation can be detrimental to the company financial 
performance  (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Nygaard, 2011) .  
 
Methodologically, the inconclusive and controversial evidence lies in the fact that 
endogeneity problem exists between board gender diversity and company 
financial performance. This endogeneity issue is caused by the possible 
simultaneous relationship, company-level heterogeneity and dynamic endogeneity 
between the variables in the model specification (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012). 
Moreover, data used from different countries with different jurisdictions and 
corporate governance practices also lead to diverse findings. The large body of 
previous literature also apply the whole spectrum of diverse model specifications 
with the application of various econometric techniques over a different time frame 
that led to inconsistent results. 
 
Theoretically, board gender diversity enhances boardroom efficiency and 
dynamics that positively affects overall company performance. However, different 
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theories support the relevancy of gender-diverse boards and its implications on 
company financial performance in a different way that may result in contradictory 
arguments. Furthermore, the model specification of previous studies is based on 
the expectation of a positive linear relationship between female participation and 
company performance. Logically the relationship between board gender diversity 
and company financial performance should not be linear. We posit that token 
female director will not positively affect company financial performance until a 
critical mass is reached, and at some point increased female participation beyond 
the optimal level of board composition will become value decreasing as male 
participation decreases and the benefits of diversity are diminished.  
 
Given both the methodological and theoretical concerns in board gender diversity 
and performance studies, the main objective of this study is to improve on both 
concerns by applying the most appropriate and advance econometric techniques 
and introduce a valid and supportive external instrumental variable to address the 
endogeneity issue. We hope to answer the following questions raised by the 
government initiatives in implementing gender policy and the inconclusive 
empirical evidences in company financial performance and board gender diversity 
studies as follows:  
1. What is the main endogeneity issue resulting in inconclusive or spurious 
findings in board gender diversity and company financial performance 
studies? 
2. If we can address the endogeneity concern using the advancement of 
econometric techniques, what is the implication of gender-diverse boards 
on company financial performance? 
3. With the application of the appropriate econometric methods, is the 
relationship between board gender diversity and company financial 
performance linear?   
4. What is the tipping point for female directors to make a difference in 
company financial performance? 
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1.5 Importance And Contributions Of This Study 
This study empirically tests the implications of board gender diversity on company 
financial performance in the Australian context and contributes to the existing 
board gender diversity studies to understand whether female board representation 
affects company financial performance. Given the fact that the essential roles of 
corporate governance; being the most influential body in setting company’s 
strategic direction and determining the allocation and utilisation of resources to 
generate the desired outcomes of the company; it is important to understand the 
most fundamental question whether board gender diversity affects board’s 
strategic decision that flows on to the company financial performance. 
Furthermore, with the initiatives of the regulatory authorities around the world in 
promoting board gender diversity policy, there is more of a reason for the 
researchers to investigate the real economic impacts of gender-diverse boards.  
 
This study is noteworthy particularly in the Australian context in view of the gender 
diversity initiatives by the government regulatory bodies (the ASIC and ASX) on 
public listed companies’ gender policy and other NGOs and institutional push for 
mandatory gender quotas if females continue to be under-represented on the 
corporate boards. It is timely to examine whether there is a causal relationship 
between board gender diversity and company financial performance to support the 
policy debates. Although there have been increasing studies in the literature 
examining the relationship between board gender diversity and company financial 
performance, studies focus predominantly in the Australian context between board 
gender diversity and company financial performance are limited, and the results 
are inconclusive 11 . These studies suffer from both the methodological and 
theoretical flaws that diminish the credibility of their evidence due to the most 
damaging endogeneity issue in diversity-performance studies. Consequently, we 
are unable to derive meaningful inferences from these studies on the causality 
relationship between board gender diversity and company financial performance.   
 
                                                        
11 Refer Appendix 8(a) for the studies with the Australian sample in relation to board gender diversity and 
performance and Appendix 8(b) on the Australian study in another area of corporate governance  
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The main methodological weakness of the extant research in the Australian 
context lies in the inadequacy of attempts to address the damaging endogeneity 
issue present in diversity-performance studies. Given the inconclusive results in 
the academic community due to the most damaging methodological flaws in 
previous studies, this study contributes to the existing literature by addressing this 
endogeneity concern. We apply the more advanced and appropriate econometric 
methods to examine the relationship using the dynamic Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimations (Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2010; Wintoki, Linck, & 
Netter, 2012) . Furthermore, this study is important not only by applying a well-
structured dynamic modelling approach to improve on the inconclusive findings but 
also introducing a carefully selected external instrumental variable to control for 
the loop of causality between board gender diversity and company financial 
performance. The quality of the choice of external instrumental variables utilised in 
previous studies has been cirticised for their weakness and lack of theoretical 
reasoning that cause logical plausibility. A valid external instrument variable based 
on economic theory and fulfil both the relevancy and exogeneity tests produces 
unbiased estimates in the structural model may provide evidence of a relationship 
between board gender diversity and company financial performance. Therefore, 
this study applies the theory of “economic ramification of distance” (Bouwman, 
2012)  and the influence of political science in corporate governance  (Terjesen, 
Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015)  in the selection of the external instrumental variable of 
this study. This study identifies the representation of local female councillors as 
the important influence on local female board representation. The representation 
of local female councillors is believed to have a positive influence on the 
experienced and skilled females to excel as directors on corporate boards. This is 
demonstrated in our endogeneity test and the relevancy F-test of the selected 
instrumental variable. The exogeneity Hansen-J-test in the dynamic model also 
presents that the selected external instrumental variable is exogenous and 
uncorrelated to the errors in the company financial performance measure, 
indicating that the selected external instrumental variable is a strong inference to 
address the endogenous female directors regressor in the model.  
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The theoretical problem lies in the fact that, while researchers argue that gender 
diversity improves the quality of decision making of boards, enhance board 
effectiveness and hence company financial performance, their model is most often 
based on the expectation of a positive linear relationship between gender-diverse 
boards and company financial performance. Furthermore, the relationship 
between board gender diversity and company financial performance is not 
predictable by any single extant theory (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003)   and 
there is always the opposite argument on the relationship between board gender 
diversity and company financial performance within the theoretical argument itself. 
This study contributes to the existing literature, especially in the Australian context, 
by referring to the multiple theories to understand both the positive and negative 
impacts of gender-diverse boards. We further apply Kanter’s critical mass theory 
(1977b) to examine the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the different 
grouping of female directors on boards and company financial performance. We 
argue that the effects of gender-diverse boards should not be linear as the impact 
of a different grouping of female directors on boards affect board dynamics in 
various ways. In this instance, the relative number of female directors on boards 
influences board dynamics and outputs differently. Several studies refer to 
Kanter’s critical mass theory in analysing group discussion processes and the 
implications of boardroom gender diversity. However, this critical mass theory has 
rarely been tested empirically in boardroom gender diversity and company 
financial performance studies in the Australian context.  
 
In summary, considering the government regulatory bodies and NGOs approach in 
intervening corporate boardroom gender policy, this study is timely to examine if 
there is any causal relationship between gender-diverse boards and company 
financial performance in the Australian context. This study also contributes to the 
literature in boardroom gender diversity and company financial performance by 
addressing both methodological and theoretical concerns. Based on a stronger 
theoretical basis for the choice of a valid and relevant external instrumental 
variable, this study illustrates that the negatively spurious relationship between 
board gender diversity and company financial performance is due to the 
endogeneity issue. We also demonstrate that the relationship between boardroom 
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gender diversity and company financial performance varies depending on the 
estimation method of a study and different sources of endogeneity that cause a 
study to report a spurious negative correlation. This is the first empirical study in 
the Australian corporate boardroom context that applies the critical mass theory 
together with a well-structured dynamic modelling approach. This study also 
introduces a truly exogenous external instrumental variable to control for any 
potential source of endogeneity to examine the implications of different female 
directors grouping on company financial performance.  
 
1.6 The Organisation Of The Thesis 
This thesis is systematically structured to investigate the relationship between 
board gender diversity and company financial performance. In Chapter two, we 
present the theoretical constructs and literature reviews that are related to board 
gender diversity to provide a background understanding of how boardroom gender 
diversity may affect company financial performance and other board dynamics. 
This is followed by hypothesis development and construction of the conceptual 
framework of this study. Chapter three discusses the methodology of this study 
and presents the most contentious endogeneity issue between female board 
representation and company financial performance. This chapter also describes 
the data and the variables of this study. We then demonstrate the theoretical basis 
and biases of the commonly used estimations in board gender diversity and 
company financial performance study. Chapter four applies the necessary 
diagnostic tests and presents the empirical analysis using various statistical 
techniques that are commonly used in the literature. We conclude this chapter by 
comparing the results from the econometric techniques of this study and 
discussed accordingly. Chapter five concludes this thesis by demonstrating how 
this study contributes to the existing literature, follows by tabulating the limitations 
of this study and suggestion for future study.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Constructions, Literature Reviews, 
And Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Introduction 
There is an increasing number of studies investigating the implications of board 
composition on company performance.  Heterogeneous board composition can be 
distinguished as either observable diversity or unobservable diversity  (Erhardt, 
Werbel, & Shrader, 2003) . Observable diversity includes demographic 
characteristics such as gender, ethnic groups, nationality and age. Unobservable 
diversity relates to cognitive characteristics like knowledge, education, 
qualification, experiences, perspectives and other personal characteristics. This 
study empirically investigates the demographic issue of board gender diversity and 
its implications on company financial performance. The first two sections of this 
chapter provide both theoretical constructs and empirical evidence to evaluate the 
effect of board gender diversity on company financial performance. The final 
section of this chapter will present the conceptual framework of this study that links 
the theoretical constructs and empirical studies to the development of the 
hypotheses that examine the relationship between board gender diversity and 
company financial performance. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework In Corporate Governance and Board 
Gender Diversity 
Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella Jr (2009)  indicate that there are two key 
functions of boards that relate to company performance. Firstly, the board of 
directors is the influential actors in the company that determine the strategic 
direction and decision-making inherent in the structural position. Secondly, boards 
of directors fulfil their monitoring role to the management team which includes 
monitoring proper use of company’s assets and resources, representing 
shareholder to safeguard their investment and response to takeover threats. Prior 
literature on board gender diversity and performance studies also provides some 
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evidence that the increment of female board representation may improve the 
effectiveness of the boards’ strategic direction and efficient monitoring function, 
and consequently have a positive impact on company performance. This study 
takes on this notion and examines the relationship between board gender diversity 
and its implication on company financial performance.  
 
This sub-section presents the theoretical constructs that form the backgrounds 
and arguments for corporate governance in general and more specifically to 
gender diversity in the boardroom. Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) suggest that 
it is necessary to use multiple theories in corporate governance studies to enable 
the understanding of interrelated mechanisms and structure of the gender-boards 
and company performance. Carter e.t al. (2010) indicate that no single theory can 
predict the nature of the relationship between board gender diversity and 
performance and different theories support the relevancy of gender-diverse boards 
and its implications on company financial performance in different ways. Hence, 
this study covers a wide range of theories that relate to corporate board gender 
diversity and its implications on company overall outcomes, and more specifically 
on company financial performance. We present the most commonly used theories 
to evaluate the impacts of gender-diverse boards on company performance. 
These theories are agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980), 
resource dependency theory (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978), human capital theory 
(Becker, 1964), gender differences theory (Gray, 1992) and group effectiveness 
theory (Gladstein, 1984). We also include Kanter’s critical mass theory (1977a) to 
examine the implications of different groupings of the proportion of female 
directors on company performance.  
 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit that the underlying principle of agency theory is 
the potential of conflict of interest between the management team and the 
shareholders, where the management team tends to be self-interested and is likely 
to maximise their benefits at the expense of the shareholders. Therefore, the 
fundamental principle of agency theory suggests that board’s duty is to monitor 
and control the management team of a company with the intention to align any 
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inherent conflicts of interest between owners and management  (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) . The primary goal of the board of directors is to ensure that the 
management team acts in the best interest of the shareholders to reduce agency 
costs. Research shows that companies with strong governance structure have 
minimal agency problems and consequently perform better  (Core, Holthausen, & 
Larcker, 1999) . Hence, good corporate governance is an essential tool in the 
organisational context to mitigate agency problems that arises due to the 
separation of ownership and management control of companies. 
 
Many corporate governance studies in the economics and financial literature 
employ agency theory as the dominant theoretical approach involving the casual 
relationship that links the board characteristics with company financial 
performance  (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2001) . Agency theory (Fama, 1980) is also 
the dominant theoretical approach applied in board gender diversity and 
performance studies (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2001). There are three aspects in 
applying agency theory in board gender diversity studies. Firstly, gender-diverse 
boards improve the monitoring and controlling function of the management team. 
Secondly, the essential characteristic of board gender diversity enhances the 
independent role of the board of directors, in which boards independence is 
perceived as an important characteristic in mitigating agency problems. Thirdly, 
gender diverse boards reduce the opportunistic behaviour of the management 
team by disseminating more accurate information and reduce information 
asymmetry issue.   
 
The monitoring and controlling functions of the board of directors on the 
management team play an important role in mitigating principal-agent conflicts. 
Fama (1980) uses agency theory to link gender diversity with boards’ 
effectiveness in monitoring and controlling the managers to protect shareholders’ 
interest and to minimise the agency costs. Gul et al. (2013)  and Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) also suggest that gender-diverse boards are more efficient in their 
monitoring activities and more demanding on managerial accountability. Both 
studies support the argument that gender-diverse boards in weak-governed 
companies are more effective in monitoring and act as substitute governance in 
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the context of corporate governance   (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Gul, Srinidhi, & 
Ng, 2011) . Adam and Ferreira (2009) suggest that board gender diversity 
improves board inputs and financial outcomes. Their study indicates that gender-
diverse boards improve the attendance behaviour of male directors, CEO turnover 
is more sensitive to stock performance and directors receive more equity-based 
compensation in gender-diverse boards. Nielsen and Huse (2010b) document that 
gender-diverse boards are more efficient in monitoring board processes with 
regards to company strategic decision making and setting policies. Jurkus, Park 
and Woodard (2011) also suggest that companies with a greater proportion of 
female directors present lower agency costs, especially for companies in less 
competitive markets. Based on the ‘captured boards’ hypothesis introduced by 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) the monitoring of female directors reduces a CEO’s 
influence over the non-executive board. This ‘captured boards’ hypothesis 
suggests that companies improve their performance as a consequence of the 
reduction in agency costs.  
 
The independence characteristics of gender-diverse boards reduce the agency 
costs by performing their duties more diligently than directors that are closer to the 
management team (Fama, 1980). Carter et al. (2003) also argue that board 
gender diversity improves board independence because female directors possess 
different perspectives and experiences that encourage them to ask questions that 
do not conform to the traditional insiders-controlled boards. Their study suggests 
that boards with a higher proportion of female directors are more independent than 
boards with lower female representation. Simpson, Carter and D’Souza (2010) 
indicate that female directors are more independent as they usually do come from 
the same background of ‘old-boys’ network with the same kind of characteristics. 
Hence they are more independent and serve as a better monitoring mechanism on 
the management team. Adams, Gray and Nowland (2011) also suggest that 
gender-diverse boards are more independent as they are not affected by the old-
boys’ club syndrome.  
 
In addition to the monitoring and controlling function of the management teams, 
efficient boards also play an essential role in managing information dissemination 
 28 
and integrated reporting between the management team and the shareholder to 
ensure that quality and diligent information are disclosed to shareholders at a 
timely manner. Previous studies suggest that there is a positive link between good 
corporate governance mechanism and companies’ reporting quality  (Beekes & 
Brown, 2006; Christensen, Kent, & Stewart, 2010) . On the other hand, 
management-controlled boards tend to be involved in fraudulent reporting and 
abnormal accruals  (Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart, & Kent, 2005) . Inadequate and 
misleading information to the shareholder will give rise to agency conflicts and 
hence negatively impact on company performance. Gul et al. (2011) suggest that 
gender-diverse boards are effective in managing the flow of information and create 
an affluent information environment that improves public disclosures on stock price 
information. Female directors are also reported to improve earnings quality and 
mitigate earnings management  (Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011) . In this instance, 
efficient boards are able to address the opportunistic behaviour of the 
management team and mitigate the agency conflicts by reducing the information 
asymmetry issue, which in turn improve company stock performance.  
 
Despite that gender-diverse boards are perceived as independent and effective 
monitoring mechanism of the management’s activity, female directors are usually 
a minority in the board of directors. In this instance, if female directors are being 
marginalised by the majority of male directors, their input may not be fully 
considered as in-group discussions (Carter et al., 2003). Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) term the marginalisation of female directors as tokenism and the influence 
of the token directors on decision-making is low. Board gender diversity may not 
necessarily enhance board monitoring if female directors are being marginalised. 
 
Although board gender diversity has a positive impact on company financial 
performance due to the efficient monitoring and effective controlling role, board 
gender diversity can be detrimental to company financial performance if there is 
unnecessary over-monitoring (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). The improvement in 
company financial performance from the monitoring and controlling functions of 
gender-diverse boards is contingent upon the quality of the company’s 
governance. In well govern companies, over-monitoring and excessive control 
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from gender-diverse boards can lead to decrease in company financial 
performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). They argue that strong corporate 
governance can lead to a breakdown in effective communication between boards 
and managers and may consequently decrease shareholder value   (Almazan & 
Suarez, 2003) . Furthermore, gender-diverse boards may create more conflicts 
because of disagreement during meetings and differences in opinion  (Wellalage & 
Locke, 2013) . Wellalage and Locke (2013) show a significant negative 
relationship between gender-diverse boards and company value along with an 
increase in company’s agency costs and suggest that more time and efforts are 
required to resolve the board conflicts in gender-diverse boards.    
 
In addition, the studies on the implications of boards independence and 
performance are not conclusive. Ammari, Kadria and Ellouze  (2014) and 
Christensen, Kent and Stewart  (2010)  suggest that the independence of boards 
has negative correlation with company performance, while other studies show that 
the independence of boards has no implication on companies performance   
(Charles, Redor, & Zopounidis, 2015; Pham, Suchard, & Zein, 2011; Wintoki et al., 
2012) . Monks and Minow (2011) argue that equity ownership plays a more critical 
role in monitoring the management team than the independence of the boards. 
Although there is a belief that gender-diverse boards are more effective in the 
monitoring role and increase the independence of boards and consequently 
improve company financial performance, agency theory does not provide a clear 
prediction of direction or explanation of any causal relationship between these two 
variables. Carter et al. (2003) support the over reliance of agency theory in board 
gender diversity studies and suggest that there is no clear linkage between board 
diversity and company financial performance from an agency theory perspective. 
Although Hermalin and Weisbach  (2001)  agree that principal-agent principle 
provides many insights from the monitoring role, and independence of boards’ 
function, agency theory is not particularly applicable in board-specific phenomena 
and there is no clear prediction of the relationship between board gender diversity 
and performance. The dominant use of agency theory as the premise for 
investigating the relationship between board gender diversity and performance has 
resulted in conflicting findings  (Ben-Amar, Francoeur, Hafsi, & Labelle, 2013) . 
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2.2.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
The dominant use of agency theory may cause conflicting findings in the diversity-
performance study. Carter et al. (2010) argue that resource dependence theory 
provides a more convincing business case for board diversity. Resource 
dependence theory is developed by Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) who indicate that 
companies operate in an open system in which the success and survival of the 
business is dependent on the external environment and resources. The 
proponents of resource dependence theory suggest that boards of directors 
provide an important link between a company and its resources and environmental 
dependencies. For example, Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) indicate that boards of 
directors provide four essential resources to companies. These resources are: 
directors provide useful information to facilitate company’s strategic decision-
making process; directors act as an important channel for communication to 
external parties; directors establish network and connection with other companies 
and institutions, and directors also help to legitimise the companies. From the 
social network viewpoint, directors are classified into insiders, business experts, 
support specialists and community influential role  (Hillman, Shropshire, & 
Cannella Jr., 2007)  . Hillman et al. (2007) define insiders as current or retired 
employees of the company; business experts are executives and officers of other 
public companies; support specialists are professionals in law firms, banking 
industry, accounting and consulting firms; community influential are leaders in 
academia, government department and non-profit organisations.  As different 
directors provide access to different resources for a company, gender-diverse 
boards expand the profiles of the boards and create possible links with critical 
internal and external resources. Gender-diverse boards also improve the 
relationship between the companies with its customers, suppliers and competitors, 
enhance the board’s knowledge to the industry and access to the availability of 
finances and other external resources that benefit a company compared to boards 
with all male director.   
 
The function of the boards is to provide a linkage between the company and the 
external environment in order to create economic benefits  (Pfeffer, 1972). Hence, 
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boards are required to attain a mix of skill sets, knowledge, experience and 
expertise in various areas to create a competitive advantageous environment for 
the organization  (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella Jr., 2007; Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003). Given the advantages of board diversity, numerous studies that have 
evolved from the resource dependency theory and conclude that heterogeneous 
boards enhance the value of companies by creating a competitive advantage 
environment within the board of directors. Erhardt, Werbel and Shareder (2003) 
suggest that heterogeneity in board composition leads to better decision-making 
due to a more excellent knowledge base and innovation. This leads to competitive 
advantage for the organisation. Chen and Tjosvold (2013) also suggest that 
cognitive conflicts in diverse group discussions create innovative solutions. High 
quality decision-making process influences the governance outcomes positively 
and consequently positively affects the companies’ financial performance.  
 
With reference to the four essential resources as mentioned by Pfeffer and 
Salancik (2003), female directors with different perspectives, skills, knowledge, 
experiences and behaviour will bring different beneficial resources and useful 
information to the company. These critical and unique resources of female 
directors can be different from their opposite counterpart especially in diverse 
environments and useful to deal with market uncertainty. The additional resources 
that female directors bring to the boards may facilitate boards’ decision-making 
process and open up opportunities for companies to penetrate markets more 
effectively. Geiger and Marlin (2012)suggest that gender-diverse boards enhance 
overall board expertise and improve the companies’ linkages with external 
environment and resources. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) also suggest that the 
boards of directors also act as a channel for communication between the company 
and the external parties to establish network and connection with other companies 
and institutions. As important information is transferred between companies or 
external institutions through boards of directors, gender-diverse boards are 
beneficial in obtaining and communicating information between external 
resources, stakeholders and the internal management  (Hillman et al., 2007).   
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In view of the benefits of heterogeneity boards, female directors in gender-diverse 
boards bring to the table important skills, various perspectives of life and 
knowledge and a different set of competencies and behaviours that contribute to 
better board discussions and processes. Differences in traits of directors imply that 
the directors will behave differently and this will have implications on how directors 
interact with each another, their risk appetite and level of ethical concerns. Female 
directors are found to set a higher ethical value relative to personal interest in the 
decision-making process  (Bart & McQueen, 2013) . The dynamic of 
heterogeneous boards’ discussions and processes will change as female board 
representation increases.  
 
Robinson and Dechant (1997) also suggest that workplace diversity improves the 
competitive advantage of a company. They propose four propositions that support 
diversity as enhancing companies’ value. First, more diverse companies are able 
to capture the change in diverse demographics and penetrate potential markets. 
Second, diverse companies are more creative and innovative. Third, diverse 
companies allow more perspectives to be evaluated during the decision-making 
process, which enhances problem solving. Fourth, diverse companies have more 
global perspectives and are more sensitive to differences in international 
environment. As gender diversity is one of the attributes concerning the general 
demographic diversity, it also indicates that gender-diverse boards also can 
improve companies’ competitive advantage and financial performance that is 
especially critical in the current global and diverse economy. 
 
To enhance the competitive advance of a company and penetrate the diverse 
demographic of the market, Mclnerney-Lacombe, Bilimoria and Salipante (2008) 
indicate that female directors are usually the agent of change in a corporate 
environment. Female directors tend to be younger than male directors and are 
more open to new concepts and ideas when dealing with business. They also tend 
to create unique links between the company’s strategy and to the labour and 
product markets. This leads to more creative and innovative board decisions 
where creative and innovative companies tend to outperform other competitors. 
McInerney-Lacombe et al. (2008)  also suggest that female directors positively 
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influence the board dynamics by changing the boards’ communication and 
interpersonal interaction. This improves boards’ creative and innovative decision-
making and consequently leads to better company financial performance.  
 
Gender-diverse boards are able to maximize the benefit from the mix of skills in 
their decision making process. Companies face a serious loss if they do not 
capitalise on the pool of female’s talent in gaining competitive advantage. Kiel and 
Nicholson (2003) term this mix of skill set as the intellectual capital theory. The 
effective integration of skill and knowledge is the major determinant of value-add 
that gender-diverse boards bring to the companies  (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003) . 
Diverse boards are able to improve information flow to managers, produce unique 
information in the decision-making process and provide access to important 
constituencies for external environment linkage (Carter et al., 2010). This also 
indicates that gender-diverse boards are more likely to have a pool of diverse 
talent from the human capital theory perspective. Overall resource dependence 
theory supports the notion that board gender diversity improves overall company 
financial performance by utilising the essential internal and external resources.   
 
2.2.3 Human Capital Theory  
The human capital study of Becker (1964)  reveals that the enhanced cognitive 
and productive abilities of each individual’s cumulative education, skills and 
experiences benefit the organisation human intellectual property. The board of 
directors consists of a group of highly capable people who possess a broad range 
of knowledge, experiences, skills and values. The cognitive and productive 
abilities of the directors allow them to seek and interpret information that 
influences the effectiveness of board decision-making and processes, and 
ultimately influences overall company performance.  
  
In the general population, the recent statistics in Europe and the U.S. shows that 
females outperform males in university graduates and the employment rates of 
young females exceed the older generation 12 . In Australia, the proportion of                                                         
12 Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2012). Current employment statistics. http://www.bls.gov/ces. 
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females who attained a bachelor degree or higher is 39.6% compared to the 
proportion of male graduates at 30.4% (WGEA, 2018).  In relation to board gender 
diversity, Singh, Terjesen and Vinnicombe (2008) in their study reaffirm these 
statistics and conclude that female directors of FTSE 100 firms in the UK are more 
likely to have an MBA degree with international experience. These statistics 
suggest that females have attained a similar level of education as to their male 
counterparts and are able to contribute their knowledge into the workforce. 
Simons, Pelled and Smith (1999)  support the educational attainment of 
management teams, and agree that cognitive diversity has positive implications on 
company financial performance.  
 
Farrell and Hersch (2005) suggest that female directors with their increase 
cognitive and educational attainment level provide diverse perspectives and 
engage in more productive discussions. With their different experience and values 
in life, they ask different sets of questions and contribute positively to overall group 
performance. The dynamic interaction in the gender-diverse boards offers diverse 
perspectives in understanding and dealing with a complex business environment 
as well as to solve specific problems. This allows the diverse board to be more 
effective in the board decision-making process  (Nielsen & Huse, 2010a)  . 
 
Despite cumulative educational attainment enhancing the cognitive level of each 
individual; the cognitive and productive abilities of each director differ depending 
on their experiences, skills and values  (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996; Hambrick, 
2007; Hsu, Kuo, & Chang, 2016) . Hillman and Daiziel (2003)  suggest that high 
educational level of female directors provides additional human capital, which is 
regarded as relevant business assets to a company. Terjesen et al. (2009)  
indicate that different genders bring in unique human capital onto corporate 
boards. However, they also indicate that there could be a negative impact for 
gender-diverse boards because females may not possess the similar corporate 
experience to men even though they are compatible with men from education 
qualification perspective. They argue that although females have developed 
impressive human capital, they may not have the “right” kind of human capital that 
fits in to be a director of a company due to lack of business experience. Simpson 
 35 
et al. (2010)  also support this argument indicating that female directors are less 
likely to have a strong background in business management than men and do not 
have sufficient experience in the high-level business positions. Although this prior 
literature suggests that human capital theory supports female directors add value 
to boards’ human capital, however if females do not possess appropriate 
experiences and exposures as required to be board ready, it could limit female 
advancement to corporate boards and may have negative impacts on company 
financial performance.  
 
Another stream of literature suggests that higher levels of education and academic 
attainment of female directors lead to emotional conflicts in board decision-making 
processes that may negatively affect company financial performance (Arena et al., 
2015; Smith, Smith, & Verner, 2006) . Petrovic (2008) suggests that female 
directors who possess higher education levels with relevant skills and experiences 
are more likely to impose their ideas that lead to relationship conflict in board 
discussions. Lau and Murnighan (1998) also indicate that although gender-diverse 
boards improve critical thinking of boards, it may cause decision making to be less 
effective as the decision-making process is slower due to conflict of opinion in 
gender-diverse boards. The conflicts and disagreement in board discussion can 
cause tension and annoyance among board members that lead to ineffective 
board processes and negatively impact company financial performance(Arena et 
al., 2015). The costs of resolving conflicts and getting consensus in the boards are 
generally value destructive and outweigh the benefits  (H. Nguyen & Faff, 2007) . 
This will lead to ineffective board discussions and consequently negatively impact 
the overall performance.  
 
2.2.4 Gender Differences Theory 
This study applies the famous quote from Gray (1992) “Men are from Mars and 
Women are from Venus” and recognises that males and females are different in 
their behaviour and leadership role, as there exist gender differences between 
them. Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, & Van Engen (2003) identify the leadership 
role of men as argentic characteristics and women as communal characteristics. 
Male leaders with argentic attributes are more assertive, aggressive and self-
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confident. Whereas female leaders with communal attributes are more concern 
with the welfare of other stakeholders, speak tentatively, more democratic and 
participative, less autocratic and directive in the workplace (Eagly et al., 2003) . In 
relation to female board representation, this theory implies that female directors 
with different experiences in working and non-working lives behave differently than 
their counterparts. These intrinsic characteristics of female directors add-value to 
the male-dominated boards by offering different perspectives. Furthermore, 
diverse boards are more effective in handling a variety of different natured tasks  
(Eagly, Karau, & Makhijani, 1995) . The different skills of female directors facilitate 
the board tasks in diverse areas and enable the board to understand the 
marketplace from a broader perspective. Furthermore, the differences in values 
and cognitive between genders may also influence the decision-making process 
and how decision are made. Van Ginkel and Van Knippenberg (2008) 
demonstrate that gender-diverse groups engage in more in-depth discussion 
compared to the boards with all male groups. Adams and Funk (2011) also 
suggest that more collaboration among directors in gender-diverse boards to 
extensively discuss and integrate information in the decision making process. 
However, a study by Yukl (2002) reveals that there are no overall differences in 
effectiveness between males and females although they do have some differences 
in skills set and behave differently in some situations. 
 
For the risk-taking perspective, it is a general consensus in psychology and 
economics studies suggesting that females are more risk adverse than males. In a 
meta-analysis of 150 studies, Byrnes, Miller and Schafer (1999) exhibit that 
females make a less risky choice than males and are less likely to involve in risky 
experiment and gambling. Females also make a more conservative choice in 
investment decision   (Bernasek & Shwiff, 2001) .  However, the samples of these 
two studies are based on the risk-taking attitude of the general population. 
Deaves, Lüders, & Luo  (2009) in a study uses a sample of students from 
economic, finance and business studies, indicate that females who involve in male 
discipline can be different from the general population. This study finds that the 
confidence level of female students is similar to male students, indicating that 
females who expose to similar education and experience background are not less 
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confident than males. In this context, female directors in the corporate 
environment can also adapt to the male-dominated environment. This is 
demonstrated in Admas and Funk’s  (2011) study, suggesting that female directors 
are more risk-taking than male directors once they break through the glass ceiling 
in the corporate environment. Therefore, having female directors on boards does 
not necessarily lead to more risk-adverse decision-making. Using more advance 
econometric techniques to address the endogeneity concern in board gender 
diversity studies, Sila, Gonzalez and Hagendorff (2016) find no evidence that 
female board representation affects the company equity risk.  Powell (1990) also 
suggest that gender difference is minimal at top-level management settings 
believes that females who pursue the non-traditional high-level career at board 
level have values and leadership styles that are similar to male counterparts, 
rejecting feminine stereotyping. This is supported by Kanter’s (1977b) 
organisational behaviour arguments, suggesting that males and females at the 
same organisational level behave very similarly. On the contrary, Post and Byron  
(2015)  in their meta-analysis of 140 studies suggest that female directors are 
more risk adverse than male counterparts and geared towards more sustainable 
investment. With these two contradictory arguments, if there exist general 
differences in risk behaviour between the genders when boards comprise of mixed 
of male and female directors, it could be the board gender composition that affects 
the risk-taking behaviour of the company.  
 
2.2.5 Group Effectiveness Theory 
Group effectiveness theory suggests that boards with a particular composition may 
be more effective compared to other boards as different nature of tasks required a 
different mix of talents (Gladstein, 1984). Similarly, in the context of boards of 
directors, board’s gender composition affects group effectiveness. Nielson and 
Huse (2010a) in their study find that in the context of female directors’ 
contributions to corporate boards, critical decision-making based on the interaction 
and exchange of information are critical attributes to board effectiveness. Studies 
in the diversity of perspectives also suggest that heterogeneous boards are more 
effective than homogenous boards in implementing changes and solving problems  
(Bantel & Jackson, 1989) . This suggests that board gender diversity with the 
 38 
different personality and human capital resources improves the perspectives in 
decision-making, increases networking boundary and creativity. A panel study 
from 1992 to 2006 of Fortune 1500 companies suggests that by adding a female 
to the top management team improve companies’ Tobin Q and share price  
(Dezsö & Ross, 2012) . However, the positive implications of gender-diverse 
boards on board effectiveness can potentially have disadvantages when the 
heterogeneous boards take longer and more effort to come to consensus. A study 
by Earley and Mosakowski (2000) suggest that boards with all male directors are 
more cooperative as there is less emotional conflict within the group. Wellalage 
and Locke (2013) also find a negative impact of gender-diverse boards on 
company value due to boardroom conflicts that required more time and effort in 
getting agreement on company strategic decision-making. This slows 
responsiveness and delays actions needed to react to competitors initiative in a 
highly competitive environment  (Hambrick et al., 1996) . 
 
2.2.6 Tokenism And Critical Mass Theory 
The theory of tokenism was initiated by Kanter’s ground-breaking seminal work 
(Kanter, 1977a) and it underpins the concept of critical mass theory in the board 
gender diversity literature. Kanter develops tokenism and critical mass theory in 
organisation behaviour concerning organisation power structure, the opportunity 
for advancement and more importantly the relative numbers of a social group 
according to the observable characteristics, either gender or race. She describes 
her study as an ethnography of a corporation that dissects the corporate life in 
details. She indicates that organisations are dominated by masculine principles. 
This phenomenon produces organisational contexts that are gendered with an 
implication of the token member, generally female in context and is found to be 
dysfunctional in the organisation.  
 
A token in the board gender diversity context refers to the single female director 
that is treated as the representation of their category. Kanter indicates that the 
sole representation of a female on top management and board level as “tokens”, 
and to some extent as “solos” in the extreme cases (Kanter, 1977b). The 
contribution of the token female director is usually limited as she is denied from full 
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participation on decision-making. In some cases, the appointment of token female 
directors is to comply with the legislative requirements on gender quotas. Applying 
this to the top management of the corporations, the tokenism dysfunction of an 
organisation affects the practices, norms and values that shape the low 
representation of females on boards. The example of tokenism is demonstrated in 
the failing of Enron’s case where the annual report of Enron in 1998 showed that 
there is only one female director sitting on the board that consists of seventeen 
directors. In this instance, the impact of the token female director that can 
contribute to the board’s oversight function can be minimal (Erhardt et al., 2003). 
 
Kanter notes that the image distortion that leads to the sex-role stereotype of 
female leaders is inconsistent with general perception. She explained that females 
in organisations usually possess lower ranked position with fewer opportunities.  
Based on her study of behavioural consequences of power and opportunity 
structure, she found that males in lower power and low opportunity positions 
behave like females in the similar or same ranking and position. The general 
perception argues that females are being identified as communal rather than 
possessing the qualities of leadership. However, Kanter argues that it is the 
structure, not the gender that explains the difference.  
 
Kanter’s theory evolved from the classical analysis of absolute numbers and 
developed the critical mass theory concerning the importance of relative numbers. 
She argues that a “significant” proportion of female representation has to be 
reached in order to make their voice heard and make a difference in decision-
making on boards. She constructed four categories of the group with the basis of 
relative numbers based on the composition of male and female representation of 
the group. These groups are: 
 
i. Uniform groups – Homogenous groups where the members of this 
category share the same characteristic, e.g., boards that consist of all 
male directors.  
ii. Skewed groups – Groups with a minority of less than twenty percent. 
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iii. Tilted groups – Groups consist of at least twenty percent minority but 
less than forty percent. 
iv. Balanced groups – Groups consist of at least forty percent of the 
minority. 
(Note: In board gender diversity studies, the minority refers to female 
directors) 
 
Among all the groups as mentioned above, skewed groups are perceived as the 
problematic groups because the minority, female directors in board gender-
diversity scenario, are identified as token and prone to be stereotyped by the 
male-dominated groups  (Joecks et al., 2013; Kanter, 1977b). The token female 
director or the minority female directors in the male-dominated boards are unable 
to express their views to influence the group discussion. When the minority in the 
skewed groups increased in the relative proportion toward tilted groups and 
balanced groups, their presence is identified as a distinct group   (Torchia, 
Calabrò, & Huse, 2011) .  The representation of the minority in tilted groups and 
balanced groups are able to bring in their knowledge, skills, values and 
perspectives to contribute to the group discussions and improve the effectiveness 
of board strategic formulation and processes.   
 
However, the question remains on what is the effective number or proportion of 
female representation on boards to make a difference; even it is still a minority in 
the group. Extending from this tokenism theory, Kristie (2011) posits that “one is a 
token, two is a presence and three is a voice”. Konrald et al. (2008)  also support 
this quote and indicate that the magic number of three seems to gain more 
momentum in board decision-making, and female directors are no longer to be 
seen as outsiders. Based on this critical mass theory, previous empirical studies 
suggest that the critical mass of female directors is reached when there are at 
least three female directors on boards  (Erkut, Kramer, & Konrad, 2008; Konrald et 
al., 2008) . Dahlerup (1988)  indicates that thirty percent is the relevant 
representation for the minority group to make a difference. Torchia et al. (2011) 
also suggest a positive and significant relationship between the critical mass of 
female directors and company innovation and board strategic tasks performance 
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when there are at least three female directors on boards. Campbell and Mínguez-
Vera (2008) also found a positive effect between the critical mass of the proportion 
of female directors and company financial performance. However, their study 
shows that the presence of one or two female directors on boards has an 
insignificant impact on company financial performance.  
  
Joecks et al. (2013) examine the relationship between gender diversity and 
company financial performance using critical mass theory. Their study suggests 
that gender diversity has a negative impact on company’s return on equity before 
a critical mass of thirty percent of female directorship has been reached. Once the 
female representation passes this critical level, increase in gender diversity level is 
associated with higher company performance. They suggest a U-shape 
relationship between gender diversity and performance.   
 
Drawing from tokenism and critical mass theory, it indicates that boards need to 
achieve a “significant” proportion of female board representation, that is “the 
critical mass” of female directors on boards, in order to have more pronounced 
impacts on company financial performance. Without the critical mass of female 
board representation, female directors’ contribution is limited by being the token on 
boards. The dominant-male groups on boards will marginalise their inputs, 
consequently diminishing the impact of gender-diverse boards on company 
financial performance.  
 
2.3 Literature Reviews  
In a rational economic environment, companies are expected to maintain good 
financial and market performance within the going concern principle and to 
maximise the stakeholders’ expectations. Many positive relationships between 
board gender diversity and company financial performance have been posited in 
the popular press13. The Council in its 2010 Corporate Governance Practices and 
Recommendations state that “Research has shown that increased gender diversity 
on boards is associated with better financial performance, and that improves                                                         
13  ASX 500 - women leaders. (2011). Retrieved from http://www.reibeyinstitute.org.au/research/research/  
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workforce participation at all levels and positively impacts the economy”. However, 
these claims have not been supported conclusively in academic studies. Previous 
empirical studies suggest mixed evidence between female’s participation on 
corporate boards and company financial performance, including assertions of 
positive correlations between board gender diversity and company financial 
performance  (Bonn, 2004; Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Francoeur, 
Labelle, & Sinclair-Desgagn, 2008; H. Nguyen & Faff, 2007; Ntim, 2015) , negative 
correlations  (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Bøhren & Strøm, 
2010)  or no significant relationships  (Carter et al., 2010; Dezsö & Ross, 2012; 
Rose, 2007)  of gender-diverse boards on performance. 
 
Four main reasons contribute to diverse conclusions of previous studies. First, 
data drawn from different cultures operating in different jurisdictions and 
institutional contexts prevents consistent research findings. Depending on legal 
provisions in different countries, a two-tier corporate governance system allows 
separation of board tasks and roles between management board and supervisory 
board 14 . In comparison, the board of directors in a single-tier corporate 
governance system determines corporate strategy unitarily 15 . The impact of 
gender diversity on company financial performance depends on the type of board 
governance. Adam and Ferreira (2009) argue that in well-govern boards, over-
monitoring from gender-diverse boards leads to counter-productivity and hinders 
effective decision-making. The findings of previous diversity-performance studies 
may vary due to differences in regulatory requirements, governance structures and 
economic climate. 
  
Second, studies examining corporate governance characteristics and performance 
are plagued with endogeneity issues (Bota-Avram, 2013). The relationship 
between gender diversity and company financial performance appears to be jointly 
endogenous  (Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010). It is difficult to control 
the reverse causality between these variables and the possibility of omitted 
variables in any structural models. Furthermore, applying a valid external                                                         
14 Examples of countries that practice two-tier corporate governance system are Germany, Norway, Finland, the 
Netherlands and China. 
15 Examples of countries that practice single-tier corporate governance system are the U.S., the U.K., and Australia. 
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instrumental variable required to fulfil two fundamental conditions, which is 
challenging to ascertain the validity and relevancy of the external instrumental 
variable.   A relevant external instrumental variable needs to be correlated with the 
problematic explanatory variable whilst at the same time needs to be uncorrelated 
to the error terms of the dependent variable. Finding a valid external instrumental 
variable is a challenging task. The existence of the endogeneity problem can lead 
to unreliable findings if the issue is not being addressed appropriately. The 
methodology section in chapter three of this study provides further elaboration on 
the endogeneity issue and present various econometric methods available to deal 
with this concern.  
 
Third, various measurements of diversity and performance using different time-
frames may also explain the conflicting results. Proxies to measure gender 
diversity include the presence of females on boards, proportion of female directors 
and Blau’s diversity index (Sampson, 1984). Performance measures comprise 
common accounting performance, return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE), and market measures such as book-to-market value, Tobin’s Q and market 
capitalisation. Moreover, focusing on short-term measures of performance may not 
capture the impact of gender diversity. Lack of long-term analysis and the 
understanding of the implications of gender diversity may result in unsustainable 
policy implementation. For example, studies using cross-sectional data, focusing 
at one or two points in time, suggest that gender-diverse boards out-performed 
homogeneous boards (Carter et al., 2010; Erhardt et al., 2003). While studies 
using panel data over a period of time generally show no implication or negative 
effects of having more female representation on boards (Farrell & Hersch, 2005; 
Rhode & Packel, 2014; Rose, 2007; Smith et al., 2006) . This suggests that 
examining the effect of female on boards based on cross -data can be spurious, 
meaning that there exists a self-selection bias where successful companies tend 
to appoint more females onto their boards  (Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Ryan & 
Haslam, 2005) .  
 
Finally, applying different statistical methods in analysing the relationship between 
the corporate governance characteristics and company financial performance has 
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also led to inconclusive findings in previous studies. Previous literature in the 
gender diversity and corporate governance studies generally apply ordinary least 
square method, fixed effect estimation, the two-stage-least-square method with 
instrumental analysis and lately generalised method of moments analysis in 
examining the relationship between board diversity and performance. Depending 
on the statistical method used in the literature, the results may vary and are not 
consistent throughout each method.   
 
This following section reviews the previous empirical literature that examines the 
relationship between gender-diverse boards and the company performance. We 
categorise the studies into three main streams; studies that support gender-
diverse boards with positive implications, studies that suggest a negative 
correlation between gender-diverse boards and company performance and studies 
that do not support either positive or negative implications of having gender-
diverse boards on company performance.  
 
2.3.1 Studies Supporting Gender Diversity And Company Performance 
Media and supporters of boards’ gender diversity often cite Catalyst (2007) and 
McKinsey (2007) reports despite the statistical shortcoming in these studies. 
Catalyst (2007) examines US’s Fortune 500 company financial performance and 
ranks the companies according to the proportion of female directors on boards. 
The results from the univariate analysis of the sample indicate that the companies 
in the highest quartile performed better than the lowest quartile in return on equity 
(ROE), return on sales (ROS) and return on invested capital (ROIC). McKinsey 
Report (2007) comprising two studies, a qualitative study that surveys 115,000 
employees to inquire if companies with women in top management perform better 
than companies without women in top management; and a quantitative study on 
89 European listed companies with the best diversity score against the industry 
average. The quantitative study contained in the McKinsey Report (2007) shows 
that more diverse companies performed better in terms of ROE and operating 
results, earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) against the average of their 
industry. However, both studies compare the means of the study groups without 
taking into consideration other control variables. Therefore, it is unable to 
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empirically show the correlation between female board representation and 
company financial performance or be able to imply if there is any causal 
relationship. Both studies also did not report if there is any significant test being 
carried out on the differences of the means of the sample. Furthermore, 
McKinsey’s Report (2007) also suffers from sample selection bias as the sample is 
based on The Amazon Euro Fund’s criteria, the funding organisation in the study.  
 
In academia, early empirical evidence of the positive relationship between board 
diversity and company financial performance is provided by Carter et al.  (2003) 
and Erhardt et al. (2003) .  Carter et al. (2003) studied Fortune 1000 companies 
and find a significant positive relationship between percentage of females on 
boards and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. Erhardt et al.  (2003)  studied a 
smaller sample of the 127 largest US companies from 1993 to 2002 and find a 
positive association between gender-diverse boards and performance measured 
in ROA and ROI. Erhart et al. (2003) suggest that the improved company financial 
performancefor gender-diverse boards is associated with effectiveness in the 
oversight function of the boards where gender-diverse boards offer a broader 
range of opinions. This is consistent with the agency theory suggesting that 
effective monitoring function of gender-diverse boards on the management team 
that leads to the improvement of company financial performance.  
 
In line with resource dependence theory, prior literature also suggests that board 
gender diversity improves market competitive advantage. Female directors provide 
an essential link between the company and its external environment that facilitate 
the company in securing critical resources and enhance market valuation  
(Francoeur et al., 2008; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; Ntim, 2015). Richard (2000) 
supports the essential link of gender-diverse boards with internal and external 
resources. He suggests that board gender diversity encourages workforce 
diversity; especially talented female employees; and enhances company 
competitive advantages with innovation and board effectiveness that leads to 
better company performance. Miller and Triana (2009) also demonstrate that 
gender-diverse boards enhance company’s good reputation and improved 
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innovation. These are the mediators that positively affect company financial 
performance.  
 
In Australia, there are few studies that examine the relationship between gender-
diverse boards and performance. Bonn (2004) examines manufacturing 
companies from 1999 to 2003 and suggests that although the average females 
representation on boards is lower than five percent during the study period, the 
ratio of female directors is positively associated with company performance, 
measured in return on equity and market-to-book ratio. They argue that because 
the selection criteria are more stringent for females to join the boards, female 
directors possess exceptional attributes and qualifications that significantly affect 
the company financial performance in a positive way. Nguyen and Faff (2007) 
examine the top 500 public listed companies in Australia from 2000 to 2001 and 
suggest that both the presence of female directors on boards and the proportion of 
female directors on boards promote shareholders’ value and it is associated with a 
higher market value of the company. However, They suggest that board gender 
diversity should be promoted as a common corporate governance practice. An 
important point to consider in these two studies is the application of OLS 
estimation in examining the correlation between board gender diversity and 
company performance. Bonn (2004) uses simple regression analysis without 
taking into consideration the endogeneity concern in the diversity-performance 
study. Nguyen and Faff (2007) attempt to address the endogeneity concern using 
2SLS estimation. However, the results from OLS and 2SLS estimations are highly 
similar, and they suggest that the OLS estimations are not affected by the 
endogeneity issue.  It is plausible that the positive correlation between female 
representation on boards and company financial performance can be a reliable 
inference in explaining the causality relationship, as both board gender diversity 
and company financial performance are endogenously determined  (Carter et al., 
2003; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Martin-Ugedo & Minguez-Vera, 2014) .   
 
The most recent study of the relationship between gender diversity and 
performance in the Australian context is by Strydom, Au Yong and Rankin (2017). 
They draw from Kanter’s critical mass theory (Kanter, 1977a) and suggest that all-
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male and skewed boards have a lower earnings quality compared to more 
balanced boards that are comprised of at least twenty percent of female directors. 
This result is consistent with Joecks et al. (2013), where they suggest that female 
directors have limited opportunity to affect company financial performance until the 
critical mass of thirty percent of female board representation is achieved. The 
critical mass of female directors on boards breaks through the acceptance barrier 
on boards and creates a more supportive atmosphere, consequently increasing 
collaboration among the board members and positively impacts the dynamics in 
the boardroom. Their observations also reveals that female directors are superior 
monitors that constrain earnings management on financial reporting, leading to 
improved earning quality and lower stock price volatility.   
 
Campbell & Mínguez-Vera (2008) use the sample of Spanish non-financial listed 
companies in their study and show a positive effect of percentage of females on 
boards on companies’ value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Consistent with resource 
dependence theory, they argue that gender-diverse boards are more creative and 
innovative as the diverse boards provide a wider spectrum of perspectives and 
wider range of knowledge and skills. The image of gender-diverse boards has 
positive impacts on customer behaviour, and this enhances competitive advantage 
and sets a strong foundation of a company in the marketplace  (Campbell & 
Mínguez-Vera, 2008) . They also suggest that gender-diverse boards are more 
effective in their monitoring role and improve company performance. However, this 
study indicates that merely examining the presence of females on boards has an 
insignificant impact on the company financial performance. It is rather the relative 
proportion of female directors on boards has a positive impact on company 
financial performance. Another study by Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2010) 
examines the market reaction on the appointment of female directors and found 
that the share price movement is positively correlated to the announcement of the 
appointments of female directors. This implies that investors do not penalise 
companies with increased female board representation. They further indicate that 
the economic gains and the reaction of the overall market for gender-diverse 
boards were sustained over a period of time. They suggest that the legislative 
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change in Spain makes economic sense and assists females’ advancement to 
board level. 
 
Reguera-Alvarado, Fuentes and Laffarga (2017) study the most recent 
development of board gender diversity in Spain after the implementation of 
mandatory gender quotas on boards in 2015. They suggest that the mandatory 
laws in Spain on board gender diversity have improved the appointment of female 
directors on boards and the increment of female board representation is positively 
correlated to higher economic results. Gender-diverse boards open up the board 
dynamics with new ideas and skills from different perspectives that lead to the 
increase in company values, consistent with resource dependence theory. The 
positive correlation between female board representation and company financial 
performance is in-line with Martin-Ugedo and Minguez-Vera (2014) study that 
examine Spanish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from 2003 to 2008. 
This study also suggests that gender diversity and performance is endogenously 
determined where females tend to serve in better-performing companies and 
companies with higher performance are more likely to add females to the board  
(Farrell & Hersch, 2005) .   
 
A recent study based on a US sample of 3000 companies from 2007 to 2014 by 
Conyon and He (2017) suggest that the presence of female directors on boards 
has a positive effect on company performance. Applying threat-rigidity and job 
sorting and matching theories, this study argues that gender diversity is not 
constant across the performance distribution. The results from the quantile 
regression methods show that the positive impact of female directors on boards is 
larger in high-performing companies relative to low-performing companies. They 
argue this is due to the threat posed by declining performance in low-performing 
companies as suggested by threat-rigidity theory, the unique perspectives and 
experiences of female directors are less likely to be utilised as there is a strong 
pressure toward uniformity of ideas and opposition to expression of directors 
opinion. On the other hand, there is less pressure to suppress ideas of female 
directors in well-performed companies and consequently better utilisation of their 
knowledge, expertise and perspectives.    
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Gender-diverse boards also demonstrate more effective risk monitoring and 
dealing with unstable economic conditions during a crisis. Adams and Ragunathan 
(2017) study large publicly traded US banks and find that banks with more diverse 
boards have better financial performance especially in crisis situations. They 
suggest that females in finance careers have the same average level of risk-
aversion as males, and more gender diversity is not necessarily associated with 
less risk.  The study shows that the listed banks with more gender-diverse boards 
did not engage in fewer risk-taking activities around the crisis. This indicates that 
generalisation of gender differences with their preference risk-profile with the 
general population to the top management level can be stereotyping. They 
attribute the banks with gender-diverse boards perform better than other banks, as 
male directors in the gender-diverse boards have fewer attendance problems and 
female directors performed different committee duties on boards compared to 
male directors.   
 
Sabatier (2015)  examines French companies listed on the CAC40 index and 
suggests that board gender diversity is not an exogenous variable. It strongly 
depends on firm attributes where the number of board directors is negatively 
correlated with board gender diversity. This study also finds that board gender 
diversity is strongly influenced by companies’ previous gender diversity and 
gender diversity in connected boards. The increased in the appointment of female 
directors during 2008 to 2012 contributed to better company financial 
performance, measure in ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, companies that 
promote gender diversity reduce company inefficiencies and approach their 
optimal performance level. The data of this study does not show the risk of 
tokenism of female directors because most of the observed companies have 
exceeded the critical threshold of three female directors on boards.  
 
In line with the improvement of overall company financial performance and public 
confidence from the increment of female board representation, investors also react 
positively to the appointment of female directors and perceive that gender-diverse 
boards add value to the overall governance structure.  Gordini and Rancati (2017)  
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study of public listed companies in Italy from 2011 to 2014 supports the argument 
that the greater gender diversity on boards generates economic gains and does 
not destroy shareholders’ value. They suggest that companies should focus on the 
right mix of male and female directors and demonstrate that simply appointing one 
female to show the presence of the female on boards has no significant effect on 
company performance. Kang, Ding and Charoenwong (2010)  suggest that 
companies with good business and corporate reputations have a lower cost of 
debt and this has a positive effect on the profitability of the company. They 
suggest that investors respond positively to the appointment of female directors 
and are more receptive when the female directors are independent directors in 
Singapore companies. 
 
Public perception of company image and good corporate governance in place is a 
topical debate in the current economic conditions. High quality and accurate 
financial reports and transparency in corporate governance practices are essential 
in creating a good workplace culture. Previous studies also reveal that gender-
diverse boards improve public confidence by displaying higher quality corporate 
governance practice. The integrity and credibility of corporate disclosures give 
confidence to the public about the transparency of corporate governance 
practices. Gul, Hutchinson and Lai (2013) in their study of 2200 US companies, 
suggest that board diversity adds to transparency and there is a positive 
relationship between gender diversity and analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. 
This study suggests that gender-diverse boards make more informed and accurate 
disclosure that assists in more accurate analysts forecast. Their study supports the 
hypothesis and suggests that board diversity improves the transparency and 
accuracy of financial reporting. Another study by Gul, Srinidhi & Ng (2011) also 
shows that gender-diverse boards in large companies are more transparent in 
their disclosure and hence improve the credibility of publicly available information. 
This indicates that gender-diverse boards are more diligent in terms of public 
disclosure and have a higher quality of financial reporting. In addition, females 
serving as the chief financial officer also reduce the discretionary accruals in 
financial reports, more conservatism and managerial opportunism that lead to 
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more accurate financial reporting and good corporate governance practices  (Peni 
& Vähämaa, 2010) .  
 
On the other spectrum and inline with current social and ethical concerns globally, 
companies should not focus solely on company profitability and the shareholders. 
There is a shift of corporate responsibility toward overall stakeholders of the 
society. Given current investment trends that are geared toward social 
responsibility investment, Bear, Rahman and Post (2010) indicate that investors 
and analysts are considering the existence of boardroom gender diversity as a 
positive investment variable when making an investment decision. The positive 
market opinion commends of these analysts to encourage the market to invest in 
companies that commit to social and ethical responsibility, and consequently this 
leads to a higher demand of shares and the increment in share price and market 
values (Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017) . The social, ethical and accountability 
concerns have become more relevant in the recent economic trend of good 
governance and corporate reputation. Female directors are perceived to posses 
communal attributes that are more concern with the welfare of other stakeholders 
(Eagly et al., 2003). The inborn characteristics of female directors influence boards 
decision-making and processes with different perspectives and value. Gender-
diverse boards pay more attention to ethical concerns that enforce ethical 
behaviour of the company and support good corporate governance practices  
(Labelle, Gargouri, & Francoeur, 2010) . Nadeem et al.  (2017)  also show a 
significant positive relationship between gender-diverse boards and corporate 
sustainability practices. When board gender diversity is well managed, it enhances 
not only board strategic decision making but also sends a positive public image by 
conveying commitments to equal opportunity and inclusion  (Rhode & Packel, 
2014) .  
 
The discussions so far focus mainly on the board gender diversity of developed 
countries. However, the board characteristics and governance structure between 
well-developed countries can differ compared to countries in the transition phase 
or under-developed economy.  Cultural differences, government regulations and 
business practices are the main contributors to the difference in board structure 
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and governance systems. There is another stream of literature that examines 
board-gender diversity in these transitional economies and under-developed 
countries. Nguyen, Locke and Reddy (2015) examine the 120 public listed 
companies in Vietnam from 2008 to 2011 and find that board gender diversity has 
positive effects on company financial performance, Tobin’s Q. They suggest that 
boards with at least one female director outperform boards with boards with all 
male directors, and boards with at least two female directors perform better that 
boards with at least one female director. The positive impact on performance is 
attributed to the additional monitoring of gender-diverse boards in weak-governing 
companies in the Vietnamese context. Agency theory is well applied in this context 
as board gender diversity improves the monitoring function of boards in weak-
governing companies and hence company financial performance.  
 
Liu, Wei and Xie (2014) study the public listed companies in China from 1999 to 
2011 and suggest that board gender diversity is positively correlated with company 
financial performance, measure in ROA and ROS. They emphasise that the 
participation in the daily operation of female executive directors is more important 
than the monitoring role of the independent female directors, and it has stronger 
effects on company financial and operation performance. Consistent with resource 
dependence theory, they argue that female executive directors have more useful 
connections and communication channels that lead to a stronger impact on 
company performance. This study also suggests that the underdeveloped 
corporate governance system in China also benefit from the monitoring role of 
female directors to improve the quality of board deliberations on complex issues 
and reducing the probability of major decision missteps. Another important finding 
of this study also reveals the impact of tokenism and gender-role stereotypes of 
the sole female director. This study finds an insignificant impact of sole female 
director on company financial performance, while it supports the critical mass 
theory and suggests that boards with at least three female directors have a 
stronger impact on company financial and operation performance.   
 
From a national and global perspective, Post and Byron (2015) in a meta-analysis 
of 140 studies suggest that female board representation is positively correlated in 
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countries with better shareholders protection and culture with gender parity. In this 
context, they find that stronger shareholder protection provides a better ground for 
companies to utilise the talent, knowledge and experience of female directors. 
With a gender parity mentality, the society enables females to acquire appropriate 
human capital and produce a higher quality of female directors that contribute to 
the overall company performance. Investors value the social differences in human 
capital and positively evaluate the future earnings potential of companies with 
more female representation. Another multi-territory study on Asian countries by 
Low, Robert and Whiting (2015)  suggest that increasing numbers of female 
directors on boards has a positive effect on company financial performance. 
However, they indicate that the positive effects diminished in countries with higher 
economic participation and empowerment. Mandating gender quotas or forcing the 
appointments of female director can reduce company financial performance in 
countries with strong cultural resistance. Terjesen et al. (2016)  carry out a meta-
analysis of the public listed companies in forty-seven countries, suggest that 
although independent boards serve as an effective control mechanism on the 
management team, external independent directors do not contribute to company 
financial performance unless the board is gender diversified. They also 
demonstrate that board gender diversity enhances board effectiveness and have 
better performance measured in Tobin’s Q and ROA. Schmid and Urban (2017)  
use a board dataset of fifty-three countries and find that female directors lead to 
higher company valuation in more developed countries. The selection process of 
female directors is more stringent in the developed countries that breakup of the 
old boys club and glass-ceiling effect. This contributes not only to the positive 
impact of gender-diverse boards on company financial performance but also over-
performance of the female directors who make it to top positions. 
 
In relation to critical mass theory, the theory suggests that female directors need to 
achieve the critical threshold before they can make a difference on boardroom 
dynamics and influence the decision-making and processes. Torchia et al. (2011) 
survey the directors in 317 Norwegian companies and suggest that the critical 
mass of at least three female directors is the sufficient number for female directors 
to contribute to strategic board task that leads to improvements in company 
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performance.  Arena et al.  (2015)  base on 211 European Union public listed 
companies in the construction industry also suggests that the critical mass of 
female board representation, rather than the simple presence of the female 
director on boards, has an incremental benefit on company performance. The 
critical mass of female directors on boards influences the boards’ dynamics in 
interactions and processes between the male and female directors with positive 
implications on company financial performance (Erkut et al., 2008; Konrald et al., 
2008). Joecks et al. (2013)  also suggests that board gender diversity initially has 
a negative effect on company financial performance until a critical mass of thirty 
percent of female directors on boards is achieved. The critical mass of female 
board representation is associated with higher company financial performance 
compared to boards with all male boards. Kogut et al.  (2014)  argue that imposing 
gender quotas is the need to disrupt a structural impediment to permitting an 
endogenous mechanism to sustain the appointment of female directors beyond a 
critical mass.  
 
2.3.2 Studies With Negative Correlations Between Gender Diversity And 
Performance  
Despite the positive relationships cited by some previous studies between gender-
diverse boards and company performance, some studies do not support the 
positive implications of having gender-diverse boards and suggest a negative 
impact of having more female board representation. Earley and Mosakowski  
(2000)  suggest that directors in all male boards are more cooperative than 
gender-diverse boards, and they appear to have less emotional conflicts. This 
indicates that directors in gender-diverse boards are less cohesive in board 
discussions and experiences communication breakdown. Boardroom conflicts 
arise when there exist different and conflicting opinions amongst the board of 
directors as suggested in gender differences theory. As such the distinct 
personality and leadership style of male and female directors can lead to sub-
optimal group effectiveness that causes boardroom conflicts. Despite the benefits 
of gender-diverse boards producing quality board decision-making, in an intensely 
competitive marketplace where companies are required to react to market 
changes in a timely manner, the disagreement of gender-diverse boards can 
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cause the delay in reaching consensus and inefficiency in the decision-making 
process (Hambrick et al., 1996) . 
 
Adams and Ferreira (2009), study a sample of US S&P 500 companies from 1996 
to 2003. Their findings suggest that boards gender diversity is negatively 
correlated to company financial performance. Although the results of this study 
suggest that gender-diverse boards add value to company financial performance 
by improving the monitoring function on companies with lower level governance in 
place as suggested in agency theory, overall the negative implications on 
company financial performance is due to excessive monitoring imposed by 
gender-diverse boards on well-governed companies. For less well-governed 
companies they are more effective in reducing agency costs and CEO turnover is 
more sensitive to stock performance. They also find the negative effect of gender-
diverse boards on the effectiveness of take-over defences that result in negative 
company performance. The negative effect of gender-diverse boards is attributed 
to the increase of company agency cost due to boardroom conflicts that require 
greater time and effort in getting consensus on strategic decisions  (Wellalage & 
Locke, 2013) . Jurkus et al. (2011)  also supports the reduction of agency costs in 
gender-diverse boards of the Fortune 500 companies only materialised when 
strong external governance is absent in a less competitive product market.  
 
Bøhren and Strøm (2010) and Ahern and Dittmar (2012) both examine Norwegian 
companies and suggest that companies create more value when gender diversity 
is low, and the company’s performance deteriorates after the implementation of 
mandatory gender quotas. Bøhren and Strøm (2010) link the increase of female 
representation to low company values due to the shortcoming of imposing gender 
quotas on Norwegian companies. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) also demonstrate that 
the forty percent mandatory gender quotas on Norwegian companies has resulted 
in many companies rushing into the appointment of younger and inexperienced 
female directors, causing the negative impact on company operating performance. 
These two studies suggest an important finding on imposing mandatory gender 
quotas and question the ineffective recruitment process that force companies to 
increase female representation on boards to comply with the legislative 
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requirements. An important point to note in Ahern and Dittmar (2012) study is the 
application of the exogenous change to corporate boards from the implementation 
of the gender quotas as a natural experiment in board structure. They hypothesise 
that if companies chose the board structure to maximise company value, forcing a 
company to comply with the new law may lead to a decline in company value, as 
there is a legal constraint on the choice of board structure. The deterioration in 
company value measured in Tobin’s Q is due to the characteristic of the newly 
appointed female directors. Although the new female directors are highly 
educated, they are likely to be employed as a non-executive manager with 
significantly less CEO experience and relatively younger, substantially different 
compared to the existing male directors. The analysis also indicates that the 
companies maintain the optimal board size and companies are forced to replace 
male directors to comply with the gender quota. This study uses pre-quota 
variation in female directors as an instrument and finds that the mandatory gender 
quota has led companies to undertake more acquisition and increase leverage. 
Interestingly, this finding of Ahern and Dittmar (2014) also in line with a study by 
Berger, Kick and Schaeck (2014) on Germany’s banks, suggesting that younger 
female executive in banks take on higher portfolio risk.    
 
Some studies suggest that gender-based diversity on corporate boards is a sign of 
tokenism and limit the contribution of the sole female director (Abdullah, 2014). 
Minguez-Vera and Martin (2011) attribute the negative impacts of the presence of 
the females on boards of the Spanish SMEs between 1998 and 2003 to less risky 
strategies implemented by gender-diverse boards. The stereotype threat theory 
suggests that female directors are unable to influence strategic board involvement 
through the contribution to board decision-making, as they are perceived as 
unequal board members and seen as only the token female director on boards  
(Nielsen & Huse, 2010a) .  
 
In addition to the board of directors, the top management team of a company also 
plays an essential role in determining the performance of the company. Darmani 
(2013) investigates the performance of Indonesian companies and finds a 
negative association between female executive in the top management and 
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company performance. They also suggest that it is tougher for females to join 
large companies boards while smaller family-controlled companies are more likely 
to appoint female directors on boards. It is important to note that this study 
examines a cross-sectional data from the sample of Indonesia public listed 
companies in 2007 using simple regression analysis without considering 
endogeneity concern. Furthermore, public listed companies in Indonesia follow the 
two-tier governance system and the representation of female directors on boards 
in 2007 is relatively low. It is questionable that the estimation can be a reliable 
inference to investigate the relationship between female representation on the top 
management and company performance.  
  
2.3.3 Studies That Show No Correlations Between Gender-Diverse Boards 
And Performance 
The other stream of empirical studies shows no correlations between board 
gender diversity and company performance. These studies find that company 
financial performance is unrelated to the diversity of boards. Carter et al. (2010), 
using the sample of S&P 500 companies from 1998 to 2002, do not find any 
correlation between gender-diverse boards and performance. They attribute the 
non-significance of gender-diverse boards on performance to the contingency 
explanation because the effect of gender diversity on boards is offset over several 
companies under different circumstances and time periods. Dezsö and Ross 
(2012) based on the US sample of S&P 500 companies over fifteen years of panel 
data suggest that female representation in top management improves company 
financial performance only if the company strategy is focused on innovation. They 
hypothesise that the managerial attribute of female managers in the top 
management is an important moderator on company performance because female 
representation in top management improves the innovation intensity of company’s 
strategy. However, the findings also indicate that merely examine the females 
participation in top management when the company’s strategy is not related to 
innovation, gender-diverse in top management do not show a significant effect on 
company performance. The results support human capital and gender difference 
theory, suggest that when females join a company’s top management team, it 
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adds insight into important strategic questions that are related to diverse 
consumers and stakeholders  (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 1999) .  
 
Another study that explores the critical mass theory is Broome, Conley and 
Krawiec (2011). The outcomes of interviews with corporate directors and relevant 
insiders fail to support the critical mass of female directors on boards will produce 
different and distinct boardroom outcomes. In contrast with most of the studies that 
support boardroom critical mass of female directors (Arena et al., 2015; Konrald et 
al., 2008; Liu et al., 2014; Torchia et al., 2011), the respondents of this study 
reveal that they view themselves as path breakers. Female directors on boards do 
not behave as the general population; they are highly qualified corporate directors 
that need no reassurance or support from other female directors. They function as 
effective directors that are accustomed to their “outsider” status. The findings of 
this study also reveal the disadvantages of group effectiveness theory, where the 
respondents of this study indicate that as the proportion of female directors rises, 
group conflict arises and the disagreement with each other also increases due to 
the diverse viewpoints among the female directors.  
 
Rose  (2007) examines Danish public listed companies from 1998 to 2001 and 
also suggests that board gender diversity does not affect company performance. 
They imply that in order to be qualified for a board position, the unconventional 
directors choose to socialise and adapt to the behaviour and norms of the 
conventional directors and leaders. As the consequence of this socialisation 
process, the gains from having female directors on boards have never been 
reflected in any chosen performance measure. Marinova et al. (2016)  also 
indicates that board gender diversity in Danish and Dutch public listed companies 
is rather low and this is the main reason for the insignificant correlation between 
gender-diverse boards and performance. Joecks et al. (2013)  support the finding 
of low female board participation and argue that the insignificant results of gender-
diverse boards on performance is affected by the overall low female board 
representation that invalidates the results. The possible reason for the insignificant 
effect of female board representation on company financial performance could be 
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related to the lack of significant impact, as female board representation has not 
achieved the critical mass that makes a real difference on company performance.    
 
An event study by Farrell and Hersch (2005) find that there is no significant 
change in company market value with the appointment of females on boards of 
Fortune 500 companies from 1990 to 1999. This study suggests two reasons for 
the appointment of directors on a corporate board; to replace a departure of a 
director or to increase the board size. The findings of this study suggest that when 
board gender diversity is the goal of a company, it is very likely that the company 
will add female directors when the female is under-represented on the boards or to 
replace a departure director. The appointment of directors on boards is not gender 
neutral as the increment of female directors is not because of the increased supply 
of qualified female directors; rather it is the external pressure that force companies 
to add female directors. The study fails to detect significant market reaction to the 
appointment of female directors and gender-diverse boards do not generate better 
company performance. This indicates that the increment of female board 
representation due to internal preference or external pressure has resulted in the 
female candidates to self-select better performing company.      
 
In the Australian context, Wang and Clift (2009) study the top 500 listed 
companies in Australia and suggest that although gender-diverse boards do not 
lead to poor performance, there is an absence of statistical significance between 
board gender diversity and performance. They argue that the absence of a 
significant impact of female directors on performance can be attributed to low 
females board representation, where female directors have not achieved the 
critical mass on boards to realise their potential and talents. Chappel and 
Humphrey (2014) also examine the sample of ASX300 companies listed on the 
ASX from 2004 to 2011. The findings suggest a weak negative correlation 
between gender-diverse boards and overall market performance. However, there 
is no clear performance differential between companies with and without female 
directors. This study uses the portfolio approach to examine the market-level 
impact on board gender diversity and suggests that larger and more established 
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companies have more diverse boards as a business proposition instead of for 
economic reasons.  
 
Board gender diversity also affects company risk. The economic and psychological 
studies suggest that females have less risk appetite than males in general  (Barber 
& Odean, 2001; Bernasek & Shwiff, 2001; Byrnes et al., 1999) . However, it is 
unclear whether the greater female board representation will lead to less risk-
taking in board strategic decisions  (Sila et al., 2016) . Sila et al. (2016) find no 
evidence that boards with greater female participation influence company’s equity 
risk on the U.S. non-financial companies. This study extensively applies various 
GMM specifications to address the endogeneity concern in board composition 
studies. In contrast to the findings of less risk-averse of gender diverse boards of 
financial companies and females are have less risk appetite of the general 
population, this study finds that boards with higher proportion of female directors is 
no more or less risk-taking than boards that are dominated by male directors. The 
findings suggest that the negative relationships between board gender diversity 
and company equity risk are spurious and driven by unobserved between-firm 
heterogeneous factors. 
 
2.4 Summary From Theoretical Framework And Empirical Studies  
The theoretical frameworks provide various insights on the implications of gender-
diverse boards on company performance. No single theory can completely explain 
and support the complex relationship. Different theories support the relevancy of 
gender-diverse boards and their implications on company performance in different 
ways (Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010). The review of the literature 
also suggests conflicting findings from previous empirical studies. These 
differences arise from a number of factors including samples from different 
jurisdictions with different corporate governance practices and regulatory 
requirements. Further there is the vast spectrum of diverse model specifications 
with the application of various econometric techniques applied over different time 
frames. Both theoretical frameworks and prior empirical studies are unable to 
demonstrate a consensus on the relationship between board gender diversity and 
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performance. Larcker and Rusticus (2010)  note that the development of a 
comprehensive theory is an ongoing process and may never be completed. On the 
other hand, to empirically examine the relationship between board gender diversity 
and company financial performance also face with technical challenges due to 
endogeneity issue.  
 
The main issue in board gender diversity and company performance studies is the 
endogeneity concern, derives from the possibility of reverse causality concerns or 
the possibility of an omitted unobserved heterogeneity in the structural model that 
affects the relationship between board gender diversity and company 
performance. Farrell and Hersch (2005) confirm that neither board gender diversity 
nor the proportion of female directors is an exogenous random variable to 
company performance. WIntoki et al. (2012) and Schultz and Tan (2010) also 
demonstrate that the reverse causality between board characteristics and 
company financial performance are dynamic, meaning that current board gender 
diversity measure is likely to be the results of past realisation of company 
performance. In this instance, board gender diversity and performance are 
endogenously determined  (Carter et al., 2003; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Martin-
Ugedo & Minguez-Vera, 2014) . There is a general consensus that board 
characteristics, and more particularly board gender diversity in this study, are 
affected by the scope of complexity of a company. It is also a choice that the 
company makes to determine the board structure and composition that suits its 
needs and nature of the business model  (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Fama, 
1980; Sila et al., 2016) . This requires us to take into consideration the most 
damaging endogeneity problem arises from reverse causality, company-level 
heterogeneity and omitted unobserved factors to examine and explain the 
implications of board gender diversity on company performance. Therefore, this 
study posits that the inconsistent findings of the extant literature are due to 
inadequate attempt in addressing the endogeneity concern using the appropriate 
econometric technique.  
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2.5 Hypothesis Development 
This sub-section presents the hypothesis development based on the discussion of 
the theoretical framework and the literature reviews. The two hypotheses of this 
study are as follows: 
2.5.1 Hypothesis 1 – Gender Diversity And Company Financial Performance 
Agency theory, resource dependency theory, human capital theory and group 
effectiveness theory suggest that there is a theoretical valid link between gender-
diverse boards and company performance. However, each theory suggests the 
relevancy of gender-diverse boards and company financial performance from a 
different theoretical perspective and each on their own is insufficient to explain the 
causal relationship between gender-diverse boards and performance. Moreover, the 
empirical studies show mixed results. The effect of gender-diverse boards on 
company financial performance is somewhat ambiguous with the continual 
development of theoretical frameworks and the inconclusive findings of prior studies. 
There is no clear indication of how female representation on boards will benefit the 
board functions and ultimately company performance. Hence, the first hypothesis of 
this study is: 
 
H1:  Ceteris paribus, board gender diversity is not correlated with company 
financial performance. 
 
2.5.2 Hypothesis 2 – Critical Mass Of Female Board Representation 
To identify if the critical mass of female directors on boards is a valid explanation for 
the impact of gender diversity on company performance, this study argues that there 
is a critical mass or optimal proportion of female board representation. This critical 
mass is essential in making the difference to the company performance. Kanter’s 
critical mass theory raised the idea of “tokenism” of the female director on boards, 
referring to the sole female representation on a dominant male board. The sole 
female director may be treated as a token on the board, and her influence on the 
board decision may be limited. Erkut et al. (2008) suggest that the magic number of 
females on boards to have real performance impacts is three. This indicates that 
while the token female director may not have pronounced effect on board decision 
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processes and company performance, the critical mass of female board 
representation may have positive implications. Female directors are able to 
contribute and influence board decision making once female board representation 
achieves its critical mass. This study applies critical mass theory introduced by 
Kanter’s study of men and women of the corporation (Kanter, 1977a) to examine the 
true impact of female board representation on performance. We hypothesise that 
female directors have a positive influence on company financial performance once a 
critical mass of board representation is achieved. This theory leads to the second 
hypothesis as: 
 
H2:  Female representation on boards has positive impacts on company 
financial performance when a critical mass is achieved. 
 
 
Lee Lee ONG        July 2018 
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework on Board Gender Diversity and Company Financial Performance 
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2.6 Chapter Summary 
Figure 2.1 presents the conceptual framework of this study. The theoretical 
constructs do not provide a consensus on the relationship between board gender 
diversity and company performance. The discussion in the theoretical framework 
reveals that no single theory can predict the relationship between board gender 
diversity and performance (Carter et al., 2010). The link between board gender 
diversity and company financial performance is unclear. It depends on the 
individual company’s governance structure, the directors’ individual traits, the 
dynamic relationship among the directors of the company, the external 
environment, and the industry. Board gender diversity is affected by the scope of 
complexity of the company and is a choice that the companies make  (Coles et al., 
2008; Fama, 1980; Sila et al., 2016) . Previous studies also provide conflicting 
results due to differences in research contexts, model specification throughout a 
spectrum of time frame and application of various econometric techniques (T. 
Nguyen et al., 2015). This leads to the formation of both hypotheses of this study 
to examine whether there is a link between board gender diversity and company 
financial performance and if the critical mass of female directors on board 
influences company performance. The following chapter continues the discussion 
of the inconclusive findings in board gender diversity and company financial 
performance due to endogeneity problems and presents the methodological 
background of each econometric method in dealing with the endogeneity concern 
in gender diversity and company financial performance studies.    
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
Three key endogeneity issues that are endemic in board gender diversity and 
company financial performance studies are unobserved heterogeneity, 
simultaneous causality and dynamic relationship between the variables (Wintoki et 
al., 2012). These endogeneity concerns have always been the problem and 
undermine the causal inference of the variable. The design of a study must clearly 
identify the relationship of the variables and how each variable affects one another 
(Rusticus & Larcker, 2007). If a design of a study ignores the endogeneity 
problems, it limits the validity of empirical testing of the model, especially when the 
relationships of the variables are complex (Gippel et al., 2015). This study employs 
various econometric techniques to demonstrate why board gender diversity is not 
exogenous to company financial performance in the estimations, and present how 
the robust GMM method together with the selected noble instrumental variable 
mitigate all forms of endogeneity concerns.  
 
This chapter presents the methodological framework, models and empirical 
measures used in testing the relationships between board gender diversity and 
company performance. It begins with a discussion of the challenging endogeneity 
issues that arise when examining board gender diversity and company 
performance. Specifically why board characteristics and females board 
representation are not exogenous to the company’s performance The following 
sections present the data collection and sample selection process, the description 
of variables and the general model specification. Following is the methodologies 
used in previous board gender studies are reviewed and critiqued. The 
penultimate section describes the empirical indicators used and details the 
econometric techniques used in the analysis. The final section summarises the 
chapter.  
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3.2 Endogeneity Problem In Corporate Governance And Gender 
Diversity Studies 
Studies examining the relationship between corporate board characteristics and 
performance are plagued with endogeneity issues (Wintoki et al., 2012). The 
endogenous nature of the corporate governance measures and company financial 
performance limits our understanding of the direction of causality between the two 
variables. If there is an omitted variable in a structural model, then causality 
cannot be inferred because only partial correlation can be observed, not causality. 
In this instance, it is difficult to establish whether board characteristics affect a 
company’s performance, or if better-performed companies attract certain board 
characteristics. Specifically as board gender diversity is one of the board 
characteristics, similar endogeneity problems exist when a study examines the 
relationship between board gender diversity and company performance. The three 
main endogeneity concerns in the governance and diversity-performance literature 
are unobserved company-level heterogeneity, simultaneous causality bias and 
dynamic endogeneity between the variables in the model specification (Wintoki et 
al., 2012). Any study that does not address these endogeneity problems may be 
biased and raises a question of the internal validity of the model. 
 
The first concern of endogeneity is whether unobserved company-level 
characteristics that may affect company’s board structure and the performance. 
This issue arises when there is an unobserved factor that affects the relationship 
between the variables in a structural model. For example, an unobserved firm 
characteristic in gender diversity studies is companies’ policy to improve their 
ethical corporate governance social image and appoint more female directors 
(Bear et al., 2010; Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017). Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 
2010) suggests that maintaining a good relationship with stakeholders increases 
company’s legitimacy and social image, and consequently improves overall 
performance. Albuquerque, Durnev and Koskinen  (2012) also suggest that the 
profitability of socially responsible companies is less sensitive to economic 
conditions and customers show greater loyalty towards the companies. There is a 
positive association between gender-diverse boards and these socially 
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responsible companies, and prior studies also show that socially responsible 
companies also exhibit better performance  (Eagly et al., 2003; Labelle et al., 
2010; Nadeem et al., 2017). In this instance, the company’s practice that affects 
the appointment of female directors on boards is unobservable. Many previous 
studies also suggest that shareholders value a diversity perspectives and 
knowledge from board members and the appointment of female directors may 
improve companies share value  (Gordini & Rancati, 2017; Kang et al., 2010) . In 
addition, self-selection bias can be classified as omitted variable bias (Heckman, 
2013), which is unobservable in the specification.  Companies may choose to have 
gender-diverse boards in the hope that will improve board monitoring, and 
consequently better performance  (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011) . We 
argue that a correlation between board gender diversity and company financial 
performance cannot be determined when there is a possibility of unobserved 
variable that exists and affects the company financial performance.  
 
Secondly, there is an endogeneity issue caused by the simultaneous causality 
between the dependent and explanatory variables. In diversity-performance 
studies, there is a concern of a co-existence relationship between gender diversity 
and company performance. It is a challenging task to exogenously determine the 
dependent variables and to address the possibility of reverse causality 
relationship. Several studies show that company size and performance affect the 
appointment of gender-diverse boards (Charles et al., 2015). Also, a company 
may also choose the board structure that suits its operation and industry’s norm   
(Adams & Ferreira, 2007) . Conversely, female directors may be more attracted to 
join better-performed companies with greater corporate social responsibility  (Hafsi 
& Turgut, 2013; Nadeem et al., 2017; Turban & Greening, 1997) . This is an 
example of cause and effect relationship with feedback loops between gender-
diverse boards and performance. This self-selection bias causes an unclear 
casual relationship between gender diversity and company performance. The 
simultaneous causality between the proportion of female directors and company 
financial performance confound the relationship between the variables. It is 
essential for empirical studies to address the possibility of biased and inconsistent 
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parameter estimates caused by the simultaneity issue to make a reliable inference 
of the relationship between gender diversity and performance.  
 
Finally, endogeneity is influenced by the dynamic relationship between a 
company’s past performance and their current board structure and current 
performance. For example, although Tobin’s Q is a good proxy for company 
financial performance as it measures the future growth of a company, the change 
in Tobin’s Q over time can be affected by the market’s valuation of future growth. 
A company’s future growth prediction may influence the board structure to suit the 
economic and industry conditions  (Pham et al., 2011) . In this instance, there is a 
dynamic relationship between the past performance on the current performance 
and the board structure. Furthermore, the relationship between board 
characteristics and performance are dynamic  (Cicero, Wintoki, & Yang, 2013; 
Wintoki et al., 2012) . This means that past performance affects the appointment 
process of the board of directors and the representation of females on boards. In 
this instance, the existing board will take into consideration the previous 
performance indicator in appointment decision concerning the board structure. It is 
potentially impossible for empirical studies to capture all the dynamic determinants 
of company performance. To address this endogeneity problem caused by the 
dynamic relationship and possible omitted variable bias, relevant structural 
equation models are required to incorporate as many representatives and 
independent indicators as possible. 
 
To address the endogeneity concerns in diversity-performance study, theoretical 
arguments alone are insufficient to explain the causality relationship between 
gender diversity and company performance. It requires careful research design 
and appropriation analysis (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010) . 
Fornell & Larcker (1981) state that variables selection is crucial. A good 
understanding of variables interaction is crucial to identify the causality direction 
among the variables. Endogeneity issues commonly arise amongst past research 
design that are intended to determine causality relationship. This is particularly 
common in corporate governance research as the relationships among the 
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variables is complex  (Rusticus & Larcker, 2007)  and there are observed and 
unobserved factors that may influence the appointment process of the board of 
directors. 
 
Given all three possible causes for endogeneity in a diversity-performance study, a 
researcher needs to develop a convincing theory that supports the research 
design and then apply appropriate statistical techniques to mitigate the 
endogeneity issue. Larcker and Rusticus (2010) suggest that developing a strong 
and convincing theory to support the relationships between the variables is 
important to explain the direction of the causality effect. However, theory 
development is an ongoing process and is often an incomplete explanation of the 
relationships.  
 
Pindado and La Torre (2004) suggest that the solution to control an endogeneity 
problem is by way of applying the method of instrumental variables. Identifying an 
instrumental variable is a common empirical strategy to deal with endogeneity 
problem. It helps explain that gender diversity is exogenous to the performance 
outcomes in the estimate. Although this instrumental variable approach overcomes 
the issue of biases in OLS regressions (fixed or random effect estimation), finding 
a truly exogenous instrumental variable is not an easy task. Bozec (2012) confirms 
that the most challenging task for a researcher to address the endogeneity 
problem in a corporate governance study is to find a valid and exogenous 
instrumental variable. Larcker and Rusticus (2010) suggest that a good 
instrumental variable needs to be justified using economic theory. In addition to 
theoretical support for the instrumental variable, there are two econometric 
requirements; first, the instrumental variable is correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variable; and second, the selected instrumental variable is 
uncorrelated with the error term in the structural equation or the dependent 
variable. The selection of a weak instrumental variable in gender diversity and 
company performance studies can be inefficient. Furthermore, if the relationship 
between the board characteristics and performance is dynamic, a weak 
instrumental variable may not be truly exogenous and may influence the 
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company’s performance. In this instance, a study requires an empirical model that 
considers both the influence of unobserved heterogeneity and the dynamic 
relationship between the past performance of the board structure and current 
performance (Wintoki et al., 2012).  
 
Given the challenging in identifying the exogenous external instrumental variable, 
prior studies suggest that the alternative and more convincing method to mitigate 
the endogeneity issue in diversity and performance study is by way of natural 
experiment. Gippel, Smith and Zhu (2015) suggest that research in accounting 
and finance should look beyond textbook solutions and design a natural 
experiment to mitigate the endogeneity issue. The natural experiment utilises the 
exogenous source of change in the problematic explanatory variable and testifies 
the effect of the variation in the dependent variable. For example, Ahern and 
Dittmar (2012) exploit a natural experiment with the implementation of new 
legislation to impose gender quotas on Norwegian corporate boards as an 
unprecedented exogenous shock to the existing board structure to examine the 
relationship between gender-diverse boards and company performance. Schmid 
and Urban  (2017), based on an extensive database of 53 countries’ company 
boards, consider the retirement of female directors due to death and illness as the 
exogenous shock to the system to examine the market reactions from the news. 
They report that the share market reacts negatively to the retirement of the female 
directors and the situation is more significant if the departure of the female 
directors is replaced with male directors.  
 
It is important to note that the endogeneity issue needs to be addressed in all 
studies in addition to a well-developed theory. A good empirical design with high-
quality data is crucial in empirical research. The research design will then fit into a 
selected statistical technique to test the hypotheses with an intention to mitigate 
the endogeneity issue. Clear empirical evidence can resolve the confounding 
effect of endogeneity and conflicting arguments that undermine the causal 
inference between the variables. Robert and Whited (2013) emphasise that 
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researchers should not be discouraged from carrying out a study even with the 
presence of the endogeneity issue.  
3.3 Overview of Research Design 
Section 2.6 presented the two hypotheses of this study. The first hypothesis 
examines if there is any relationships between board gender diversity and 
company financial performance. Given the inconclusive findings of previous 
literature and the ambiguous theoretical frameworks of the impact of gender-
diverse boards on company performance, there is no clear indication of how 
female board representation on boards will impact company financial performance, 
hence the first hypothesis of this study is: 
  
H1:  Ceteris paribus, board gender diversity is not correlated with company 
financial performance. 
 
The second hypothesis examines if the critical mass of female board representation 
have positive implications on company performance. This study applies Kanter’s 
(1977b) critical mass theory to examine the true impact of female board 
representation on company performance. We hypothesise that female directors have 
a positive influence on company financial performance once a critical mass of board 
representation is achieved. This theory leads to the second hypothesis as: 
 
H2:  Female representation on boards has positive impacts on company 
financial performance when a critical mass is achieved. 
 
These two hypotheses are tested using the general model as shown in equation 
(1) to regress the board gender diversity and other control variables on company 
financial performance as follows:  
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Pit = β0 + β1GDit + βkCVit + εit   t = 1…….t, i = 1……n  ---------- (1) 
Where:   
P  – The n*1 vector of company financial performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q, across n observations 
GD  – The n*1 matrix of gender diversity measure across N observations 
CV  – The n*k matrix of the control variables across n observations 
β – The unknown k*1 vector of regression parameters  
ε  – A n*1 vector of the error term 
i  – The number of n observations of the sample 
t  – The time period of each financial year 
k  – The number of control variables used in the structural model 
 
In this study, Tobin’s Q is the focus of company financial performance indicator. 
Tobin’s Q measures companies’ market value and reflects market’s expectation of 
the companies’ future growth  (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988) . Board gender 
diversity measure is represented by the proportion of female directors on boards as 
the primary focus and the Blau index as the robustness test on gender diversity 
analysis to examine the first hypothesis. This study also applies Kanter’s critical 
mass gender classification as the gender diversity measure to examine the second 
hypothesis. The board characteristic control variables are board size, board 
independence, CEO tenure and CEO duality. At the company level, this study 
controls for company size measured in market capitalisation and total revenue, 
company’s leverage levels measured by net gearing ratio, and risk level measured by 
volatility of return on equity (ROE). The following section will discuss the data 
collection procedures and the variables in the model specification in details. 
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3.4 Data Collection Procedures 
The sample for this study consists of Australian top two hundred companies listed 
on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) for the period from 2008 to 2015. Table 
3.1 presents the summary data collection procedures. 
 
Table 3.1: Data collection procedures 
Procedures Specific details of data collection procedures 
Step 1 Sample selection process – identify the companies in ASX200 as at 
31st December 2015 
Step 2 Financial data – download financial report from MorningStar 
DatAnalysis premium database 
Step 3 Board characteristics – download directors and board structure 
information from SIRCA’s corporate governance portal 
Step 4 External instrumental variable – identify each of the selected sample’s 
headquarters’ address and match to the respective local council, 
extract the councillor’s information from the identified local council’s 
annual report 
Step 5 Cross check of financial data and board characteristics information 
with Bloomberg database 
Step 6 Statistical analysis – apply Stata 14 to test the hypotheses 
 
The details of these processes are explained in the following section. 
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3.4.1 Sample Selection and Test Period  
The initial sample of this study consists of an unbalanced panel data of the top 200 
public listed companies (ASX200) on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) for the 
period from 2008 to 2015. The ASX200 index is accounted for about 70% of 
Australian’s market capitalisation. There are three listing and qualifying conditions 
for companies to be listed in the ASX200 index16. These three conditions are:  
 
i. The stock must be listed on the ASX as ordinary or preferred shares;  
ii. The stock must satisfy liquidity requirements, that is the stock must be 
actively traded on the ASX and investors can easily buy and sell the 
stock on the market; and  
iii. The stock’s market-adjusted capitalisation must be amongst the 
largest 200 companies on the ASX.   
The ASX200 index is rebalanced quarterly, indicating that some companies can be 
added or removed from the index during the study period of this study. Hence, this 
study includes all companies that have been classified in the ASX200 listing in any 
of the quarters from 2008 to 2015 to mitigate the possibility of survivor bias. The 
entire sample in the dataset consists of 319 companies. The sample companies’ 
market capitalisation ranges from $2.2 million to $244 billion. This indicates that 
the sample of this study covers a wide range of companies in terms of size 
measured in market capitalisation. 
 
Following previous literature (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003) , 
this study excludes companies that are classified as banks and insurance with 
GICS industry grouping due to their unique reporting and regulatory requirements. 
This study also excludes firm-years when a company is being delisted from the 
ASX as the financial information is no longer available, results in missing values, 
which cannot be obtained from any other sources. 
 
                                                        
16 Qualifying in the ASX 200 index listing. Refer https://www.wise-owl.com/investment-education/asx-200-explained-
what-is-the-asx-200 and https://www.marketindex.com.au/methodology and https://www.asx200list.com/  
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The final sample of unbalance data consists of 299 companies for the period from 
2008 to 2015 with 1981 firm-years. Table 3.2 summarises the sample selection 
and table 3.3 presents the summary of the sample by year.  
 
Table 3.2: Sample selection 
Initial sample size: 319 companies listed on the ASX200 from 2008 to 2015 
Minus:  15 companies classified as banks and insurance with GICS code  
Minus:  5 companies with insufficient financial data 
Final sample size:  299 ASX200 companies listed on the ASX from 2008 to 2015 
 
 
Table 3.3: Summary of the sample by year 
Year No of companies 
2008 265 
2009 261 
2010 261 
2011 254 
2012 240 
2013 236 
2014 236 
2015 228 
Total Firm Year 1,981 firm-years 
 
3.4.2 Collection Of The Financial Data  
Once the finalised sample is selected, the financial data of each company are 
obtained from the MorningStar DatAnalysis Premium database. Each companies’ 
registered headquarter address is used for identifying the local government of the 
respective companies to match the locality of the selected external instrument 
variable of this study, the proportion of local female councillors. We use GICS 
codes to identify the industries in our sample. Appendix 9 shows the definition of 
the selected financial variables of this study. 
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3.4.3 Collection Of Board Characteristics And Directors Information 
Board characteristic and directors’ data are downloaded from the SIRCA 
Corporate Governance portal. This database provides detail information of 
companies’ board characteristics and directors, which includes name, gender, 
birth year, date of appointment and resignation to the company, education 
attainment and qualification, position held in the company and other directorships 
if any. The entire director’s database is downloaded, and the relevant information 
is sorted according to the specification of this study. Appendix 10 shows the 
definition of the board characteristics and directors’ variables extracted from this 
database. 
 
3.4.4 Cross Check Of Financial And Board Of Directors Data 
Once the financial data and board characteristic information are collected, a data 
integrity check was carried out. Any ambiguous and missing information are cross-
checked against the company’s annual reports and Bloomberg database.  
 
3.4.5 Selection And Data Collection Of Instrumental Variable 
Section 3.2 demonstrates the damaging effects of endogeneity issues if it is not 
being addressed in a study. This study applies an external instrumental variable 
method to address the endogeneity problems and robust testing of the relationship 
between board gender diversity and company financial performance. Larker and 
Rusticus (2010) specify that the selection and usage of an instrumental variable 
need to be justified using economic rationale and Roberts and Whited (2012) 
postulate that the influence of the instrumental variable on the estimations should 
only through its effect on the endogenous variable. A valid instrumental variable 
needs to fulfil two fundamental requirements, the exogeneity and the relevancy of 
the instrumental variable. A non-correlation between the instrumental variable and 
the error term indicating that the instrumental variable is exogenous to the error 
term. On the other hand, the instrumental variable needs to be correlated to the 
exogenous variable to be relevant. Section 3.6.3.2 will demonstrate the statistical 
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technique to test if this instrumental variable fulfils the two fundamental 
requirements in applying instrumental variable. 
 
This study follows Gippel et al.’s (2015) suggestion and uses the proportion of 
local female councillors as the instrumental variable for female board 
representation. This instrumental variable has not been tested and applied in 
board gender diversity. The selection of this external instrumental variable also 
supported by two studies. First, we refer to Terjesen et al.’s (2015) “influence of 
political science in corporate governance”. Their study signpost that the elite 
government who endorse gendered policies supports the improvement of female 
board representation. This suggestion is based on the premise that institutional 
establishment co-evolves with corporate gender policies. Second, Bouwman’s 
(2012)  theory of “economic ramification of distance”. In this study, Bouwman 
demonstrates how CEO’s compensation is affected by the envy factor and the 
influence of locality “leading-company”. He postulates that geography factor has 
led the companies in a given area follow the “leading-company” in the same 
geography coverage in setting CEO compensation. In addition, using the same 
argument of geography influence, Bouwman (2012) also uses the professional 
sports players’ compensation as the instrumental variable to the CEO’s 
compensation in the same area to address the endogeneity in the study. King and 
William (2013) follow Bouwman’s application of instrumental variable and use local 
sports person’s salary to instrument with the bank’s executive compensation. 
Using both the locality influence and the role of government, this study believes 
that local female councillors play an important role in influencing other females’ 
involvement in the workforce and have a positive impact on the experienced and 
skilled females to excel as directors on corporate boards. Therefore, the proportion 
of local female councillors is instrumented to the proportion of female directors on 
boards to address the endogeneity concerns in this study. 
 
The external instrumental variable in this study, the proportion of local female 
councillors, is hand collected and extracted from the annual report of each local 
council website. To collect the local councillor’s information, we link each 
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companies’ headquarter office of our sample to its respective local governments 
and extract the local council members’ information from the local government 
annual report of the respective year of observation. If the annual report is not 
available on the website, we send an email to the local council representative 
requesting current and past councillors’ information. 
 
3.4.5.1 An Additional Note On Instrumental Variable 
Finding a truly valid instrumental variable is a challenging task. The researchers 
can use their imagination and creativity in selecting the instrumental variable. 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010) signify that it is important to use economic theory to 
identify a valid and exogenous instrumental variable. However, it is challenging to 
use economical meaningful external instrumental variable compared to using a 
lagged variable in the model specification (Gipple et al., 2015). Gipple et al. (2015) 
also suggest that it is essential to run Hausman-Wu endogeneity test, relevancy F-
test between the endogenous variable and the instrumental variable, and 
Hansen’s over-identifying Chi-square test to validate the instrumental variable. As 
it is difficult to find a truly exogenous instrumental variable in addressing the 
endogeneity issues, the common approach for board gender diversity studies in 
applying instrumental variable method is by way of using lagged value of the 
endogenous variable  (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2010; 
Gordini & Rancati, 2017) .  This is questionable as the lagged value of the 
endogenous variable can be correlated to the dependent variable. In board gender 
diversity and company financial performance study, it is very likely that the lagged 
value of female board representation affects company performance. In this 
instance, the lagged value of the endogenous variable will not fulfil the exogenous 
requirement.  
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Table 3.4: Some examples of external instrumental variable used in 
board gender diversity studies 
Authors Focus of study Instrumental variable 
Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) 
Board gender diversity on 
performance in the U.S. 
The proportion of male directors 
who sit in other boards with the 
presence of female directors 
Capezio and 
Mavisakalyan 
(2016) 
Female directors and fraud in 
Australia 
The CEO’s first name femininity as 
a proxy for gender awareness 
Hsu, Kuo and 
Chang (2016) 
Gender diversity in 
accounting company’s 
partnership and performance 
in Taiwan 
 
The number of female employee of 
the company 
Jurkus, Park 
and Woodard 
(2011) 
Female at top management 
and agency cost in the U.S. 
The proportion of increment in 
female resident population in the 
state of the company 
Liu, Wei and 
Xie (2014) 
Board gender diversity on 
performance in the China 
The proportion of female directors 
and the proportion of female 
employment in the company’s 
industry 
 
Marinova, 
Plantenga and 
Remery (2016) 
Board gender diversity and 
company financial 
performance in Netherlands  
The proportion of female in the 
company’s industry 
Smith, Smith 
and Verner 
(2006) 
Female at top management 
and company financial 
performancein Denmark 
The average length of education of 
the company’s CEO’s spouse  
 
Table 3.4 presents some examples of the external instrumental variable used in 
board gender diversity studies. Among the list of the instrumental variables, the 
exceptional external instrumental variable is the proportion of male directors who 
sit on other boards with the presence of female directors used in Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) study. This instrumental variable is also commonly followed by 
other studies  (Adams & Ragunathan, 2017; Gregory‐Smith, Main, & O'Reilly, 
2013; Levi, Li, & Zhang, 2014) . The economic argument on using this 
instrumental variable is that females have less access in professional network 
compared to male counterparts. Therefore they instrument that the proportion of 
male directors with a connection to the external female directors to the fraction of 
female directors on boards.  It is debatable if this instrumental variable fulfils the 
exogeneity test. If there is a professional network between male directors and 
  81 
female directors on other boards, could there be a strategic tie or business 
relationship between the companies and exchange of some information? If this 
were the case, would the relationships between directors have any implications on 
the company performance? Sila et al. (2016) tested this instrumental variable in 
their study in relation to board gender diversity on company risk. The statistical 
tests of their study substantiates that this instrumental variable is not valid in their 
estimation. Due to the limited information in the dataset, this study does not 
replicate this instrumental variable and unable to substantiate the relevancy and 
the exogeneity of this instrumental variable. 
 
3.5 The Variables 
This section describes the dependent, independent and control variables used in 
this study. This study adopts the variables selection used in previous research that 
examines the relationship between gender-diverse boards and company financial 
performance in the selection of the variables. Table 3.5 presents the summary 
definition and formula of each variable of this study. Each of these variables is 
then discussed in detail in the sub-section that follows. 
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Table 3.5: Summary of the variables 
Dependent Variables (Company financial performance) 
Tobin's Q Q =  Market Value of Equity + Book Value of DebtBook Value of Assets  
 
Variable of Interest: Gender Diversity Measures 
Proportion of female 
directors PFOB =  Total number of female directors on boardsBoard Size  
 
 
Blau Index B = � 1 − [𝑆𝑆2 + (1 − 𝑆𝑆2)]𝑘𝑘
𝑐𝑐=1
 
Where:   
 k – the number of categories (k=2 for gender study, that is 
male and female) 
 S – the proportion of female directors 
 
Critical Mas classification 
based on Kanter’s 
grouping of gender 
diversity measure 
K1 (Uniform group) - Dummy variable equals to 1 when a board 
has no female directors and 0 otherwise; 
 
K2 (Skewed group) - Dummy variable equals to 1 when the 
proportion of female directors is more than 0% but less than 20%, 
and 0 otherwise; 
 
K3 (Tilted group) - Dummy variable equals to 1 when the 
proportion of female directors is equals or more than 20% but 
less than 40%, and 0 otherwise; 
 
K4 (Balanced group) - Dummy variable equals to 1 when the 
proportion of female directors is equals or more than 40%, and 0 
otherwise.   
Critical Mas classification 
based on amended / 
incremental female board 
representation 
classification 
ACM0 – Dummy variable equals 1 to 1 when a board has no 
female directors and 0 otherwise; 
 
ACM20 – Dummy variable equals to 1 when there is at least 20% 
female directors on boards and 0 otherwise; 
 
ACM30 – Dummy variable equals to 1 when there is at least 30% 
female directors on boards and 0 otherwise; 
 
ACM40 – Dummy variable equals to 1 when there is at least 40% 
female directors on boards and 0 otherwise; 
Control Variables (CV) 
a) Board Characteristics Variables 
Board Size 
 
Board = Total number of directors on boards 
Proportion of Independent 
directors PIndDir =  Total number of independent directors on boardsBoard Size  
CEO Tenure CEOT = Total number of years CEO sitting on boards 
 
CEO Duality CEODua = Dummy Variable equals 1 if CEO is also the Chairman 
of the board or 0 otherwise 
 
b) Company Level Variables (CV) 
Company size LogMC = Log of total market capitalisation, measured by total 
number of share outstanding x share price as at the financial date 
 
Sales revenue LogRev = Log of total sales revenue 
 
Net gearing NDE = (Short term debt + long term debt - cash) / shareholders 
equity 
 
Volatility of ROE VROE = Standard deviation of annual ROE over the last 3 years 
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3.5.1 Dependent Variables – Company Financial Performance 
Various empirical indicators are used to measure company financial performance 
in the literature  (Mackey, Mackey, & Barney, 2007) . This study defines the 
market-based measure of company performance, Tobin’s Q, as the dependent 
variable of this study. The choice of Tobin’s Q as the performance measure is 
consistent with previous literature (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Campbell & Mínguez-
Vera, 2008; Dezsö & Ross, 2012) . Tobin’s Q was introduced by James Tobin in 
1978 and has been used to measure company financial performance in Western 
and developed countries with more stable and strong capital market structure, 
such as the United States and European countries. Similarly, the Australian capital 
market is comparatively stable and follows a similar market trend to the United 
States and Europe, allowing Tobin’s Q to be a useful market-based performance 
measure to examine company financial performance of the Australian companies. 
 
Most literature  (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Campbell & 
Minguez Vera, 2010; Carter et al., 2010; Conyon & He, 2017; Schultz et al., 2010)  
use Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) approximation of Tobin’s Q as the measurement of 
company financial performance. This is calculated as the sum of the market value 
of company’s common stock plus liquidating value of preferred stock plus book 
value of debt divided by book value of total assets. This study applies this 
approximation and calculates Tobin’s Q as followed: 
 
Tobin’s Q =  
(Market Value of Equity+Book Value of Debt)
Book Value of Assets   
 
Where:  
Market value of equity  = Market share capitalization 
= Total number of shares issued * share price 
(as at the end of the company’s financial year) 
Book value of debt   = Total liabilities  
Book value of assets  = Total assets  
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The ratio of Tobin’s Q provides a yardstick for measurement of company financial 
performance. Investors expect that the company can create positive returns with 
effective use of currently available resources if the Q ratio is more than one. It 
represents the company’s strong competitive advantage with growth opportunity  
(Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Gordini & Rancati, 2017; Rose, 2007) . Poor 
utilization of resources is indicated by a Q ratio of less than one, meaning that the 
company is unable to create more value with existing resources. As Tobin’s Q is a 
market-based measurement and embodies the market expectation of company 
financial performance, it enables the market to forecast the future cash flow and 
provide an assessment of the company’s investment opportunities. 
 
The rational to use Tobin’s Q over other common accounting measure is because 
it measures market performance of wealth of a company that emphasises future 
expected earnings capacity of the company. While most of the accounting 
measures (e.g. ROA and ROE) measure past performance, it does not capture the 
future potential growth and earnings of a company  (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001) . 
Hence, Tobin’s Q is a suitable proxy for a company’s competitive advantage as it 
measures a companies’ market value and reflects the market’s expectations of 
future earnings  (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988) . The market value of a 
company is also determined by distributed shareholders’ return and consequently 
driving the share price and market capitalisation of a company. Furthermore, the 
value of Tobin’s Q is associated with intellectual capital, where companies with 
high Tobin’s Q is expected to improve the financial performance through the 
greater use of companies’ higher intellectual capital   (Coles et al., 2008; López & 
Morrós, 2014) . Tobin’s Q focus on future performance has allowed it to gain 
acceptance in recent studies.  
 
However, Tobin’s Q has a few weaknesses as the performance measure of a 
company. As Tobin’s Q uses book value of debt and book value of assets, it is 
subjective to the accounting treatment of liability and assets on the balance sheet. 
Moreover, as Tobin’s Q indicates the growth opportunity of a company, any 
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changes over a company’s Q over time may reflect changes to its growth 
opportunity in the future. This future growth may be driven by economic and the 
industry conditions. Zhuo (2001) indicates that the changes in company value may 
be a result of noise when examining the effects of governance characteristics on 
company’s performance.  
 
Tobin’s Q is more forward-looking than the accounting measure of performance in 
which the value of companies reflects more on the company’s current plan and 
strategies   (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003) . The examples of the other alternative 
accounting measures of company financial performance are return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE). This market-based performance measure is 
also more reflective of market responses to particular company’s decision   (Griffin 
& Mahon, 1997) . Kiel and Nicholson (2003) indicate that market-based measures 
of performance are more important compared to the accounting-based measure of 
performance in board composition studies in Australian public listed companies. 
The accounting-based measure can be subjective as management of the 
company can choose the adoption of accounting standard and policy depending 
on their circumstances and intention.  
 
3.5.2 Variable of Interest – Board Gender Diversity Measures 
The main focus of the explanatory variable in this study is board gender diversity. 
To examine the effect of gender-diverse boards on company performance, this 
study employs the proportion of female directors on boards as the primary 
measure of board gender diversity. We also include the Blau index as a 
robustness check on the effect of gender-diverse boards on company 
performance. To test the second hypothesis on effects of critical mass of female 
directors on boards, this study applies Kanter’s critical mass theory and classifies 
the proportion of female directors on boards according to Kanter’s classification 
groups as the measure of board gender diversity. The following section presents 
the details of the board gender diversity measures.  
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3.5.2.1 The Proportion Of Female Directors On Boards 
Previous literature that employ the proportion of female directors on boards as the 
gender diversity measure are Adams and Ferreira (2009), Ahern and Dittmar 
(2012), Allemand and Barbe (2014), Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2010), Darmani 
(2013), and Erhardt et al. (2008). It is measured by dividing the number of female 
directors on the board with the total number of board members of a company as 
followed: 
 PFOB = Total number of females board representationBoard size  
  
Where:  
PFOB  – The proportion of female directors on board 
Board Size  – Total number of board members 
 
The proportion of female directors provides a more meaningful board gender 
diversity measure than other gender diversity measures, such as the absolute 
number of female directors or the dummy variable that measures the presence of 
female directors on boards. This is because the proportion of female directors on 
boards takes into account the board size in relative terms. 
 
3.5.2.2 Blau Index  
This study also users another widely used diversity measure for categorical 
variables, the Blau index, as the robustness check on the relationship between 
board gender diversity and performance (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010). Blau 
(1977) measures the diversity using the following formula: 
B = � 1 − [𝑆𝑆2 + (1 − 𝑆𝑆2)]𝑘𝑘
𝑐𝑐=1
 
  Where:   
k – the number of categories (k=2 for gender study, that is male 
and female) 
S – the proportion of female directors 
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The Blau index measures the diversity of the sample by considering the ratio of 
female and male directors, using the proportion S as stated above. This study 
sample consists of two groups of diversity measures, the groups of male and 
female directors. In this instance, k equals two. A proportionate board with equal 
numbers of male and female directors will have a maximum Blau index value of 
0.5, and boards with no diversity will have a minimum Blau index of zero  (Miller & 
Triana, 2009) . Previous studies that employ the Blau index as the measure of 
board gender diversity are Ali, Kulik, and Metz (2011), Campbell and Minguez-
Vera (2008), Joecks, Pull and Vetter (2013). 
 
3.5.2.3 Kanter’s Classification of Gender Diversity 
To test the second hypothesis of this study, we apply the critical mass theory and 
measure the board gender diversity with Kanter’s (1977b) four gender diversity 
categories. Consistent with Joecks, Pull and Vetter (2013), Liu, Wei and Xie 
(2014), Strydom, Au Yong and Rankin (2017), and Konrad, Kramer and Erkut 
(2008), we create four sets of dummy variables for each of the four gender 
diversity categories that reflect Kanter’s critical mass grouping as:  
 
i. Uniform group: K1 equals one when board consists of all male directors 
and zero otherwise; 
ii. Skewed group: K2 equals one when there is at least one female director 
but less than twenty percent female directors on boards, and zero 
otherwise; 
iii. Tilted group: K3 equals one when there is at least twenty percent but not 
more than forty percent of female directors on boards, and zero 
otherwise; 
iv. Balanced group: K4 equals one when there are at least forty percent of 
female directors on boards, and zero otherwise.   
 
This study also extends the critical mass theory and modifies the gender grouping 
in an incremental order. The rationale for this amended grouping is to allow 
  88 
comparison of boards with less female board representation to boards with more 
female directors. Based on Kanter’s original critical mass classification, we 
compare the dummy group to others that do not belong to the category. For 
example, the analysis of K2 category, which is the skewed group consisting of 
boards with at least one but less than twenty percent female directors are 
compared to K1 boards with all male directors and also boards with twenty percent 
or more female directors, which is K3 and K4 boards. The amended gender 
classification enables this study to examine the level at which female board 
representation affects company performance. The amended critical mass 
classifications of female directors on boards are as followed: 
 
i. ACM0 – Dummy variable equals one when board has no female director 
and zero otherwise; 
ii. ACM20 – Dummy variable equals one when there is at least twenty 
percent of female directors on boards and zero otherwise; 
iii. ACM30 – Dummy variable equals one when there is at least thirty 
percent of female directors on boards and zero otherwise; and  
iv. ACM40 – Dummy variable equals one when there is at least forty percent 
of female directors on boards and zero otherwise.   
 
3.5.3 Control Variables  
This study also includes control variables in our model to isolate the effects of 
female board representation on company performance. We rely on previous 
corporate board gender diversity studies to identify the relevant control variables 
that may have an impact on company performance. In general, previous studies 
categorise the control variables into two groups; the board characteristic control 
variables and company level control variables   (Christensen et al., 2010; Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003; Pham et al., 2011; Schultz et al., 2010) . This study applies the 
same concept, and the following sub-section presents both board level control 
variables and company level control variables.  
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3.5.3.1 Board Characteristic Control Variables  
The board of directors defines the strategic direction and significant decisions that 
determine the success of a company. Hence, board characteristics influence the 
company performance, and the important board characteristics should be included 
as control variables when determining company performance. The board 
characteristic control variables in this study are: board size measured as the total 
number of board directors (Board), the proportion of independent directors 
(PIndDir), CEO’s tenure (CEOT) and CEO and board’s chairman duality dummy 
(CEODua).  
 
Board size (Board) is an important trait that determines the effective monitoring 
and controlling of the management team and carries out the advising role to the 
CEO  (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Prior literature that examines the 
relationships between board structure and company financial performance argue 
that there is a negative correlation between the board size and board effectiveness  
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013) . These 
studies argue that when the board increases in size, there is a tendency to 
increase agency problems. Jensen (2010) suggests that there is a tendency of 
free riding and ineffective monitoring of the managerial function with large boards. 
A larger board generally lacks cohesiveness and it is difficult for the CEO to 
engage every board member in meaningful and interactive discussions. Jensen 
(2010) also suggests it is more difficult to coordination large boards. A large board 
tends to symbolise the success or power of a company rather than fulfilling its 
function in the management role and setting the strategic direction of the company   
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 2001) . Lipton and Lorsch (1992) recommend that the 
optimal number of directors on a board is seven or eight as any board larger than 
this size could result in ineffective discussion. On the other hand, some studies 
suggest an inverse relationship between board size and company financial 
performance  (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Mak & Kusnadi, 2005; Yermack, 1996) . 
These studies argue that smaller boards create more value than larger boards as 
smaller boards interact better and are more effective in coordinating and 
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communicating with board members. This creates meaningful involvement and 
cohesiveness among the board members.  
 
Board independence (PIndDir) is an important trait that reflects the monitoring 
capacity of the corporate board of the management team (Fama, 1980). It is 
conventional wisdom to accept that board independence adds value to the 
company as they oversee the executive and management teams in carrying out 
their duty. The advocates for good corporate governance suggest that the majority 
of the board members should comprise independent directors17. However, prior 
studies demonstrate mixed results on board independence and company 
performance.  For example, Adams and Ferreira (2009) found a mixed result on 
the proportion of independent directors with company financial performance 
dependent on the estimation method used. They found a significant positive 
relationship with 2SLS estimation and significant negative relationship with a GMM 
model. Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) and Bhagat and Black (2002) found 
insignificant relationships between outside directors and company’s financial 
performance. Chen and Tjosvold (2013) found a positive correlation between the 
proportion of independent directors and the quality of financial disclosure that 
leads to subsequent improvements in financial performance. 
  
The CEO’s roles in a company include the making of major corporate decisions, 
implementation of high-level operational strategies with the executive team of 
managers, and maintaining the communication with the board of directors. We use 
the proxy of CEO tenure to measure the CEO’s experience in managing a 
company. We believe that the longer the CEO is responsible for managing the 
company, the CEO accumulates more executive experience in the company as 
well as the industry, and that leads to better performance, in terms of the company 
and the CEO’s human capital. CEO tenure refers to the number of years the CEO 
is serving with the company. This study accounts only on the full years of service 
as a CEO and not partial years of service as the CEO tenure measures. 
                                                         
17 ASX Corporate Governance Council’s 2014 edition: Principle 2.4 of Corporate governance principles and 
recommendations. 
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The roles of the chairman of a company’s board is to assure that there is active 
and adequate communication between the board of directors and the 
management team, responsible for planning and developing an effective board of 
directors and executive team to implement the company’s overall strategies  
(Ammari et al., 2014). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the separation of 
management and control roles of CEO and Chairman could reduce the agency 
costs and possible abuse of power and consequently improve company 
performance. Other studies also suggest that the combination of the CEO and the 
Chairman’s role is an obstacle to board’s duties as it weakens the control 
mechanism of the board and there are no significant advantages of having 
combine role of the CEO and the Chairman   (Carty & Weiss, 2012) . Hence, this 
study includes CEO duality (CEODua) as the control variables at board level as it 
affects the effectiveness of board monitoring  (Bear et al., 2010)  and performance 
in the broader aspect. The Australian corporate governance council also 
recommended that the chairman of the board should be independent director and 
CEO of the company should not be the chairperson of the board of directors18. 
The variable CEO duality (CEODua) refers to the dual function of the CEO, which 
is when an individual is holding a dual position as the Chairman and the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of a company. It is a dummy variable equals to one when 
the same individual holds the role as the CEO and the Chairman of the board 
concurrently, zero otherwise. 
 
3.5.3.2 Company Level Control Variables 
In addition to the board level control variables, this study also controls for a 
number of company-level variables that affect performance. These variables are 
obtained from the financial reports, and they are company size, company’s 
gearing, and risk level.  
 
                                                        18 ASX Corporate Governance Council’s 2014 edition: Principle 2.5 of Corporate governance principles and 
recommendations.  
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Company size is widely used as a control variable in board gender diversity 
studies. In general, larger companies have the economies of scale that influence 
the industry and the market trend. Hence a positive correlation between company 
size and company financial performance is expected. A study by Lee  (2009) 
suggests that larger companies tend to perform better than the smaller companies 
as larger companies have more growth potential and are more efficient with higher 
market power. Many different proxies are used to measure company size in the 
literature. For example, total sale or revenue (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Hillman et 
al., 2007)  , market capitalisation  (Geiger & Marlin, 2012; Joecks et al., 2013)   
and total assets  (Carter et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2010; Sila et al., 2016) . This 
study applies both total market capitalisation and total revenue as a proxy for 
company size. We do not use total assets as a control variable in this study 
because of the cancellation effect between the right-hand side control variable with 
the denominator of total assets in Tobin’s Q.  
 
Leverage is also a frequently used control variable in studies that examine board 
gender diversity and company financial performance  (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Schultz et al., 2010; Wang & Clift, 2009)  . Highly leveraged companies required 
greater monitoring from management and boards and hence increase monitoring 
costs. The leverage level of a company is expected to have a negative correlation 
with company performance.  We use the net gearing ratio as the proxy of a 
company’s leverage level. It is measured by dividing the company’s total debt to its 
total equity as followed: Net Gearing (NDE) = Short term debt +  Long term debt −  CashShareholders equity  
 
Follow previous studies  (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ahmed & Ali, 2017; Wintoki et 
al., 2012) , we also control for the volatility of return of the company. Volatility ROE 
measures company risk factor that influence company financial performance 
(Miller & Bromiley, 1990). Ahmed & Ali  (2017) suggest that the volatility of 
company shares increase the uncertainty of holding costs of a company and 
hence affect the risk factor and share price as well as company financial 
performance measured in Tobin’s Q. This study applies the volatility of return on 
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equity (VROE) as the proxy for company risk, which is measured by the standard 
deviation of the prior three years return on equity. 
 
3.6 Empirical Methods 
This study employs multiple regression analysis to test the hypotheses concerning 
the implications of board gender diversity on company performance. We use the 
statistical software, STATA 14, to run the diagnostic tests and the statistical 
regression analysis of the model. The following sub-section presents the methods 
of estimation of this study. 
 
3.6.1 Panel Data  
This study uses unbalanced panel data of 299 companies listed in the ASX200 
index from the period 2008 to 2015. Panel data involves analysis of both cross 
sectional and time series dimensions of the sample set. Panel data controls for 
any unobserved variables and produces a consistent regression estimates. It also 
enables us to mitigate against any unobservable heterogeneity that may present in 
the sample. Panel data also provides more information and increases the degrees 
of freedom, results in less collinearity among the explanatory variables and 
improves the efficiency of the parameter estimates.  
 
Furthermore, the dynamic relationships between company’s past performance and 
current board structure cannot be estimated using cross-sectional data or a single 
time series data. Panel data allows the utilisation of the intercompany prior years’ 
effects to estimate an unconstrained distributed lag model (Hsiao, 2014). The 
additional information in panel data also allows us to blend within company and 
between company information that enables a study to produce more reliable 
parameter estimates, which a single cross-sectional and an individual time series 
data are unable to address.  
 
In panel data, the availability of repeated observations of a group of companies 
allow a study to detect the unobservable through a linear transformation by either 
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taking the differencing of the companies or taking the deviation from the mean 
across the individual company over time. For example, in a simple regression of Yit 
= β0 +  β1Xit +  β2Zit + εit, with an error term (ε) that is independently, identically and 
distributed (i.i.d) over i and t with zero mean and variance equals to σ2, the OLS 
regression will yield unbiased and consistent estimates (Hsiao, 2014). However, if 
the values of Zit are unobservable and the covariance of Xit and Zit are non zero 
[Cov(Xit, Zit) ≠ 0], then the OLS estimates can be biased. Therefore, if the values of 
Z stay constant over the entire period of examination for a particular company but 
vary across the sample companies, that is Zit = Zi, the estimate will take the first 
difference of an individual company over time with the model as (Yit - Yi,t-1) = β1(Xit 
- Xi,t-1) +  (εit - εi,t-1). Similarly, if the values of Zit stay the same across all 
companies at time t, that is Zit = Zt, the estimate will take the deviation of mean 
across the companies at time t with the model as (Yit – meanYt) = β1(Xit - meanXt) +  
(εit - meanεt). Single cross-sectional data or single time series data cannot perform 
this transformation, unless we have an instrumental variable that correlates with X 
but does not correlate with Z and the error term. An OLS single cross-sectional 
regression or a single time series regression can result in biased estimates 
(Baltagi, 2008) 
 
However, there are limitations in using panel data. Due to a wide-variety of 
variables or factors that can influence the company’s performance, it is not 
possible to include all possible influencing variables in the model specifications. 
The challenging task in this situation is to establish a model that addresses the 
heterogeneity across companies over a period of times that are not captured on 
the right-hand side of the model. However, it is acceptable that insignificant 
variables are not to be included in the model specification because the main focus 
of a good model is not to capture the reality, but rather to achieve the essential 
factors that influence the outcomes (Hsiao, 2014). The next section discusses a 
variety of methods that address the limitations in panel data. 
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3.6.2 Diagnostic Tests 
This study employs a number of diagnostic techniques to examine the dataset to 
ensure that the dataset is free from biases and are efficient before proceeding with 
the statistical tests. These diagnostic tests are multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, 
Hausman test, unit roots and endogeneity tests.  
 
3.6.2.1 Multicolinearity Test 
A correlation matrix examines the data for multicollinearity. The general rule of 
thumb for identifying if multicollinearity exists between two variables is a 
correlation of 0.7 or higher. In a multiple regression analysis, multicollinearity 
among the variables will cause unstable parameter estimates and produce biased 
results. It may also undermine the significance of an explanatory variable and 
difficulty in demonstrating the impact of an explanatory variable on the dependent 
variable.  
 
3.6.2.2 Heteroskedasticity Test 
The heteroskedasticity test is to examine if the variance of the error terms is 
constant and uncorrelated to the variable in the model specification. The presence 
of heteroskedasticity in a model can cause an inefficient parameter estimate in a 
structural model because the variance in the model is not constant. In this study, 
we use Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test to examine if pooled regression or 
random effects regression is more appropriate in the model with the following null 
hypothesis: 
 
H0: The variance in the model is constant, that is homoskedasticity 
 
If Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test rejects the null hypothesis with the 
probability chi-square of less than the critical value of five percent, this indicates 
that the variance of the error terms in the dataset is not constant. This suggests 
that standard errors robustness test is required in the estimation to examine the 
relationship between board gender diverse boards and company performance.  
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3.6.2.3 Hausman Test Of Fixed Effects And Random Effects Model 
This study also carries out a Hausman test to determine if a fixed effects model or 
random effects model is more suitable for the dataset.  In general, if there is no 
endogeneity concern between the error terms and the explanatory variable, 
random effects estimation provides the most efficient, consistent and unbiased 
parameter estimates.  However, if an endogeneity issue due to the present of 
unobservable heterogeneity in the structural model, then a random effects model 
becomes inconsistent and the estimation can be biased. In this instance, fixed 
effects model is more appropriate (Wooldridge, 2010). Furthermore, when the 
estimation makes inferences on the outcomes of a sample data rather than a 
population, fixed effects model is preferred over random effects model. As 
mentioned in section 3.4, the general model specification of this study is: Pit = β0 + 
β1GDit + βkCVit + εit. This model will produce an unbiased estimate if the coefficient 
of the parameter is consistent across the individual companies and there is no 
correlation between the error terms and the explanatory variables, making the 
random effects model estimation most appropriate. However, if there is 
unobservable heterogeneity concern in the structural model and the possibility 
differences among the individual company component, then fixed effects model is 
more appropriate with the following model specification: 
 
Pit = β0 + β1GDit + βkCVit + δi + γt + εit  t = 1…….t, i = 1……n  ---------- (1a) 
Where:   
P  – The n*1 vector of company financial performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q, across n observations 
GD  – The time-invariant n*1 matrix of gender diversity measure across N 
observations 
CV  – The time-invariant n*k matrix of the control variables across n 
observations 
β – The unknown k*1 vector of regression parameters  
δi  – Company time-invariant fixed effects 
γt  – Year dummy fixed effects 
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ε  – A n*1 vector of the error term 
i  – The number of n observations of the sample 
t  – The time period of each financial year 
k  – The number of control variables used in the structural model 
 
Referring to model (1a), δi and γt represent the company and time-specific effects. 
Hausman specification test allows this study to examine if the company and time 
specific effects δi and γt can be treated as random effects that are drawn from a 
population or fixed effects that are drawn from a sample (Baltagi, 2008). The 
hypothesis to test which model is more suitable for our dataset is: 
 
H0: There is no correlation between δi and γt with εit, indicating that random 
effects model is more appropriate. 
H1: There is correlation between δi and γt with εit, indicating that fixed 
effects model is more appropriate. 
 
3.6.2.4 Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test For Endogeneity  
This study also utilises Hausman test for fixed effects estimation to address the 
issue of inconsistent coefficients across the individual companies in the sample 
data and produce consistent parameter estimates. However, Sila et al. (2016) 
argue that a fixed effects estimator is insufficient to mitigate the presence of 
endogeneity if the explanatory variable is not exogenous to the dependent 
variable. We apply the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity to address the 
most detrimental problem in board diversity-performance studies and also to 
examine if an endogeneity issue exists in the structural model.  
 
To examine if the variable of interest of this study, the proportion of female 
directors, is exogenous to the dependent variable, company performance, we 
hypothesise the null hypothesis as followed: 
   
H0: The variable of interest is exogenous. 
  H1: The variables of interest are endogenous. 
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This hypothesis can be tested using the following statistics that has a Chi-square 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the k number of the β in equation 
(1a): 
(βOLS – βIV)t [VarIV – VOLS]-1 (βOLS – βIV) ~ χ2 of the k number of β in equation (1a) 
  
We first run the 2SLS instrumental variable analysis on the identified problematic 
explanatory variable (PFOB) with the specified external instrumental variable (FC) 
and all other control variables in the model. We then run the diagnostic test using 
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman’s endogeneity test. If the result rejects the null 
hypothesis, this indicates that the variable of interest is endogenous to the 
dependent variable. This implies that using the fixed effects estimation is 
insufficient to deal with the endogeneity issue. In this instance, applying an 
external instrumental variable will be the appropriate method to address the 
endogeneity issue.  
 
3.6.3 Multiple Regression Statistical Analysis 
This study carries out a comprehensive analysis with various types of statistical 
methods to examine the effects on parameter estimates when applying different 
statistical methods in a governance-performance study, and more specifically 
board gender diversity and company financial performance study. We begin with 
the ordinary least square (OLS) pooled regression with random effects analysis, 
followed by the fixed effects model, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
instrumental variables method, Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) dynamic Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) methods. The most 
common empirical methods used in governance-performance studies before the 
year 2000 are random effects or pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
and fixed effects linear regression. The existence of an ongoing endogeneity 
problem (Bota-Avram, 2013) in governance and performance studies led to the 
subsequent use of 2SLS instrumental variable, dynamic and system GMM 
methods to address the endogeneity issues.  
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The three possibility causes of endogeneity are unobserved heterogeneity, 
simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity (Wintoki et al., 2012). Unobserved 
heterogeneity exists due to the unobservable individual company-specific 
characteristics that influence the company’s governance structure and 
performance. An example would be managers’ capability and the CEO’s 
experience, the company’s risk and their risk tolerance, which may affect the 
company’s performance. Simultaneity occurs when a company’s board 
characteristics are simultaneously determined by its performance. For example, a 
company may choose the board characteristics and control mechanisms that suit 
the company’s performance level or the expected company’s performance. 
Dynamic endogeneity occurs when past indicator variables affect the current 
variables. In corporate governance and performance studies, this happens when 
the past performance influences the characteristics of the current board and 
performance control variables. An example would be that poor performing 
companies might choose to change the board structure to have stronger corporate 
governance control (Schultz et al., 2010).   
 
The possibility of an endogeneity issue caused by at least one of the above 
causes will result in biased and inconsistent estimates in a study. It is plausible to 
make a valid inference without carefully addressing the possibility of any one of 
the sources of endogeneity (Bota-Avram, 2013). To address the endogeneity issue 
in a diversity-performance study when testing female board representation effects 
on company’s performance, we need to consider all three possibilities endogeneity 
causes. The general statistical methods for dealing with the endogeneity problem 
are; fixed effects linear regression estimator, two-stage least square (2SLS) 
instrumental variable method, system GMM approach and dynamic GMM 
estimator. We will discuss each of these methods in the following section and the 
suitability of these methods in our analysis.  
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3.6.3.1 Ordinary Least Square Regression: Pooled Regression, Random 
Effects And Fixed Effects Estimation 
The simple general linear regression of panel data can be specified as Yit = β0 +  
βiXit + εit. The main feature of panel data is to control the impact of the unobserved 
heterogeneity in the model to produce unbiased and efficient parameter estimates. 
In governance characteristics and performance studies, the potential causes of 
omitted variables in a model are company specific time-invariant variables, time-
specific company-invariant variables, and company-time varying variables. If the 
unobserved heterogeneity is company specific time-invariant, then the parameters 
β0 and βi stay the same for a given cross-sectional company but may vary across 
the cross-sectional companies. In this instance, the sampling distributions may 
change. The examples of the unobserved heterogeneity in time-invariant variables 
are CEO’s ability, managers’ / CEO’s and board members’ gender and social 
economic background. These characteristics stay constant for a given company 
but vary across the cross-section of companies in the sample over a period of time 
if there are no changes in board members. Time-specific company-invariant 
variables are variables that remain the same for all companies in the sample at a 
given period but may vary through a different period of study. The examples of this 
company-invariant variable are interest rates, government policies affecting the 
companies and market conditions. The company and time-varying variables are 
variables that exhibit variation across the cross-sectional companies in the sample 
set at a given period and also vary throughout the sample period. The examples of 
company and time-varying variables are company’ profitability, revenue and 
market capitalisation.  
 
In a panel data regression model, we assume that the unobserved heterogeneity 
in the simple regression model [Yit = β0 + βiXit + εit] remains constant through 
time for a given cross-sectional company or remains the same across companies 
at a given period.  With this assumption, the estimate produces unbiased 
parameters and controls for all three possible time-invariant, company-invariant 
and both company and time-invariant variables. In this instance, the effects of 
omitted variables can be absorbed in the intercept β0, and the generalisation of a 
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variable-intercept model for panel data can fit in very well in the linear regression 
model using panel data (Hsiao, 2014).  
 
Three linear regression models can be used to examine the panel data. The 
fundamental pooled linear regression model in panel data can be specified in the 
ordinary least square estimation as Yit = β0 + βiXit + εit, where we use the variable-
intercept model. The underlying assumptions are that all excluded omitted 
variables are absorbed in the intercept and remain constant across the cross-
sectional data and over time. Under these assumptions, the pooled OLS estimator 
is the best linear unbiased estimator (Wooldridge, 2010). We can also include the 
unobserved company and time specific effects μ in the simple linear regression 
stated above as Yit = β0 + βiXit + μit + εit, where μit is assumed to remain constant 
for a given company of i over time t and a given period of t over company i. We 
can treat the company and time specific effects μit as either fixed or random 
effects.  
 
Hausman (1978) discovered in empirical testing that using fixed effects estimation 
produce a significantly different result from random effect estimation. The ideal 
approach to unify the fixed effects model and random effects model is by way of 
assuming that all effects are random. The fixed effects model is appropriate when 
a study makes inferences on the outcomes that are in the sample. A random 
effects model is more appropriate than fixed effects model when a study makes 
unconditional inferences concerning the population. When the company and time 
specific effects are treated as random, these effects can be considered either 
correlated or uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. However, when the 
company effects are regarded as fixed and vary across the companies in the 
sample of a study, and because of the possibility of multicollinearity between the 
company effects and other time-invariant variables, fixed effects estimation will be 
more appropriate. This study applies Hausman misspecification test to verify if the 
company and time specific effects μ can be treated as random effects that are 
drawn from the population or fixed effects from the sample. The null hypothesis for 
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this misspecification test is H0: Cov (μit, Xit) = 0 and the alternative hypothesis is 
H1: Cov (μit, Xit)  ≠ 0.  
 
The Hausman test examines if the difference in the coefficients is systematic. If 
the F-test reject the OLS random effects estimation, which is the null hypothesis, 
fixed effects panel regression will be more appropriate in a study. Using company 
fixed effects helps eliminate bias due to a constant omitted variable, while 
company and time fixed effects control for the economic-wide yearly fluctuations. 
For this study’s general model (1), we separate the company and time specific 
effects μ into αi + γt, where αi is the company fixed effects, and γt is the time-
specific fixed effects. The general model using fixed effects panel regression 
estimation for this study is as follows: 
 
Pit = β0 + β1GDit + βkCVit + δi + γt + εit  t = 1…….t, i = 1……n  ---------- (1a) 
Where:   
P  – The n*1 vector of company financial performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q, across n observations 
GD  – The time-invariant n*1 matrix of gender diversity measure across N 
observations 
CV  – The time-invariant n*k matrix of the control variables across n 
observations 
β – The unknown k*1 vector of regression parameters  
δi  – Company time-invariant fixed effects 
γt  – Year dummy fixed effects 
 
ε  – A n*1 vector of the error term 
i  – The number of n observations of the sample 
t  – The time period of each financial year 
k  – The number of control variables used in the structural model 
 
Antonakis et al.  (2010)   indicate that OLS regressions tend to be negatively 
biased towards the result when there is an unobserved omitted variable in the 
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data. To mitigate this, we apply the fixed effects method to make up for any 
omitted variables. A dummy variable is created for each individual company that is 
unique to itself. By including fixed effects in the model, we eliminate any 
unobservable variables from the equation and use the least squares method to 
produce unbiased parameters. Adams & Ferreira (2009) suggest that omitted 
variables affect the board diversity’s policy and performance relationship. They 
employ firm fixed effects in their analysis and show that firm fixed effects are 
significant in the results. Carte et al.  (2010) also apply OLS fixed effects 
regression with time and firm fixed effects to mitigate omitted variables.  
 
3.6.3.2 Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable Method 
Applying fixed effect estimator is insufficient to address the possibility of 
endogeneity that exists in the diversity-performance study (Sila et al., 2016). This 
is due to the fundamental key assumptions in the ordinary least squares 
regression. OLS method assumes that the explanatory variables are strictly 
orthogonal to the errors and the error terms are independently and identically 
normally distributed (i.i.d) with a mean zero and a variance equals to σ2. It means 
that an unbiased estimation of the relationship between governance 
characteristics and performance can only be estimated when the expected value 
of the dependent variable is a function of the exogenous explanatory variables.  
 
It is also ambiguous whether gender-diverse boards affect company financial 
performance or whether there exists a simultaneous causality between female 
representation on boards and company financial performance due to self-selection 
process. Self-selection processes influence the appointment decisions on the 
board of directors that determine the diversity of the board structure. These 
endogeneity problems can lead to biased and unreliable findings if it is not being 
addressed appropriately.  
 
It is a general consensus that a better strategy in dealing with endogeneity is by 
identifying a truly exogenous instrumental variable. However, finding a truly 
exogenous variable is challenging. Adams and Ferreira (2009) use fraction of male 
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directors with board connections to female directors as their instrumental variable. 
They argue that greater gender diversity is observed if the male directors are more 
connected to the female directors. Adams and Ragunathan (2017) replicate this 
concept by applying the average number of years that bank directors interact with 
female executives or directors from other industries as their instrumental variable. 
Ahern and Dittmar  (2012) use pre-quota cross-sectional variation in female board 
representation as an instrument for exogenous changes to corporate boards 
following the quota introduction in Norway. 
 
As explained in section 3.3.5, this study introduces a unique external instrumental 
variable by applying the influence of political science in corporate governance 
(Terjesen et al., 2015) and the theory of “economic ramification of distance” 
(Bouwman, 2012) in developing the exogenous external instrumental variable. We 
believe that female politicians play an important role in influencing other females’ 
involvement in politics as well as in the workforce. As a country’s institutional 
environment co-evolves with gender corporate policies (Terjesen et al., 2015), the 
representation of local female councillors has a positive influence on the 
experienced and skills females acquire to excel as directors on corporate boards.  
The parallel argument is that as females achieve leadership positions in other 
areas of society, we should also expect to see increasing numbers of female 
representation on corporate boards.  This study applies the concept of geography 
influence of female councillors in local governments and links the headquarter 
office of the sample ASX200 companies to their respective local governments. By 
combining these two perspectives of the influence of gender on workforce 
participation, it is hoped that a more robust instrumental variable will address the 
endogeneity issue.  
 
The first justification to employ an instrumental variable method is the presence of 
an endogenous regressor in the model. In general, OLS is the most efficient and 
consistent method for estimating the parameters in the regression model.  
However, if an endogeneity issue is the concern in a study, an endogeneity test is 
required to justify the application of any other analytical method. Although the 
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instrumental variable approach is consistent with the estimates, the use of an 
instrumental variable method needs to be balanced against the possible loss of 
efficiency of the OLS method. We apply Durbin-Wu-Hausman’s endogeneity test 
to examine if endogeneity issue is present in the model and to test if the OLS 
method is inconsistent. If the test suggests that the endogeneity issue exists in the 
model, then the 2SLS instrumental variable method is more appropriate in 
estimating the structural equation of the model rather than OLS.  
 
An endogenous variable is one that correlates with the error terms in the model. In 
relation to this study, there is a likelihood that the problematic variable of interest, 
the proportion of female directors on boards, is endogenously determined with 
company performance. In this case, the coefficient of the proportion of female 
directors variable cannot be interpreted as capturing the effect of company 
financial performance due to confounding factors. This means that the 
endogenous variable is jointly determined with the dependent variable within the 
model. This study introduces an external instrumental variable that is uncorrelated 
with the disturbance term but correlated with the endogenous variable into the 
model equation to overcome the possibility of simultaneous causality between the 
endogenous variable and the dependent variable. With this in place, this 
estimation should capture only the effects on the dependent variable on changes 
in the explanatory variables induced by the external instrumental variable. This 
study applies the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to examine if there exists an 
endogenous explanatory variable in the structural model. 
 
To reiterate the general model specification of this study, the pooled OLS model is 
specified as model (1) and the fixed effects model includes both time-invariant and 
company-invariant effects is defined as model (1a) as follows: 
 
Pit = β0 + β1GDit + βkCVit + εit    t = 1…….t, i = 1……n  ---------- (1) 
Pit = β0 + β1GDit + βkCVit + δi + γt + εit  t = 1…….t, i = 1……n  ---------- (1a) 
Where:   
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P  – The n*1 vector of company financial performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q, across n observations 
GD  – The time-invariant n*1 matrix of gender diversity measure across N 
observations 
CV  – The time-invariant n*k matrix of the control variables across n 
observations 
β – The unknown k*1 vector of regression parameters  
δ  – Company time-invariant fixed effects 
γ  – Year dummy fixed effects 
ε  – A n*1 vector of the error term 
i  – The number of n observations of the sample 
t  – The time period of each financial year 
k  – The number of control variables used in the structural model 
 
Hermalin and Weisback (2001) indicate that the endogeneity issue exists in 
examining board composition and companies performance due to reverse 
causality of the variables. In this instance, the parameter estimates in the fixed 
effects estimation as stated in equation (1a) above can be biased if the dependent 
variable and explanatory variable are endogenous, specifically the company 
financial performance measure (Tobin’s Q) and the proportion of females on 
boards (PFOB).  
 
This study deals with the possibility of an endogeneity issue in the model by way 
of identifying a truly exogenous instrumental variable, the proportion of local 
female councillors. When applying an external instrumental variable regression in 
equation (1) or (1a), the external instrumental variable breaks the endogenous 
variable, the proportion of female directors on boards (PFOB), into two parts. The 
first part of the proportion of female directors on boards (PFOB) is correlated with ε 
and the second part is not correlated with ε. We can only estimate the coefficient 
of the proportion of female directors on boards by isolating the part that is not 
correlated with ε using the external instrumental variable. This external 
instrumental variable method detects the changes in the proportion of female 
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directors on boards that are not correlated with ε. It produces an unbiased 
parameter estimate to explain the relationship between gender-diverse boards and 
company performance. 
 
A valid external instrumental variable needs to fulfil two conditions. The first 
condition in applying an external instrumental variable requires that there is no 
correlation between the valid external instrumental variable and the error term of 
the dependent variable in the model equation. In this study, the proportion of local 
female councillors (FC) is not correlated to the error terms of the equation or the 
company financial performance of the ASX200 companies. The second condition 
in applying an external instrumental variable requires that a relevant and 
informative external instrumental variable to be correlated with the problematic 
variable of interest. In this study, the proportion of local female councillors (FC) is 
found to be correlated to the proportion of female directors on boards (PFOB) of 
the ASX200 sample companies.  
 
In statistical terms, the first condition means that the instrumental variable must be 
exogenous and uncorrelated with the error terms in the model. This can be tested 
using Hansen’s over-identifying J-test, which is a Chi-squared test of whether the 
selected instrumental variable is uncorrelated with the error term as follows:  
 
i) Cov (FC, ε) = 0, indicate the instrument’s exogeneity. 
Where:  
FC  – the external instrument variable – the proportion of female 
councillors in the local government 
ε  – The error term in equation (1) or (1a), that is any other variables 
that is not indicated in the system that relates to the company 
financial performance measure (Tobin’s Q) of the company 
 
The second requirement is that the instrumental variable must be correlated with the 
endogenous explanatory variable. This can be verified with the F-test by performing 
the first-stage regression of the endogenous variable on the selected instrumental 
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variable. This means that the covariance of the instrumental variable and the 
endogenous variable must be non-zero as: 
 
ii) Cov (FC, PFOB) ≠ 0, indicate the instrument relevance;  
Where:  
FC  – the external instrument variable – the proportion of female 
councillors in the local government 
PFOB  – the proportion of female directors on boards 
 
To fulfil the first condition, we first apply economic theory to assume that Cov 
(FC, ε) = 0. This is due to the presumption that the OLS estimator of ε is biased 
due the presence of an endogeneity problem in the structural model. As such, we 
are unable to test if Cov (FC, ε) = 0 because we do not have an unbiased 
estimator for ε. If we are correct in our assumptions about the external 
instrumental variable, the proportion of local female councillors, then we argue 
that it is unlikely that there is a correlation between the proportion of local female 
councillors and the companies performance, that is Cov (FC, ε) = 0. Therefore: 
 
α1Z = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑍𝑍)β1 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝜀𝜀,𝑍𝑍)
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑍𝑍)  = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑍𝑍)β1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑍𝑍)  = β1 
 
Statistically, we can test the exogeneity of the external instrumental variable in 
the differenced or system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) using Hansen 
J-test of exogeneity of the instrument. We will discuss this test in GMM section 
later in this chapter. Upon confirming the first condition of the validity of the 
external instrumental variable, this study applies 2SLS instrumental variable 
method to justify the second condition of applying an external instrumental 
variable, that is the relevancy of the external instrumental variable in examining 
the relationship between gender diversity and company performance. The first 
stage of the 2SLS analysis enables the justification of the correlation between the 
external instrumental variable and the endogenous variable, which is the 
relationship between the proportion of local female councillors (FC) and the 
proportion of female directors on boards (PFOB) of the ASX200. The second 
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stage of the analysis reveals the relationship between board gender diversity and 
company performance. The purpose of using 2SLS over OLS is to mitigate the 
possibility of an endogeneity problem and provide consistent unbiased parameter 
estimates.  
 
Revisiting our general structural equation (1), Pit = β0 + β1GDit + βkCVit + εit, as 
there is a possibility that board gender diversity (GD) measured by PFOB might be 
endogenous with P, we cannot trust the estimate of β1. However, we can use an 
instrumental variable estimate of β1 using mathematic reasoning as follows: 
  α1FC = Cov(P,FC)Cov(PFOB,FC) = Cov(β0 + β1PFOB + ε,FC)Cov(PFOB,FC)  = Cov(PFOB,FC)β1 + Cov(ε,FC)Cov(PFOB,FC)  
  Where: 
   α1FC – the coefficient of the instrumental variable  
 
To fulfil the second condition of instrumental variable estimation, we need to 
isolate the part of PFOB that is not correlated with the error term, ε. To do this, we 
regress the endogenous variable of interest, the proportion of female on boards 
(PFOB), with the selected external instrumental variable, the proportion of local 
female councillors (FC) in the first stage regression using ordinary least squares 
as follows: 
  GDit = α0 + α1FC + αkCVit + νit  t = 1…….t, i = 1……n  ---------- (2) 
  Where:  
GD  – The gender diversity measure across N observations 
FC  – The instrumental variable, the Proportion of female councillors in 
the local government 
CV  – The time-invariant n*k matrix of the control variables across n 
observations 
α – The unknown regression parameters  
ν  – The error term 
i  – The number of n observations of the sample 
t  – The time period of each financial year 
k  – The number of control variables used in the structural model 
 
  110 
By testing the null hypothesis, H0: α1 = 0 and the alternative hypothesis, H1: α1 ≠ 0, 
we are examining if Cov (FC, PFOB) ≠ 0. The key identification condition is that the 
coefficient of the instrumental variable, α1 ≠ 0.  This indicates that the selected 
external instrumental variable, the proportion of local female councillors (FC), is 
relevant to the endogenous variable of interest, the proportion of female directors 
on boards (PFOB).  
 
As OLS and 2SLS instrumental variable methods both provide consistent 
estimates, 2SLS instrumental variable method is inefficient. OLS estimation is 
preferred to the 2SLS instrumental variable method when the explanatory 
variables are strictly exogenous to the dependent variable in a structural model. In 
this instance, we need to be able to test if the endogeneity problem is present in 
the general equation (1) or (1a). This study applies Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test to 
examine if the OLS estimates and 2SLS instrumental variable methods are 
different. Hausman (1978) suggests that we need to compare the OLS and 2SLS 
instrumental variable estimates to determine if the differences are significant. The 
2SLS instrumental variable method will only be applied when there exists an 
endogeneity problem in the estimation. If there is a significant difference between 
the two methods, we can conclude that the proportion of female directors on 
boards (PFOB) is an endogenous variable.  
 
Considering the original regression in the general equation 1: 
Pit = β0 + β1GDit + βkCVit + εit    t = 1…….t, i = 1……n  ---------- (1) 
 
If board gender diversity (GD) measured by the proportion of female directors on 
boards (PFOB) is exogenous to company financial performance (P), OLS 
estimation as equation (1) will produce unbiased estimates and is more efficient 
compared with the 2SLS instrumental variable method. The first stage regression 
in equation (2) examines if the selected external instrumental variable, the 
proportion of local female councillors (FC), is significant and relevant to the 
endogenous variable of interest, the proportion of female directors on boards 
(PFOB). If the external instrumental variable is relevant and exogenous with the 
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endogenous variable of interest, we will conduct an auxiliary regression to test if 
there exists an endogeneity problem.  
 
Referring to equation 2:  
  GDit = α0 + α1FC + αkCVit + νit  t = 1…….t, i = 1……n  ---------- (2) 
 
If the external instrumental variable fulfilled the two fundamental conditions, in 
which Cov (FC, GD) ≠ 0 (indicates the instrument relevance) and Cov (FC, ε) = 0 
(indicates the instrument’s exogeneity), then GD is uncorrelated with ε in equation 
(1) only if ν in equation (2) is uncorrelated with ε. To test this, we run the following 
regression using OLS as follows: 
 
Pit = β0 + β1GDit + βkCVit + β2νit + εit  t = 1…….t, i = 1……n  ---------- (2a) 
Where: 
P  – The n*1 vector of company financial performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q, across n observations 
GD  – The time-invariant n*1 matrix of gender diversity measure across n 
observations 
CV  – The time-invariant n*k matrix of the control variables across n 
observations 
β – The unknown k*1 vector of regression parameters  
ν  – The residual value of the instrumental variable estimation in 
equation (2) 
ε  – A n*1 vector of the error term 
i  – The number of n observations of the sample 
t  – The time period of each financial year 
k  – The number of control variables used in the structural model 
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The hypothesis to test if there is an endogeneity problem in the estimates is as 
follows: 
 
H0: The coefficient of νit = 0, means that Cov (GDit, εit) = 0 
H1: The coefficient of νit ≠ 0, means that Cov (GDit, εit) ≠ 0 
 
If the results from the standard t-test reject H0, this indicates that Cov (GDit, εit) ≠ 0, 
we can conclude that GD is endogenous since νit and εit will be correlated. In this 
instance, the OLS methods are biased, as there is an endogenous explanatory 
variable in the equation model (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). To mitigate the 
endogenous problem, we need to apply 2SLS instrumental variable estimation by 
applying the predicted value of females on boards into equation (1) in the 2SLS 
estimation.  The second stage of the regression will replace the gender diversity 
measure, GD, with the predicted value of the gender diversity measure, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺� . The 
structural equation for the 2SLS with instrumental estimation is as follows: 
 
Pit = β0 + β𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺�  it + βkCVit + εit  t = 1…….t, i = 1……n  ---------- (2b) 
Where:  
P  – The n*1 vector of company financial performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q, across n observations 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺�   – The time-invariant n*1 matrix of predicted value of gender diversity 
measure across n observations after taking into consideration of 
instrumental variable estimation  
CV  – The time-invariant n*k matrix of the control variables across n 
observations 
β – The unknown k*1 vector of regression parameters  
ε  – A n*1 vector of the error term 
i  – The number of n observations of the sample 
t  – The time period of each financial year 
k  – The number of control variables used in the structural model 
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If both fundamental conditions are satisfied, the 2SLS instrumental variable 
method will be an unbiased estimator of β1. By applying the external instrumental 
variable into the model equation using the predicted value of GD, we ignore the 
residual value from the original OLS estimation in equation (1). The 2SLS 
instrumental variable method has stripped off any endogenous relationships 
between the proportion of female directors on boards and company financial 
performance by using the exogenous shock of the instrumental variable (Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2010).  
  
3.6.3.3 Dynamic Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
By nature, many economic relationships between the variables in a study are 
dynamic (Baltagi, 2008). In parallel, the relationships between board gender 
diversity and company financial performance may also be dynamic. These 
dynamic relationships can be explained with a lagged dependent variable in this 
study, the company past performance. Using panel data allows us to understand 
the dynamic correlations between the dependent variable and the regressors. 
However, using lagged dependent variables in the model may cause some 
problems. As the dependent variable is the function of the error terms in the 
model, the lagged dependent variable follows through as the function of the error 
term too. In this instance, the lagged dependent variable at the right-hand side of 
the model will be correlated with the error term. If we apply OLS estimator to 
examine the relationships, the estimated parameter will be biased and inconsistent 
(Anderson & Hsiao, 1981). Nickell (1981) also discovered that the fixed effect 
estimator is also biased and inconsistent because the lagged variable is correlated 
with the time-invariant fixed effect in the model. The random effect estimator is 
also biased when there exist dynamic relationships in the model (Baltagi, 2008). 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) wipe out the individual fixed effects by introducing the 
first difference transformation in the model to include the first difference of the 
explanatory variables as the internal instrumental variables. These instrumental 
variables will not be correlated with the error term. This first difference method is 
consistent in estimating the relationships between the variables but is not efficient 
because it does not utilise all the available moment conditions   (Ahn & Schmidt, 
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1995) . Arellano and Bond (1991) introduced a Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) procedure that solves the efficiency issue in the first difference method. 
 
Hansen (1982) developed the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) framework 
and Anderson and Hsiao (1981) extended the GMM framework and suggested 
using more lags of the level or differencing of the dependent variable as the 
internally generated instrumental variables in the dynamic panel data model. 
Building on Anderson and Hsiao’s (1981) concept, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
include the lags of the dependent variable as covariates and unobserved random 
and fixed panel-data effects in the dynamic panel data models to derive a 
consistent and efficient Generalised Method of Moments estimator for the 
parameters in the model.  They suggest that there are many more instrumental 
variables available in the general structural model setting, in which more lags of 
the dependent variables can be included as the instrumental variables, and the 
predetermined variables and endogenous variables are potentially the valid 
instrumental variables. To exploit the dynamic relationships between the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variable, they use the instrumental matrix 
to combine the lagged dependent variable with first differences of the strictly 
exogenous variables with predetermined variables and endogenous variable in the 
dynamic GMM estimator. Previous literatures in economics and finance areas 
employed this dynamic approach and suggest that there exist a dynamic 
relationship between dependent and explanatory variables   (Beck, Levine, & 
Loatza, 2000; Bond & Meghir, 1994; Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, & Yermack, 2012) . 
This dynamic GMM method requires that there is no auto-correlation in the 
idiosyncratic errors.   
 
Semykina & Wooldridge (2010) and Roodman (2009b) indicate that if there is a 
dynamic relationship between the current values of an explanatory variable and 
the past performance of the dependent variable, fixed effects regression may be 
positively biased. Wontoki et al. (2012)   and Schultz et al.  (2010)  apply the 
dynamic panel GMM by using current values of governance variables as a function 
of past company performance. Carter et al. (2010) and Garay and Gonzalez 
  115 
(2008) also use lagged dependent variables in their analysis to address 
endogeneity problems. They recognize the fact that it is difficult to identify natural 
experiments or exogenous external instrumental variables in corporate 
governance research and this may potentially result in bias estimates from 
unobservable heterogeneity.  
 
To illustrate the GMM moment conditions, we base upon the structural equation 
(1) and (2) of this study19 and redefine the normal OLS equations for the GMM 
moment conditions as (1GMM) and (2GMM) as follows:   
P = β0 + β1GD + βkCV1 + ε   ---------- (1GMM) 
GD = α0 + α1FC + αkCV2 + ν   ---------- (2GMM) 
 
The GMM moment conditions regress the dependent variable, company financial 
performance measure (P) in the first three conditions. The error term equals to 
mean zero in the first condition and the error term in the second and third condition 
is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. We then regress the endogenous 
explanatory variable in the remaining forth through sixth moment conditions. In this 
instance, the GMM moment conditions will nest all the endogenous estimations 
and provide another way to consider the instrumental variable estimator. The 
GMM moment conditions is as follows: 
   
P - β0 - β1GD - βkCV1 
 (P - β0 - β1GD - βkCV1) (GD) 
E =      (P - β0 - β1GD - βkCV1) CV1     = 0 
GD - α0 - α1FC - αkCV2 
(GD - α0 - α1FC - αkCV2) (P) 
(GD - α0 - α1FC - αkCV2) CV2 
 
                                                        19 Pit = β0 + β1GDit + βkCVit + εit    ---------- (1) 
   GDit  = α0 + α1FCit + αkCVit + νit    ---------- (2)  
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The endogenous variables, the company financial performance (P) and the gender 
diversity measure (GD) are in the bracket. To get the instrumental variable 
estimators, we replace the endogenous variable P and GD with instruments CV1 
and CV2 and yield the following moment conditions: 
   
P - β0 - β1GD - βkCV1 
 (P - β0 - β1GD - βkCV1) (CV2) 
E =      (P - β0 - β1GD - βkCV1) CV1     = 0 
GD - α0 - α1FC - αkCV2 
(GD - α0 - α1FC - αkCV2) (CV1) 
(GD - α0 - α1FC - αkCV2) CV2 
 
The instrumental variable system as shown in the GMM moment conditions above 
is identified and has a unique equation for every parameter.  
 
In differenced GMM, we estimate the whole equation (1) in changes and add a 
lagged dependent variable to account for the dynamics of the relationship in the 
structural model as follows: 
 
Pit = β0 + β1Pit-1 + β2GDit + βkCVit + εit  t = 1…….t, i = 1……n  ---------- (3) 
Where:   
P  – The n*1 vector of company financial performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q, across n observations 
GD  – The time-invariant n*1 matrix of gender diversity measure across n 
observations 
CV  – The time-invariant n*k matrix of the control variables across n 
observations 
β – The regression parameters  
ε  – A n*1 vector of the error term 
i  – The number of n observations of the sample 
t  – The time period of each financial year 
k  – The number of control variables used in the structural model 
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We then take the first difference of equation (3) as follows: 
 
Pit-1 = β0 + β1Pit-2 + β2GDit-1 + βkCVit-1 + εit -1  t = 1…….t, i = 1……n ------ (4) 
  
To estimate the equation in changes form, we subtract (3) and (4) to derive the 
following equation: 
 
ΔPit = β1ΔPit-1 + β2ΔGDit + βkΔCVit + Δεit  --------- (5) 
Where:   
P  – The n*1 vector of company financial performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q, across n observations 
Δ - The time-differencing operator 
GD  – The time-invariant n*1 matrix of gender diversity measure across n 
observations 
CV  – The time-invariant n*k matrix of the control variables across n 
observations 
β – The regression parameters  
ε  – A n*1 vector of the error term 
i  – The number of n observations of the sample 
t  – The time period of each financial year 
k  – The number of control variables used in the structural model 
 
In equation (5), the differenced of equation (3) and (4) cancels off the intercept and 
the error term will now be correlated. The instruments are at t-2 because the 
change in the control variables is from t-1 to t. The differenced GMM moment 
conditions using this approach are as follows: 
 
 ΔPit- β1ΔPit-1 - β2ΔGDit - βkΔCVit 
E =      (ΔPit- β1ΔPit-1 - β2ΔGDit - βkΔCVit) GDit-2            = 0 
 (ΔPit- β1ΔPit-1 - β2ΔGDit - βkΔCVit) CVit-2 
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The first differenced equation above eliminates any time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity due to any potential bias in the model. The second step in applying 
dynamic GMM is to use lagged explanatory variables as the instruments for the 
current explanatory variables in the model. In this instance, we draw a set of 
historical values of the dependent variable and explanatory variables as 
instruments for the changes in company performance, the board structure 
variables, and firm-level control variables.  
 
Despite the ability of dynamic GMM in addressing the endogeneity issue in board 
gender diversity and company financial performance studies using internally 
generated instruments, there are three econometric shortcomings in applying 
dynamic GMM. First, the differenced model reduces the power of the estimation in 
the original model specification by reducing the number of observations in 
explanatory variables (Beck et al., 2000) . Second, the internally generated 
instruments in levels may be weak for the first-differenced estimations   (Arellano 
& Bover, 1995)  Third, if there is a measurement error on the dependent variables, 
the first differencing may exacerbate the measurement error’s issue  (Griliches & 
Hausman, 1986) . 
 
Given the shortcomings as mentioned earlier, Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) improved this dynamic GMM method by including both 
levels and differenced equations in the estimations using dynamic panel system 
GMM.  
 
Dynamic Panel System Generalised Method of Moments (DPS-GMM) estimator is 
proposed by Arellano and Bover  (1995)  and Blundell and Bond  (1998) . While 
differenced GMM treats all the explanatory variables as endogenous, system 
GMM with the equation in difference form, instrumented the lagged differences in 
both lagged and the equation levels. This system simultaneously estimates the 
model in both level and differences by adding the level equation into the 
differenced GMM in the dynamic equation as follows: 
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Pit = β1Pit-1 + β2GDit + βkCVit + εit  
 ΔPit = β1ΔPerfit-1 + β2ΔGDit + βkΔCVit + Δεit 
 
Where:   
Δ – The time-differencing operator  
P  – The n*1 vector of company financial performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q, across n observations 
GD  – The time-invariant n*1 matrix of the board gender diversity, 
measured across n observations 
CV  – The time-invariant n*h matrix of the control variables across n 
observations 
β – The regression parameters 
ε  – The n*1 vector of error term across n observations 
i  – The number of n observations of the samples 
t  – Time period of each financial year 
k - The number of control variables used in the structural model 
 
Equation (6) presents both the levels and difference form where the first equation 
is the structural model in levels and the second equation is the lagged differences 
in difference form. The GMM moment conditions in system GMM can be specified 
as follows: 
 
      Pit - β1Pit-1 - β2GDit - βkCVit  
 (Pit - β1Pit-1 - β2GDit - βkCVit)(ΔGDt-2) 
E =    (Pit - β1Pit-1 - β2GDit - βkCVit)(ΔCVit-2)          = 0 
 ΔPit - β1ΔPit-1 - β2ΔGDit - βkΔCVit     
(ΔPit - β1ΔPit-1 - β2ΔGDit - βkΔCVit) (GDit-2)     
(ΔPit - β1ΔPit-1 - β2ΔGDit - βkΔCVit) CVit-2 
 
-------(6) 
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Blundell and Bond (1998) obtain the first stage instrument variable regression by 
running past company financial performance on current company performance. 
Next, they use the extended system GMM that uses the differences of past 
company financial performance as an instrument in the level, in addition to lagged 
levels of company performance. By taking into consideration of both level and 
difference equations in the system, this allows more instruments to be included in 
the estimate and provides a more efficient hypothesis test while controlling for 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (Roodman, 2009a). If there are valid 
relationships between board gender diversity and company financial performance 
at level, system GMM will provide a more accurate specification than the dynamic 
differenced GMM. However, if the relationship is persistent at the levels, the 
differenced equation with lagged levels of the variables will be considered due to 
weak instruments. In this instance, the system GMM augments the moment 
conditions by using the lagged differences of company financial performance as 
instruments for the levels of board gender diversity and company financial 
performance relations (Schultz et al., 2010) . 
 
Furthermore, the system GMM estimator is capable of detecting potential omitted 
variables by using two tests. First, the test of second-order autocorrelation that 
assumes the model is completely dynamic when sufficient lags are included in the 
model. In this case, no serial correlation remains in the residual value. Second, as 
there are more than one lag of past company financial performance measure can 
be used in the model, we can use over-identifying restrictions test to examine the 
null hypothesis, which is to test if all instrumental variables are jointly valid 
(Hansen, 2012) . System GMM is more superior than differenced GMM as it 
enables the correction for unobserved company-level heterogeneity, omitted 
variable bias, measurement error and potential endogeneity that frequently affect 
growth estimation (Bond, 2002).  
 
  121 
This study examines the suitability of system GMM with the structural model and 
relies on the assumption that all time variants influence female representation on 
boards and company financial performance are included in the model, or 
alternatively, the influence of time variants on female board representation is 
channelled through past company performance. Based on the insight of system 
GMM, this study employs the rationale that past company financial performance 
measures influence the appointment of board of directors are not correlated with 
the current error term in the first differences (∆εi,t) and the past performance 
measures in first differences are not correlated with the error term in levels (εi,t).  
 
As noted at the beginning of this section, the dynamic GMM method requires that 
there is no auto-correlation in the idiosyncratic errors. We utilise the diagnostic test 
in GMM estimation to examine the first difference residuals for auto-correlations 
using Arellano-Bond test of second-order serial correlation. The null hypothesis to 
test the error term of the differenced GMM model is: H0: There is a no second-
order serial correlation in the model, particularly at the second order. Therefore, 
the estimate of AR(2) should have a p-value of more than 10% and not reject the 
hypothesis in order to fulfil the requirements of no auto-correlation in the 
idiosyncratic errors. This indicates that the error terms in the estimated model are 
not serially correlated and there are enough lags of the instrumental variables to 
control for the dynamic relationship in the model.  
 
We also follow Roodman’s (2009b) recommendation in implementing dynamic 
GMM model and applying Hansen J-test of over-identifying restriction and the 
difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of instrument subsets. The null hypothesis 
for Hansen J-test of over-identification is the instruments are valid. To ensure that 
there is no over-identification of instruments in the structural model, the chi-square 
test statistics in Hansen-J-test of over-identifying should not reject the null 
hypothesis, indicating that the instruments are valid.  The rejection of the null 
hypothesis suggests that instruments are not valid and the estimation of the model 
is weak. For the difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity, the null hypothesis is the 
instruments are exogenous, meaning that the instruments are not correlated with 
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the dependent variable. If the chi-square test statistics report a significant p-value 
and reject the hypothesis, this invalidates the exogeneity of the instruments. We 
expect a chi-square test statistics of more than 10% level of p-value to validate the 
exogeneity of the instruments.  
 
3.6.3.4 Kanter’s Critical Mass And Tokenism Method 
Section 3.5.2.3 presented the board gender diversity measured by Kanter’s critical 
mass. As mentioned, this study categorises critical mass into two categories, the 
Kanter’s gender classifications and the amended critical mass classification based on 
the incremental proportion of female directors on boards. Kanter’s critical mass 
theory suggests that males with masculine traits dominate corporations’ structure, 
especially at the top management and board level. Hence, to examine the second 
hypothesis of this study whether the critical mass of female directors has any 
implications on company performance, we apply the same statistical methodologies 
as demonstrated in section 3.5.2.3. We run all the statistical methods, pooled OLS 
estimation, fixed and random effects model, 2SLS instrumental variable model, 
dynamic differenced GMM and system GMM estimations; to examine the relationship 
between the critical mass of the proportion of female directors on boards and 
company performance.  To reiterate, Kanter’s categories of four gender diversity 
groupings are:  
 
i. Uniform group: K1 equals one when board consists of all male directors 
and zero otherwise; 
ii. Skewed group: K2 equals one when there is at least one female director 
but less than twenty percent female directors on boards, and zero 
otherwise; 
iii. Tilted group: K3 equals one when there is at least twenty percent but not 
more than forty percent of female directors on boards, and zero 
otherwise; 
iv. Balanced group: K4 equals one when there are at least forty percent of 
female directors on boards, and zero otherwise.   
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This study extends Kanter’s gender diversity groupings with some modifications for 
better analysis of the data. We categorise the gender grouping based on the 
incremental proportion of female directors on boards as follows:  
 
i. ACM0 – Dummy variable equals one when board has no female director 
and zero otherwise; 
ii. ACM20 – Dummy variable equals one when there is at least twenty 
percent of female directors on boards and zero otherwise; 
iii. ACM30 – Dummy variable equals one when there is at least thirty 
percent of female directors on boards and zero otherwise; and  
iv. ACM40 – Dummy variable equals one when there is at least forty percent 
of female directors on boards and zero otherwise.   
 
The amended board gender diversity grouping is based on the reasoning that the 
entire sample set is captured in the analysis with realistic comparisons. For example, 
if the gender groups are classified according to Kanter’s grouping, for the skewed 
groups (K2), the dummy variable is assigned to boards with at least one female 
director but less than twenty percent of female directors. There are two possibilities in 
applying the sample set. First, if the skewed group (K2) is compared to the uniform 
group of boards with no female directors on board (K1), the entire sample set is not 
being included because the boards with more than twenty percent of female directors 
are not included. Second, if we employ the entire dataset, this skewed group (K2) will 
be compared to uniform groups (K1) as well as tilted groups (K3) and balanced 
groups (K4). In this instance, we will not be able to ascertain the effective proportion 
of female directors on boards to have an impact on the company performance. 
However, with the modification of the grouping and classification, we categorise the 
group based on the increment proportion of female directors on boards. This 
modification allows us to examine the implications of the incremental effect of female 
directors on company performance. Furthermore, this allows us to compare the 
boards with fewer female board representations with boards with the higher 
proportion of female directors whilst utilising the entire dataset. 
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The model specification for critical mass is as follows: 
Pit = β0 + β1 CMGCit + βkCVit + αi + γt + εit ---------- (7) 
Where:   
P  – The n*1 vector of company financial performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q, across n observations 
CMGD  – The time-invariant n*1 matrix of critical mass gender 
classification groupings measures across N observations 
K1  – Uniform group, boards with all male director 
K2  – Skewed group, boards with at least one but less than twenty 
percent of female directors on boards 
K3  – Tilted group, boards with twenty percent but less than forty 
percent of female directors 
K4  – Balanced group, boards with at least forty percent of female 
directors 
ACM0 – Boards with predominantly male directors 
ACM20  – Boards with at least twenty percent of female directors 
ACM30 – Boards with at least thirty percent of female directors 
ACM40  – Boards with at least forty percent of female directors 
CV  – The time-invariant n*k matrix of the control variables across n 
observations 
β – The unknown k*1 vector of regression parameters  
δ  – Company time-invariant fixed effects 
γ  – Year dummy fixed effects 
ε  – A n*1 vector of the error term 
i  – The number of n observations of the sample 
t   – The time period of each financial year 
k   – The number of control variables used in the structural model 
 
This study runs the regression analysis of each critical mass grouping by 
applying all statistical methods mentioned in section 3.5.2.3 based on the critical 
mass model specification (7). We then compare the performance measures 
based on critical mass classification, using pooled OLS estimation, fixed and 
random effects model, 2SLS with the instrumental variable method, dynamic 
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differenced GMM and system GMM estimations, to analyse the link between 
these gender diversity groups and company financial performance. 
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Figure 3.1: Research Design and Methodology 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, board gender diversity is not correlated with 
company financial performance Hypothesis 2: Female representation on boards has positive impacts on company financial performance when a critical mass is 
achieved  
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3.7 Chapter Summary  
This chapter has presented the methodological frameworks, models and 
empirical measures to examine the primary focus of this study, the relationship 
between board gender diversity and company performance. Figure 3.1 present 
the research design and the methodology of this study. The discussions on the 
endogeneity concern in board gender diversity and company financial 
performance demonstrate that researchers need to carefully address all three 
forms of endogeneity that arise from unobserved company-level heterogeneity, 
simultaneity and dynamic nature of the variables. This study applies various 
econometric techniques to examine the hypotheses of this study and 
demonstrate how these endogeneity concerns can be observed in each of the 
testing procedures. The discussions of the econometric techniques reveal that 
although fixed effects estimation is able to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
at the company level, the strict exogeneity assumptions in OLS estimations 
produce biased and unreliable inference in examining the relationship between 
board gender diversity and company performance. While the external 
instrumental variable in 2SLS estimation is able to strip off the endogenous 
relationship between board gender diversity and company performance, this 
method is unable to control for the possibility of a dynamic relationship of past 
performance on the board structure. Dynamic GMM estimations, both the 
differenced, and system GMM methods, are robust to all forms of endogeneity. 
With the implementation of the exogenous external instrumental variable in the 
dynamic GMM model, this study expects to produce reliable and consistent 
estimates. This chapter emphasises that failing to address the endogeneity 
problems may lead to biased and unreliable inferences that suggest a spurious 
correlation between board gender diversity and company performance. The 
following chapter presents the analysis and results using these various 
econometric techniques and how the endogeneity issue can be observed with 
the estimates.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the multiple regression results, findings and discussions of 
this study. This chapter begins with descriptive statistics of the entire sample data, 
the yearly changes of female board representation over the years and the critical 
mass grouping of females on boards. This is followed by a correlation matrix of 
this study’s variables. The results of the diagnostic tests are presented and their 
implications are discussed before the detailed regression analysis. We employ 
both the entire period analysis and critical mass grouping analysis and present 
extensive comparative results based on pooled OLS random and fixed effects 
analysis, 2SLS instrumental variable analysis and the dynamic GMM methods. 
This is followed by a discussion of the main findings between the gender-diverse 
boards and company performance. We conclude this chapter with a chapter 
summary and conclusions of the analysis.  
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents detail information on the sample data, the summary 
descriptive statistics, the detailed breakdown of female board representation by 
year and the correlation of the variables in this study. 
  
4.2.1 The Sample Data 
The sample consists of the top 200 non-financial companies listed on the ASX for 
the period from 2008 to 2015. The final sample of unbalance data consists of 299 
companies for the period from 2008 to 2015 with 1981 firm-years.  
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4.2.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics for the sample data, the dependent 
variable, variable of interest, board and company level control variables20. This 
study includes all sample data without removing the outliers as the extreme values 
are legitimate data of this study and it is the nature of the sample data that is not 
caused by incorrect data entry or measurement error. Eliminating the outliers will 
cause the loss of the important observations that can be important to the 
analysis 21 . This study also performs log transformation on Tobin’s Q, market 
capitalisation and total revenue to reduce the influence of the outliers and 
extremely large values to give the model a cleaner distribution.  
 
The dependent variable, Tobin’s Q, reflects market expectations of a company’s 
future earnings  (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988) . The ratio of Tobin’s Q provides 
a yardstick of companies’ competitive advantage and performance. In general, a 
ratio of more than one reflects investors are expecting a positive return as the 
result of effective utilisation of the existing assets. On the other hand, a ratio of 
less than one reflects the under utilisation of the company’s existing resources. 
Based on the descriptive statistics on Table 4.1, the mean (median) of Tobin’s Q 
of 2.08 (1.31) indicates that the majority companies in this sample are utilising the 
company’s resources effectively and generating a positive return to the investors. 
Despite the median value of 1.31 (which is lower than the mean value), the further 
breakdown of the detailed Tobin’s Q (not shown in Table 4.1) reveals that 28.5% 
of the sample data of this study has a value of Tobin’s Q of less than one, 
indicating that these companies are under-utilising the company’s existing 
resources with majority observations of the sample data are generating positive 
return to the investors. 
  
                                                        
20 Refer to table 3.5 in chapter 3 of this study for variable descriptions.  
21 Note: To ensure that the extreme value in the dataset does not have any impact on the overall results, this study 
has performed a comparison of regression analysis based on 1% winsorising of the dataset. Appendix 12 presents the 
comparison results and shows no major differences between the two sets of data.  
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Table 4.1 – Summary Descriptive Statistics based on Pooled Data 
Variable Observations  Mean Median  S.Dev   Min   Max  
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q  1981 2.08 1.31 7.07 0.06 255.6 
Log of Tobin’s Q (LogQ) 1981 0.17 0.12 0.28 -1.2 2.41 
Variable of Interest      
Number of Females on Boards (FOB) 1981 0.86 1 0.93 0 5 
Proportion of Females on Boards (PFOB) - % 1981 10.78 11.11 11.36 0 57.14 
The presence of Females on Boards (DFOB) 1981 0.57 1 0.5 0 1 
Blau Index (Blau) 1981 0.17 0.20 0.16 0 0.5 
Company Level Control Variables     
Market Capitalisation ($Millions) 1981 4,480 1,067 16,000 2.283 244,000 
Log of Market Capitalisation (LogMC) 1981 9.03 9.03 0.72 6.36 11.39 
Log Revenue (LogRev)  1981 8.56 8.79 1.37 0 10.92 
Gearing Ratio (NDE) - % 1981 30.46 26.03 150 -2,780 2,279 
Risk Measure (VROE) - % 1981 11.68 4.05 26.86 0 425.77 
Board Level Control Variables     
Board Size (Board) - Number 1981 7.42 7 2.29 3 19 
Proportion of Independent Directors (PIndDir) - % 1981 65.34 66.67 18.31 0.25 100 
CEO Tenure (CEOT) – Number of year 1981 5.92 5 3.85 0 23 
Duality of Chairman and CEO (CEODuo) 1981 0.07 0 0.25 0 1 
External Instrumental Variable     
Proportion of local female councillors (FC) - % 1981 42.72 40 16.1 6.67 75 
 
Note to table 4.1:  
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 299 companies with 1981 firm-year observations for the period 
from 2008 to 2015. Tobin’s Q is the dependent variables of this study. It measures the market performance and is 
calculated from the ratio of the sum of the company’s market value of equity and book value of debt to its book 
value of assets. The variable of interest of this study is the proportion of female directors on board (PFOB). The 
presence of female directors on boards (DFOB) and Blau index (Blau) are the variables of interest for the 
robustness tests of the study. The definitions and details of other control variables can be referred to Table 3.5 in 
chapter 3 of this study. 
 
The variable of interest of this is study is the proportion of female directors on 
boards (PFOB), measured by the total number of female directors over the total 
number of board members. The mean (median) of the proportion of female 
directors on boards (PFOB) for the sample is 10.78% (11.11%). Approximately 
half of the sample data has the proportion of female directors less than the mean 
value. This is supported by the statistics of the number of female directors on 
boards (FOB) with the mean of 0.86 and majority of the companies has only one 
female director on boards (median value = 1) on the overall data. This study also 
includes both the presence of female directors on boards (DFOB) and Blau index 
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(Blau) 22  in the robustness test of board gender diversity. DFOB is a dummy 
variable that equals one when there is at least one female director present on the 
company board of directors or zero if the company has no female directors on the 
board. The data shows that only 57% of the sample data have female directors on 
boards. This equates to 43% of the sample companies or 861 firm-years that have 
no female representation on their board. 
 
To further elaborate on the variable of interest of this study, Table 4.2 presents the 
details summary statistics of the female board representation based on annual 
data. As indicated in the summary statistics in Table 4.1, the average proportion of 
female director on boards for the pooled data is 10.78% between 2008 and 2015. 
However, the yearly statistics (refer table 4.2) show that the average proportion of 
female directors on boards was below 10% before the introduction of gender 
diversity requirement by The Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council in 2010. There are only 5.81% of female directors on boards in 2008, 
5.93% in 2009 and 7.46% in 2010. The proportion of female board representation 
only increased to 18.7% in 2015, representing 2.2-fold increment in 7 years since 
2008.  
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Proportion of Female Directors on Boards 
(Annual statistics 2008 to 2015) 
Year  Observations   Mean   Std Dev   Min   Max  
2008 265 5.81 8.23 0 33.33 
2009 261 5.93 8.9 0 50 
2010 261 7.46 9.97 0 55.56 
2011 254 9.66 10.46 0 55.56 
2012 240 11.7 10.57 0 57.14 
2013 236 13.21 10.92 0 50 
2014 236 15.57 11.84 0 50 
2015 228 18.67 13.05 0 50 
Note to table 4.2:  
The sample consists of the break down of an unbalanced panel data of 299 companies by 
year with 1981 firm-year observations for the period from 2008 to 2015. The descriptive 
statistics show the proportion of female directors on board (the variable of interest of this 
study), which is calculated by the total number of female directors over the total number of 
board members.                                                          
22 Blau index measures diversity with the following formula (refer section 3.5.2.2 for description detail):  B = � 1 − [S2 + (1 − S2)]k
c=1
; Where S is the proportion of female directors 
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Table 4.1 also presents the descriptive statistics for the control variable. The 
company level control variables comprise company size, measured by company’s 
market capitalisation (LogMC) and total revenue (LogRev), gearing ratio measured 
by the ratio of debt to equity (NDE) and company’s risk factor measured by 
volatility of ROE (VROE). Market capitalisation is the number of common shares 
outstanding multiplied by the share price at the end of financial year. The summary 
statistics show that the average market capitalisation of the sample in this study is 
$4.48 billion, with the lowest market capitalisation of $2.28 million and the highest 
market capitalisation of $244 billion. Total revenue is obtained from the company’s 
financial statement, which is the total sale of the companies for the financial year. 
Both market capitalisation and total revenue statistics indicate that the sample 
data of this study covers a wide range of companies in the ASX200 from the small 
capitalisation companies to the multi-billion companies. The company’s gearing 
ratio is measured by the company’s total debt net cash over the shareholder’s 
equity (NDE). Highly geared companies required greater monitoring costs and 
affect company financial performance negatively (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Schultz 
et al., 2010; Wang & Cliff, 2009). The average gearing ratio of the sample in this 
study is 30.46, indicating that the average gearing ratio of the sample is about 
30% with some of the companies being highly geared at 22 times their equity 
value. VROE represents the volatility of the risk factor of a company and it is 
measured by the standard deviation of the pervious three years equity returns. 
The mean of the sample data’s volatility of risk factor is 11.68 with a median of 
4.05. 
 
The board level control variables comprise board size (Board), the board’s 
independent ratio (PIndDir), CEO tenure (CEOT) and the duality of a joint function 
of CEO and chairman (CEODua). The average board size comprises 7.42 
directors, and the majority (on average of 65%) of the board members are 
independent directors. The average tenure for the CEOs serving on the company 
boards is approximately six years and less than 5% of the sample data has CEO 
with a joint function as the chairman of the boards. The median values of the 
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board level control variables are relatively close to the mean values, indicating that 
the central tendency of the board control variables are distributed at the mid point.  
 
This study also applies the external instrumental variable method to address the 
endogeneity issue in the model. We use both the influence of political science in 
corporate governance (Terjesen et al., 2015) and the theory of “economic 
ramification of distance”  (Bouwman, 2012)  in developing the external 
instrumental variable of this study, the proportion of local female councillors (FC). 
We believe that the institutional environment co-evolves with gender policies and 
the concept of geographical influence of local female councillors is related to the 
number of experienced female executives excelling at the board level. The 
summary statistics show that the average proportion of local female councillors of 
the sample is about 43%. The minimum proportion of female councillors on 
councillor’s boards is 7% and a maximum of 75% in the sample data. 
 
In addition to the pooled data, this study further breaks down the sample data with 
Kanter’s  (1977b) critical mass classifications23. Table 4.3 presents the summary 
statistics of the sample based on two different critical mass classifications for this 
study by year. The summary shows that female board representation has 
increased in general over the years from 2008 to 2015, even though majority of 
the boards have no female representation, which is 43% or 861 firm-year 
observations have no female directors on boards. Figure 4.1 presents the 
boardroom gender diversity over the years of this study. We notice that boards 
comprising at least 20% female directors have increased steadily from less than 
10% of total sample boards in 2008 to more than 49% over sample boards in 
2015. However, boards with at least 30% and 40% female directors have only 
marginally increased over the same period.  
                                                           
23 The four gender groupings according to Kanter’s classification are: (i) K1 (uniform group) – boards consist of all male directors; 
(ii) K2 (skewed group) – boards with at least one but less than twenty percentage of female directors; (iii) K3 (tilted group) - boards 
with at least twenty percentage but less than forty percentage of female directors; and (iv) K4 (balanced group) – boards with at 
least than forty percentage of female directors. The modified critical mass classifications are: (i) ACM0 – boards consist of all male 
directors; (ii) ACM20 – boards with at least twenty percentage of female directors; (iii) ACM30 – boards consist of at least thirty 
percentage of female directors; and (iv) ACM40 – boards with at least forty percentage of female directors. 
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of Female Board Representation based on Critical Mass Groupings 
(Number of boards with female board representation based on critical mass groupings) 
 2008-2015 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
K1 - 0% PFOB 861 165 163 147 115 85 74 60 52 
K2 - 0< PFOB <20% 638 74 70 76 90 94 87 83 64 
K3 - 20%<= PFOB <40% 443 26 26 35 46 57 72 84 97 
K4 - >=40% PFOB 39 0 2 3 3 4 3 9 15 
ACM0 - 0 PFOB 861 165 163 147 115 85 74 60 52 
ACM20 - At least 20% of FOB 482 26 28 38 49 61 75 93 112 
ACM30 - At least 30% of FOB 110 4 5 6 7 9 15 20 44 
ACM40 - At least 40% of FOB 39 0 2 3 3 4 3 9 15 
 
  
 
Note to table 4.3 and figure 4.1:  
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 299 companies with 1981 firm-year observations for the 
period from 2008 to 2015. The critical mass groupings are based on two different classifications. Based on 
Kanter’s critical mass gender classification, K1 represents the uniform group, boards with no female directors on 
boards, K2 represents the skewed group of firm-year observations with at least one female director on boards but 
not exceeding 20% of female directors; K3 represents the tilted group of firm-year observations with at least 20% 
but not exceeding 40% of female directors. K4 represents the balanced group of firm-year observations with at 
least 40% of female directors. The groupings with the abbreviations of ACM represent the modified gender 
grouping based on firm-year observations with a minimum of proportion females in an incremental order. ACM0 
represents the group of firm-year observations with no female directors on boards, while ACM20, ACM30, and 
ACM40 represent the group of firm-year observations with at least 20%, 30% and 40% of female directors on 
boards respectively. 
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Figure 4.1: The ASX200 Boardroom Diversity Over 2008 to 2015
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Table 4.4 presents the detailed break down of female board representation based 
on the absolute number of pooled and annual data. There are 62% of the 
companies in the sample data with no female directors on the company’s board in 
2008 and 2009 compared to only 25% and 20% of companies in 2014 and 2015 
respectively. Although the proportion of companies that appoint three or more 
female board members has increased from 2% in 2008 to 23% in 2015, 
representing a 10.5-fold increment of companies with three or more female 
directors on board, only 5% of the firm-year observations in the pooled data have 
three or more female directors on boards.  
 
Table 4.4: The Number of Boards with the Absolute Number of Female Board Representation on The 
ASX200 Boards (Pooled and Annual Data) 
Year 0 FOB 1 FOB 2 FOB >=3 FOB No of Boards % No of Boards % No of Boards % No of Boards % 
2008-2015 861 43% 651 33% 376 19% 93 5% 
2008 165 62% 76 29% 19 7% 5 2% 
2009 163 62% 74 28% 21 8% 3 1% 
2010 147 56% 76 29% 35 13% 3 1% 
2011 115 45% 88 35% 45 18% 6 2% 
2012 85 35% 93 39% 53 22% 9 4% 
2013 74 31% 84 36% 63 27% 15 6% 
2014 60 25% 83 35% 71 30% 22 9% 
2015 52 20% 77 30% 69 27% 60 23% 
 
Note to Table 4.4: 
Table 4.4 presents the detailed breakdown of the number and the proportion of firm-year observation in 
relation to the absolute number of female on boards. 0 FOB refers to the boards with all male directors, no 
female director was appointed to the board of directors. 1 FOB refers to the boards with one female director 
on the board. 2 FOB refers to boards with two female directors and 3 FOB refers to boards with at least three 
female directors. Each row refers to the respective years of observation with the number and proportion of 
companies for each category of absolute female board representation.   
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Figure 4.2 charts female board representation based on absolute numbers. 
Boards with at least three female directors have increased more than 10-fold by 
2015 since 2008. The progression has been slow up until 2014 to 2015 where a 
dramatic increase is shown. 
 
 
 
Note to Figure 4.2: 
Figure 4.2 presents the number of companies with the respective number of female directors sitting on the 
board of directors. 0 FOB refers to boards with no female directors. 1 FOB refers to boards with one female 
director. 2 FOB refers to boards with two female directors and 3 FOB refers to boards with at least three 
female directors. 
 
Figure 4.2 and Table 4.4 show that the average number of boards with one female 
director over the sample period is 33%. This percent is consistent throughout the 
study period, ranging between 28% and 39%. Boards with two female directors have 
increased steadily between 2008 and 2015, with a slight reduction in 2015. Contrary, 
boards with all male directors have declined significantly from 62% in 2008 to 20% in 
2015, a decline of more than 3-fold in seven years. While on the other hand, boards 
with three or more female directors have increased at a rapid rate particularly in 
2015, where 23% of the boards have three of more female directors compared to 9% 
in 2014. 
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Number of Female Directors on boards
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4.2.3 Correlation Matrix 
Table 4.5 presents the correlation matrix between all the variables in this study.  
 
Table 4.5: Correlation Covariance 
  LogQ PFOB Blau Board PIndDir CEOT CEODua LogMC LogRev NDE VROE FC 
LogQ 1 
           
PFOB -0.073* 1 
          
Blau -0.077* 0.980* 1 
         
Board -0.120* 0.249* 0.294* 1 
        
PIndDir -0.171* 0.270* 0.275* -0.027 1 
       
CEOT 0.136* -0.108* -0.096* 0.027 -0.082* 1 
      
CEODua 0.058* -0.113* -0.118* 0.0180 -0.165* 0.142* 1 
     
LogMC 0.160* 0.352* 0.385* 0.582* 0.202* 0.080* -0.055* 1 
    
LogRev -0.202* 0.293* 0.323* 0.469* 0.222* 0.106* -0.094* 0.595* 1 
   
NDE -0.144* 0.115* 0.118* 0.089* 0.105* -0.021 -0.033 0.119* 0.145* 1 
  
VROE 0.248* -0.120* -0.122* -0.11* -0.046* -0.05* 0.025 -0.212* -0.184* -0.15* 1 
 
FC -0.056* 0.140* 0.130* -0.033 0.019 -0.040 -0.050* -0.003 -0.054* -0.006 0.0207 1 
 
Note to Table 4.5:  
Table 4.5 presents the correlation matrix between all the selected variables of this study based on the unbalanced 
panel data of 1981 firm-year observation from 2008-2015. LogQ refers to the performance measure, the dependent 
variable of this study. Board gender diversity is represented by the proportion of female directors (PFOB), and the Blau 
index (Blau) as the alternate measure for the robustness test. The board level control variables comprise board size 
(Board), the proportion of independent directors (PIndDir), CEO’s tenure (CEOT) and the duality function of the 
chairman and the CEO (CEODua). The company level control variables comprise the log of market capitalisation 
(LogMC), total revenue (LogRev), company’s gearing ratio (NDE) and company’s volatility (VROE). The proportion of 
local female councillors (FC) is the selected external instrumental variable of this study. The asterisk represents the 
pairwise statistical significance between the two variables at the critical value of 5% (*).  
 
The purpose of this correlation analysis is to understand the relationship between the 
selected variables in this study. The Pearson’s pairwise correlation matrix in Table 
4.5 indicates that the explanatory variables and control variables of this study are 
significantly correlated at the 5% significant level with the dependent variable, Tobin’s 
Q (LogQ). If the correlation between two variables is 0.7 or more, there is a high 
probability a multicollinearity problem exists between the two variables (Brooks, 
2009). The matrix above shows that the correlation between PFOB and Blau index is 
0.98, indicating that these two variables are highly correlated. These two variables 
however are substitute and are not specified simultaneously in a regression model. 
PFOB serves as the variable of interest of this study and the Blau index serves as an 
alternate measure in the robustness test of the board gender diversity. The 
correlation matrix suggests that there is no concern of multicollinearity in the 
remainder of the variables in the sample. In line with expectations there is a positive 
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correlation between the endogenous explanatory variable, the proportion of female 
directors on boards (PFOB), and the external instrumental variable in this study, the 
proportion of local female councillors (FC). The positive and significant correlation 
indicates that the representation of local female councillors has a positive impact on 
the female board representation, confirming that it is a good external instrumental 
variable.   
 
4.3 Diagnostic Tests  
This section presents the diagnostic tests for our sample data before the 
hypothesis testing. This study conducted multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, unit 
roots, endogeneity and Hausman tests to ensure that dataset are free from biases 
before proceeding with the statistical analysis.  
 
4.3.1 Multicollinearity Test 
This study tests for multicollinearity among all the variables to avoid spurious 
results. As shown in Table 4.5, the correlations between all the variables are less 
than 0.7, except for the proportion of female directors on boards (PFOB) and the 
Blaus Index (Blau). This is because these two variables represent the same 
measure, which is the board gender diversity measure. The correlation matrix 
results reveal that the correlation between all other variables is less than 0.7. 
Therefore, there is no issue of multicollinearity among the variables.   
 
4.3.2 Heteroskedasticity Test 
We employ Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier to test for heteroskedasticity issue 
in the panel data (Baltagi, 2008) . To test if heteroskedasticity is present in the 
sample data, we hypothesise that the following null hypothesis: 
 
  H0: The variance in the model is constant, that is homoskedasticity 
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Table 4.6: The output of Heteroskedasticity Test 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: PFOB LogMC LogRev NDE VROE Board PIndDir CEOT CEODua 
chi2(9)      =   797.21 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
Table 4.6 presents the heteroskedasticity test with a significant chi-square of zero, 
indicating the variance in the dataset is non-constant and heteroskedasticity is 
present in the dataset. The presence of heteroskedasticity in the dataset suggests 
that dynamic GMM estimation is the appropriate method of analysis.   
 
4.3.3 Hausman Test On Fixed Effects Versus Random Effects 
The Hausman Test determines whether the difference in the coefficients is 
systematic. A fixed effects model is appropriate when the estimation makes 
inferences on the outcomes of a sample data, while random effects model is more 
appropriate when the estimates of a model make unconditional inferences of a 
population. The fixed effects model of this study is as follows: 
 
Pit = β0 + β1GDit + βkCVit + δi + γt + εit  t = 1…….t, i = 1……n  ---------- (1a) 
Where:   
P  – The n*1 vector of company financial performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q, across n observations 
GD  – The time-invariant n*1 matrix of gender diversity measure across N 
observations 
CV  – The time-invariant n*k matrix of the control variables across n 
observations 
β – The unknown k*1 vector of regression parameters  
δ  – Company time-invariant fixed effects 
γ  – Year dummy fixed effects 
ε  – A n*1 vector of the error term 
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i  – The number of n observations of the sample 
t  – The time period of each financial year 
k  – The number of control variables used in the structural model 
 
δi and γt above represent the company and time-specific effects. Hausman 
specification test examines if the company and time specific effects αi and γt can 
be treated as random effects that are drawn from a population or fixed effects that 
are drawn from a sample. The null hypothesis in the Hausman specification test is: 
 
H0: There is no correlation between δi and γt with εit, indicating that random 
effect is more appropriate. 
 
Table 4.7 the Chi-square tests is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that fixed 
effects model is the appropriate estimation for analysis. 
 
Table 4.7: Hausman Test on Random Effects Vs Fixed Effects 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
 
  FE RE Difference S.E. 
GD -0.0016 -0.0017 0.0001 0.0002 
Board -0.0212 -0.0291 0.0078 0.0013 
PIndDir -0.0018 -0.0022 0.0004 0.0001 
CEOT -0.0035 0.0009 -0.0044 0.0006 
CEODua -0.0636 -0.0420 -0.0217 0.0098 
LogMC 0.3530 0.3115 0.0415 0.0049 
LogRev -0.0742 -0.0763 0.0021 0.0019 
NDE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
VROE 0.0021 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0000 
     
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha 
 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho 
 
Test: Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 
 
chi2(9) = 173.27 
   
 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
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4.3.4 Endogeneity Test  
Hausman’s specification test in Section 4.3.3 indicates that fixed effects estimator 
is more appropriate than random effects estimator in examining the relationships 
between gender diversity and company financial performance in this study. The 
fixed effects method with OLS model is appropriate under the assumptions that 
the explanatory variables are strictly orthogonal to the errors terms, and the 
dependent variables are a function of the exogenous explanatory variables. Sila et 
al.  (2016)  suggests that fixed effects estimator is insufficient to address the 
possibility of endogeneity that exists in a diversity-performance study if the 
explanatory variables are not exogenous to the dependent variable.  
 
The correlation matrix in Table 4.5 reveals that there is a link between the gender 
diversity measures, the proportion of female directors (PFOB) and the Blau index 
(Blau), to the company level characteristics. There are various possibilities that link 
the board gender diversity to company characteristics. For example, unobserved 
characteristics such as preferences of companies to have gender-diverse boards; 
large companies tend to have a higher gender diversity ratio on the board of 
directors. In some circumstances, some companies tend to maintain a good 
corporate governance image or corporate culture by employing more female 
directors. Another possible link between board gender diversity and performance 
is the simultaneous causality between female board representation and 
performance due to self-selection process. To ensure that this study estimates the 
relationship between the gender-diverse boards and company financial 
performance without bias estimates, this study controls for the most damaging 
endogeneity bias in the estimates by using Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity. The test is whether the variable of interest of this study, the gender 
diversity measure, is endogenously determined with company performance. The 
null hypothesis for the endogeneity test is as follows: 
 
  H0: The explanatory variables are exogenous. 
  H1: The explanatory variables are endogenous. 
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We first run the two-stage-least-square instrumental variable analysis on the 
identified problematic explanatory variable (PFOB) with the specified external 
instrumental variable (FC) and all other control variables in the model. We then 
verify if endogeneity issue is a concern in the model using Durbin-Wu-Hausman’s 
endogeneity test. Table 4.8 presents the summary results of the endogeneity test. 
 
Table 4.8: Results of Endogeneity Test: 
Tests of endogeneity 
Ho: variables are exogenous 
Durbin (score) chi2(1)          =  18.7739  (p = 0.0000) 
Wu-Hausman F(1,1970)       =  18.8482  (p = 0.0000) 
 
The F-test of Durbin-Wu-Hausman’s endogeneity test in Table 4.8 indicates that 
the endogeneity issue exists in the model at a highly significant level, where the F-
test chi-square is zero, rejecting the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the variable. 
This confirms that ordinary least square method using random effects or fixed 
effects is inefficient to explain the relationship between board gender diversity and 
company performance. The results from the OLS estimations can be a bias 
inference if the endogeneity issue is not dealt with. This indicates that the variable 
of interest of this study, the proportion of female director on boards (PFOB), is 
endogenously determined with the company performance. In this instance, there is 
a possibility of confounding factors between the proportion of female directors on 
boards and company performance, which results in bias estimators if the analysis 
is based on the OLS estimation.  
 
4.3.5 Tests On Selection Of External Instrumental Variable 
The discussion in section 4.3.4 suggests that the endogeneity concern is an issue 
in examining the relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variable in this study. The general consensus suggests that a better strategy in 
dealing with the endogeneity issue is by way of identifying a truly exogenous 
external instrumental variable. A valid external instrumental variable needs to fulfil 
two conditions: first: the external instrumental variable must be correlated with the 
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endogenous explanatory variable, second: the external instrumental variable must 
be exogenous and uncorrelated with the error terms in the model. However, many 
studies recognise that identifying a truly exogenous external instrumental variable 
is a challenging task (Bozec, 2012).  
 
This study introduces the proportion of local female councillors as the external 
instrumental variable in this study. We use both the influence of political science in 
corporate governance (Terjesen et al., 2015) and the theory of “economic 
ramification of distance”  (Bouwman, 2012) . We believe that the institutional 
environment co-evolves with gender policies and the concept of geographical 
influence of local female councillors on the number of experienced female 
executives to excel at the board level. In this instance, the external instrumental 
variable can capture the effects on company financial performance on changes in 
the proportion of female directors on boards by eliminating the confounding effects 
between gender diversity and company performance.  
 
For the instrumental variable to be valid, there are two requirements, the relevancy 
and the exogeneity verification. To verify the relevancy of the external instrumental 
variable, we test the association between the proportion of female directors and 
the proportion of local female councillors by referring to the first stage regression 
results in 2SLS estimation and the F-test of the first stage regression. To fulfil the 
second requirement in applying an external instrumental variable, which is the 
exogeneity of the external instrumental variable with the dependent variable in the 
model, we refer to both the economic theory and Hansen J-test in dynamic GMM 
method. 
 
To test the relevancy of the external instrumental variable, we examine the 
covariance between the proportion of local female councillors (FC) and the 
proportion of female directors on boards (PFOB), Cov (FC, PFOB) ≠ 0. The null 
hypothesis to examine the relevancy of the external instrumental variable is: 
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H0: There is no correlation between the proportion of local female 
councillors (FC) and the proportion of female directors on boards 
(PFOB) 
 
The hypothesis to verify the exogeneity between the proportion of local female 
councillors (FC) and the error terms or Tobin’s Q in this study is to test if the 
covariance between the proportion of local female councillors and the error terms 
equal to zero, Cov (FC, ε) = 0. With pooled OLS method, if the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman’s endogeneity specification test indicates that the endogeneity problem 
does exist in the structural model of this study, it means that the OLS estimator of 
ε is biased. In this study, we are unable to test if Cov (FC, ε) = 0 because we do 
not have an unbiased estimator for ε. With the presence of endogeneity in the 
structural model, we apply dynamic GMM method to estimate the relationship 
between board gender diversity and company performance. Dynamic GMM allows 
us to verify the second condition of the external instrumental variable by referring 
to Hansen J-test of exogeneity of an instrument (Gippel et al., 2015).  The null 
hypothesis to examine the exogeneity of the external instrumental variable is: 
 
H0: The external instrument is exogenous 
 
The details analysis of the first stage regression results in 2SLS is presented in 
Appendix 11. The results indicate that the selected external instrumental variable, 
the proportion of local female councillors (FC) is significant and positively 
correlated to the proportion of female directors (PFOB). The t-statistics in the first 
stage regression shows a strong and significant positive correlation between the 
proportion of local female councillors and the proportion of female directors at a 
significance level of 1%. 
 
Table 4.9: First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R-Sq. Adjusted 
R-Sq 
Partial 
R-Sq. 
F(1,1971) Prob > 
F 
PFOB 0.2168 0.2133 0.0240 48.4932 0.0000 
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Table 4.9 presents the results of F-test on the first stage regression summary 
statistics. The F-test estimation rejects the null hypothesis, indicates that the 
selected external instrumental variable in this model, the proportion of local female 
councillors (FC), is not a weak instrument in this analysis and is positively 
correlated to the endogenous variable, the proportion of female director on boards 
(PFOB). The results indicate that the relationship between these two variables is 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the proportion local female councillors 
(FC) is relevant and positively correlated with the proportion of female directors 
(PFOB). This confirms the relevancy test of applying the external instrumental 
variable method and supports our argument on the influence of political science in 
corporate governance, where local female councillors play an important role in 
influencing other females’ involvement in the workforce at the executive and board 
level. 
 
The F-test of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman’s endogeneity specification test in Table 
4.8 indicates that the endogeneity issue exists in the model at a highly significant 
level. This suggests that the OLS estimator of ε is biased and we are unable to 
test if Cov (FC, ε) = 0 because we do not have an unbiased estimator for ε. Using 
economic theory, we assume that the proportion of local female councillors (FC) 
has no correlation with company performance. However, to be statistically 
convincing to verify the exogeneity of the proportion of local female councillors to 
the company performance, we apply Hansen J-test of exogeneity of an instrument 
with the dynamic GMM method. Section (a) of Table 4.10 presents Hansen J-test 
of exogeneity of the instrument from the dynamic differenced GMM method while 
section (b) of Table 4.10 presents the Hansen J-test of exogeneity of the 
instrument from dynamic system GMM method. The results show a probability chi-
square of 0.545 and 0.618. In both instances, the results are not significant, and 
we do not reject the null hypothesis. This suggests that the instruments used in the 
estimation are exogenous and there is no correlation between the proportion of 
local female councillors (FC) and the error terms in the model.  
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Table 4.10 (a): Hansen J-Test of exogeneity of instruments – Differenced GMM 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
iv(FC) 
Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.838 
Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.412 
 
Table 4.10 (b): Hansen J-Test of exogeneity of instruments – System GMM 
GMM instruments for levels 
Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.532 
Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =  13.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.365 
iv(FC) 
Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(14)   =  13.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.457 
Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   1.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.246 
 
4.4 Regression Analysis And Results – Gender-Diverse Boards And 
Company financial performance 
This sub-section presents the regression results of this study between boards 
gender diversity and company performance. We first apply various statistical 
regression methods as employed by previous empirical studies to examine the 
relationship between the gender-diverse boards and company performance. We 
then illustrate the implications of implementing inappropriate econometrics 
methods that cause the spurious correlations between the variables. The dataset 
comprises unbalanced panel data of 1981 firm-year observations of 299 
companies listed in the ASX200 over the period from 2008 to 2015. The 
regression analysis begins with pooled ordinary-least-square method (OLS) using 
both fixed and random effects. This follows by the analysis using two-stage-least-
square (2SLS) instrumental variable method and dynamic Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM). The results for each of these methods are discussed in the 
following section.  
 
4.4.1 Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Method- Random Effects and Fixed 
Effects Estimation 
Early literature in governance and performance studies commonly uses pooled 
OLS method, with either fixed or random effects estimation. This section present 
pooled OLS estimation as the baseline approach to compare the regression 
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results using different econometrics technique. In the pooled OLS method, 
Breusch and Pagan-Lagrange Multiplier test as discussed in section 4.3.2 
indicates that the variance in the dataset is non-constant. The results present a 
probability chi-square of zero, rejecting the null hypothesis that the variances are 
constant. With the presence of heteroskedasticity, we perform standard errors 
robustness test in the estimation to examine the relationship between board 
gender diverse boards and company financial performance. Contrary, the 
Hausman test in section 4.3.3 rejects the random effects estimation with a 
significant F-test at the 5% level, indicating that fixed effects estimation is more 
appropriate to correct for any unobserved heterogeneity existing in diversity-
performance studies.  
 
Table 4.11 presents the OLS regression results. The random effects and fixed 
effects estimations report a consistent relationship between board gender diversity 
(GD) and company financial performance (LogQ). The results suggest that the 
proportion of female directors (PFOB) is highly significant and negatively 
correlated with company performance, Tobin’s Q (LogQ), at the 1% level. The 
robustness test of the gender diversity (GD) measure, the Blau index (Blau), yields 
consistent results as the variable of interest, the proportion of female directors 
(PFOB), with a highly significant and negatively correlation at the 1% level.  
 
In relation to the control variables, at board level, both board size (Board) and 
proportion of independent directors (PIndDir) show significant negative 
correlations with company performance, indicating that larger board size has a 
negative impact on the company performance. Similarly, the proportion of 
independent directors also has a negative impact on the company performance. 
CEO tenure (CEOT) and CEO duality (CEODua) do not have any correlation with 
Tobin’s Q for both random and fixed effects estimation. At the company level, the 
control variable market capitalisation (LogMC) and volatility measured by the 
standard deviation of return on equity (VROE) have significant and positive 
correlations with company financial performance at the 1% level. On the other 
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hand, total revenue (LogRev) has negative correlations with Tobin’s Q while 
gearing ratio (NDE) of the companies has no significant on company performance.  
 
We acknowledge that if the relationship between gender-diverse boards and 
company financial performance is due to other reasons or only in part of the 
proportion of female directors (PFOB), then the endogeneity issue does arise. In 
this case, the coefficient of PFOB cannot be interpreted in the simple correlation 
manner using OLS method. This is because the coefficient of PFOB has no 
meaning in explaining the company financial performance and the magnitude of 
the relationship, as well as the direction of the relationship, can be misinterpreted. 
We will discuss the key findings and main results in the later section.  
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Table 4.11: OLS Regression Analysis Between Board Gender Diversity and Company Financial 
Performance 
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variable - Log Q 
OLS-RE  OLS-FE  OLS-RE  OLS-FE  
(GD-PFOB) (GD-PFOB) (GD-Blau) (GD-Blau) 
Gender Diversity (GD) -0.0017*** -0.0016*** -0.1377*** -0.1298***  [3.6} [3.09] [3.99] [3.52] 
Board Size (Board) -0.0291*** -0.0212*** -0.0286*** -0.0209***  [10.43] [6.92] [7.58] [4.81] 
Proportion of Indp'n Directors (PIndDir) -0.0022*** -0.0018*** -0.0022*** -0.0018***  [7.87] [5.97] [5.61] [4.13] 
CEO Tenure (CEOT) 0.0009 -0.0035 0.0009 -0.0034  [0.67] [2.42] [0.45] [1.42] 
CEO Duality (CEODua) -0.0420 -0.0636 -0.0424 -0.0637  [1.89] [2.63] [0.74] [0.85] 
Market Capitalisation (LogMC) 0.3115*** 0.3530*** 0.3121*** 0.3532***  [30.48] [31.12] [15.46] [14.18] 
Total Revenue (LogRev) -0.0763*** -0.0742*** -0.0762*** -0.0742***  [15.62] [14.18] [6.7] [5.72] 
Gearing Ratio (NDE) -0.00004 -0.00001 -0.00004 -0.00001  [1.46] [0.46] [0.93] [0.28] 
Volatility (VROE) 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 0.0022*** 0.0021**  [13.31] [12.31] [2.64] [2.33] 
# of observations 1981 1981 1981 1981 
R2 0.4026 0.4138 0.4039 0.415 
Note to Table 4.11: 
Table 4.11 reports the OLS regression results using both random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) estimations. 
Column 1 tabulates the variable and control variables used in this study in relation to the dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q, the proxy for the performance measure of this study. Column 2 and 4 tabulate the results from random 
effects estimations (OLS-RE) using gender diversity measure (GD) of the proportion of female directors (PFOB) 
and the Blau index (Blau) respectively. Column 3 and 5 tabulate the results from fixed (OLS-FE) effects 
estimations using the same gender diversity measures. The model specifications for OLS method are as followed: 
Random effects estimation: Pit = β0 + β1GDit + βkCVit + εit, and  
Fixed effects estimation is Pit = β0 + β1GDit + βkCVit + δi + γt + εit, which includes company fixed effects (δi) and time fixed 
effects (γt). 
Tobin’s Q is the measure of market performance, calculated from the ratio of the sum of the company’s market 
value of equity and book value of debt to its book value of assets. GD represents board gender diversity measure. 
The proportion of female directors (PFOB) is the variable of interest and Blau index (Blau) is the gender diversity 
measure for the robustness test. Board control variables (BCV) comprise board size (Board), the proportion of 
independent directors (PIndDir), CEO tenure (CEOT) and the joint function of chairman and CEO (CEODua). The 
company-level control variables (CV) comprise the company’s market capitalisation (LogMC), total revenue 
(LogRev), gearing ratio (NDE) and volatility (VROE). Table 3.1 in chapter 3 presents the definition of all variables 
of this study. 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 299 companies with 1981 firm-year observations for the 
period from 2008 to 2015. The regression results are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity with variance 
robustness check. The second row of each explanatory variable shows the absolute value of t-statistics and z-
statistics in brackets for the analysis. The asterisks represent the significance of critical value at 0.01 (***), 0.05 
(**) and 0.10 (*) of Prob > |z| or Prob > |t| for random effects estimation and fixed effects estimation respectively. 
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4.4.2 Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) Instrumental Variable Method 
In general, two-stage least square (2SLS) method is less preferred to ordinary 
least square (OLS) as OLS provides more consistent and efficient results if the 
explanatory variables are strictly exogenous to the dependent variable 
(Wooldridge, 2010). However, as the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test in 
section 4.3.424 indicates that endogeneity issue exists in the structural model of 
this study, OLS method will no longer provide an unbiased estimate. Section 4.3.5 
of this study has examined the pre-requisitions in applying the external 
instrumental variable where the external instrumental variable, the proportion of 
local female councillors, has fulfilled both the relevancy and the exogeneity 
requirements25.  
 
The presence of endogeneity in the structural model suggests that 2SLS 
instrumental variable method is an appropriate method compared to OLS 
estimator to minimise the biased estimation due to the endogeneity issue. The 
2SLS instrumental variable method ignores the residual value in the original OLS 
estimation, and the external instrumental variable in the 2SLS has removed any 
confounding factors between the endogenous variable, the proportion of female 
directors, and the dependent variable, the company performance. The 2SLS 
instrumental variable method has been widely used in previous literature  (Adams 
& Ferreira, 2009; Ahmed & Ali, 2017; Liu et al., 2014)  to mitigate the possible 
causations of endogeneity issue such as reverse causality, measurement errors 
and omitted variables. This study uses the exogenous shock of the instrumental 
variable to address the potential endogenous relationship between board gender 
diversity and company performance.  
 
Table 4.12 presents the regression results of the 2SLS instrumental variable 
analysis with an intention to mitigate the endogeneity concern in the structural 
model.  
                                                        
24 Refer Table 4.8 for the results on the endogeneity test. 25 Refer Table 4.10(a) and 4.10(b) and detail discussions on the selection of an external instrumental variable. 
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Table 4.12: 2SLS Regression Analysis Between Board Gender Diversity and Company Financial 
Performance 
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variable 
PFOB LogQ 
First stage PFOB (IV-FC) Blau (IV-FC) 
Gender Diversity (GD)   -0.0029 -0.2289 
   [1.13] [0.79] 
Board Size (Board) 0.0861 -0.0211*** -0.0205*** 
 [0.41] [6.82] [4.48] 
Proportion of Independent Directors (PIndDir) 0.1260*** -0.0016*** -0.0016** 
 [5.54] 3.47] [2.55] 
CEO Tenure (CEOT) 0.1536 -0.0033 -0.0032 
 [1.4] [2.15] [1.37] 
CEO Duality (CEODua) 1.5176 -0.0618 -0.0621 
 [0.72] [2.52] [0.81] 
Market Capitalisation (LogMC) 0.8353 0.3545*** 0.3547*** 
 [1.13] [30.26] [13.46] 
Total Revenue (LogRev) -0.0086 -0.0742*** -0.0742*** 
 [0.04] [14.15] [5.76] 
Gearing Ratio (NDE) -0.001 -0.00001 -0.00001 
 [1.01] [0.5] [0.30] 
Volatility (VROE) 0.00448 0.0021** 0.0021** 
 [0.59] [12.29] [2.36] 
Proportion of local Female Councillors (FC) 0.1364***     
 [5.32]     
# of observations 1981 1981 1981 
External Instrument - FC FC 
R2 0.1019 0.4112 0.4142 
Note to Table 4.12: 
Table 4.12 reports the 2SLS instrumental variable regression results using fixed effects (FE) estimations. Column 1 
tabulates the variable of interest and control variables in relation to the dependent variable Tobin’s  Q (LogQ), the proxy 
for the performance measure of this study. Column 2 presents the first stage regression analysis in the 2SLS 
estimation using the proportion of female directors (PFOB) as the dependent variable to examine the relationship 
between this endogenous variable with the selected external instrumental variable, the proportion of local female 
councillors (FC). Column 3 and 4 tabulate the second stage regression results using gender diversity measures (GD), 
the proportion of female directors (PFOB) and the Blau index (Blau) respectively. Refer to note in Table 4.11 for 
variable descriptions of the control variables. The first stage regression and the second stage regression are:  
1st stage regression: GDit = α0 + α1FC + αkCVit + νit 
2nd stage regression: Pit = β0 + β𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺�  it + βkCVit + εit 
Where: 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺�  is the predicted value of the gender diversity measure after taking into consideration of the external 
instrumental variable.  
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 299 companies with 1981 firm-year observations for the period 
from 2008 to 2015. The regression results are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity with variance robustness 
check. The second row of each explanatory variable shows the absolute value of t-statistics and z-statistics in 
brackets for the first stage regression analysis and 2SLS analysis. The asterisks represent the significance of critical 
value at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (*) of Prob > |t| or Prob > |z| for first stage instrumental regression and 2SLS 
fixed effects estimation respectively. 
  152 
The discussions in section 4.3.5 suggest that the selected external instrumental 
variable, the proportion of local female councillors (FC), has fulfilled both the 
relevancy and exogeneity test in applying instrumental variable. Column 2 in Table 
4.12 indicates that the proportion of local female councillors (FC) is significantly 
and positively correlated with the proportion of female directors (PFOB) at the 1% 
level. The coefficient of 0.14 suggests that a 1% increase in the local female 
councillors has a positive impact of 0.14 points on the local females board 
representation. This is in line with our arguments on the positive influence of 
political science in corporate governance  (Terjesen et al., 2015) and the theory of 
economic ramification of distance  (Bouwman, 2012). The effect of the proportion 
of local female councillors (FC) in 2SLS estimation has removed any confounding 
factors between the proportion of female directors (PFOB) and company financial 
performance (LogQ). This study uses the exogenous shock of the instrumental 
variable to address the possible endogenous relationship between board gender 
diversity and company performance.  
 
After taking into consideration the first stage regression of the external 
instrumental variable, this study applies the predicted proportion of female 
directors in the second stage of the regression model. The results of the 2SLS 
instrumental variable indicate that there is no significant correlation between board 
gender diversity (GD), measured in the proportion of female directors (PFOB), and 
company performance, measured in Tobin’s Q (LogQ). This contradicts the OLS 
regression results as tabulated in Table 4.11 where the proportion of female 
directors (PFOB) is highly significant and negatively correlated with company 
performance, Tobin’s Q (LogQ), at the 1% level. The robustness test using the 
Blau index (Blau) as the board gender diversity (GD) measure yields similar 
results. These results indicate that when we apply the external instrumental 
variable into the structural model, the external instrumental variable has removed 
the possible confounding relationship between board gender diversity and 
company performance. The exogenous shock of the external instrumental variable 
addresses the possible endogenous relationship between board gender diversity 
and company financial performance. This reaffirms that the endogeneity issue is a 
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primary concern in diversity-performance studies and OLS estimation can be 
biased and results in suggesting a spurious correlation between board gender 
diversity and company performance.  
 
In relation to other board-level control variables, the 2SLS estimation produces 
consistent results as the OLS estimation in both direction and magnitude of the 
parameter coefficient. Both board size (Board) and proportion of independent 
directors (PIndDir) show significant negative correlations with company financial 
performance at the 1% level. This suggests that larger board size has a negative 
impact on the company performance. This is consistent with Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) and Ahern and Dittmar (2012) studies, suggesting that board size is 
negatively correlated with board effectiveness and increase in agency costs.  
Similarly, the proportion of independent directors also has a negative impact on 
the company performance. This negative correlation contradicts the ASX Council’s 
corporate governance guidelines26 that advocate the majority of board members 
should comprise independent directors.   
 
At the company level control variables, the 2SLS and OLS estimations also report 
consistent outcomes regarding the sign of the relationship and the magnitude of 
the coefficient. The control variable market capitalisation (LogMC) and the volatility 
measured by the standard deviation of return on equity (VROE) have significant 
and positive correlations with the company financial performance at the 1% level. 
On the other hand, total revenue (LogRev) has negative correlations with Tobin’s 
Q while gearing ratio (NDE) of the companies has no significant impact on 
company performance. We will discuss the key findings and main results in the 
later section when we tabulate all econometric techniques and comparisons.  
 
4.4.3 Generalised Method Of Moments (GMM) Method 
The 2SLS instrumental variable estimation as discussed in section 4.4.2 deals with 
the endogeneity concern due to the unobserved time-invariant heteroskedasticity.                                                         
26 ASX Corporate Governance Council’s 2014 guidelines: Principle 2.4 of Corporate governance principles and 
recommendations. 
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It also mitigates the issue of simultaneity between the endogenous explanatory 
variable and the dependent variable. However, another possible concern in 
governance and performance studies is the dynamic endogeneity due to the 
dynamic relationship between board structure and performance in general  
(Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012)  and more specifically in board gender 
diversity and performance studies (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; T. Nguyen et al., 
2015; Sila et al., 2016) . Prior studies in corporate governance and performance 
studies suggest the application of panel Generalised Method of Moments 
estimator (GMM) to alleviate the dynamic endogeneity concern  (Schultz et al., 
2010; Wintoki et al., 2012). The dynamic GMM method requires that there is no 
auto-correlation in the idiosyncratic errors and the instruments are valid and 
exogenous to the dependent variables. 
 
This study applies Arellano and Bond  (1991) two-step dynamic differenced GMM 
and Blundell and Bond  (1998) two-step dynamic system GMM panel regression 
estimator with our dataset. Table 4.13 reports the regression results from dynamic 
GMM estimator by including past performance as the covariate in the model to 
address the endogeneity concern between the dynamic relationship between past 
performance and board gender diversity. The standard errors in the model are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity using variance robustness check. We also include 
the selected external instrumental variable, the proportion of local female 
councillors (FC), to account for all potential sources of endogeneity. Both 
techniques allow us to deal with the issues of the finite sample and dynamic nature 
of the dependent variable.  
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Note to Table 4.13: 
Table 4.13 reports the two-step dynamic GMM estimations using both differenced and system GMM. Column 1 
tabulates the variable aof interest and control variables of this study, and the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (LogQ), 
the proxy for the performance measure of this study. Column 2 and 4 present the dynamic differenced GMM using the 
gender diversity measure (GD), measured by the proportion of female directors (PFOB) and the Blau index (Blau) to 
examine the relationship between board gender diversity and company financial performance respectively. Column 3 
and 5 tabulate the dynamic system GMM using the same gender diversity measures. We also include the lagged 
dependent variable (Lagged LogQ) to address the endogeneity caused by the past performance. Refer to note in Table 
4.11 for variable descriptions of the control variables. The model specifications for the dynamic GMM is as follows:  
Dynamic GMM model: ΔPit = β1ΔPit-1 + β2ΔGDit + βkΔCVit + Δεit   
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 299 companies with 1981 firm-year observations for the period 
from 2008 to 2015. The regression results are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity using Windmeijer standard 
errors robustness check to correct for downward bias in two-step dynamic GMM estimation. The second row of each 
explanatory variable shows the absolute value of t-statistics in brackets for the regression analysis. The asterisks 
represent the significance of critical value at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (*) of Prob > |t|. 
Table 4.13: Dynamic GMM Regression Analysis Between Board Gender Diversity and Company Financial 
Performance 
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variable - Log Q 
DGMM(2) SGMM(2) DGMM(2): B SGMM(2): B 
Gender Diversity (GD) 0.0091 0.0027 0.1566 0.0449 
 [0.27] [0.64] [0.05] [0.16] 
Board Size (Board) -0.1398 -0.1032* -0.1167 -0.0873 
 [1.28 [1.93] [0.91] [1.62] 
Proportion of Independent Directors (PIndDir) -0.0136 -0.0061 -0.01 -0.0047 
 [0.88] [1.38] [0.68] [1.08] 
CEO Tenure (CEOT) 0.0309 0.0168 0.0297 0.0185 
 [0.97] [1.19] [0.73] [1.28] 
CEO Duality (CEODua) 0.5 0.6611 0.4115 0.6046 
 [0.67] [1.63] [0.53] [1.65] 
Market Capitalisation (LogMC) 0.4752 0.2719** 0.4987* 0.2517** 
 [1.49] [2.43] [1.65] [2.23] 
Total Revenue (LogRev) -0.0922 -0.0363 -0.079 -0.0369 
 [0.79] [0.73] [0.51] [0.71] 
Gearing Ratio (NDE) -0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0004 
 [0.57] [0.60] [0.38] [0.59] 
Volatility (VROE) 0.004 0.0066* 0.0027 0.006* 
 [0.69] [1.83] [0.42] [1.82] 
Lagged of LogQ 0.4198 0.267* 0.4712 0.3084** 
 [1.40] [1.85] [1.56] [2.26] 
# of observations 1393 1682 1393 1682 
No of Instruments 13 26 13 26 
AR(1) Test p-value 0.445 0.1 0.559 0.005 
AR(2) Test p-value 0.48 0.54 0.6 0.69 
Hansen Test of over-identification (p-value) 0.8 0.43 0.72 0.26 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity (p-value) 0.41 0.25 0.86 0.44 
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The results of the dynamic GMM models show that the main focus of this study, 
the proportion of female directors on boards (PFOB) has no significant influence 
on the company performance. Interestingly, the direction of the relationship has 
changed from significantly negative in the OLS estimation to positive in the 
dynamic GMM models, although the relationship is insignificant. These results 
contradict the estimations as shown in the OLS’s random effects and fixed effects 
methods. The significant negative correlation between board gender diversity and 
company financial performance may be caused by the omitted variable biases. 
When we include the dynamic relationship between the past performances and the 
external instrumental variable in the model, the highly negative significant 
correlations between board gender diversity and company financial performance 
as shown in the OLS estimation disappear, indicating that the endogeneity 
between board gender diversity and company financial performance may be 
caused by the simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity.  
 
Regarding the board control variables, the dynamic GMM models also indicate 
that there is no significant correlation between board characteristics and company 
performance. The significant negative relationships between board size (Board) 
and the proportion of independent directors (PIndDir) disappear in dynamic GMM 
models. This indicates that it is essential to include past performance and an 
external instrumental variable to control for any dynamic nature in board 
characteristics and performance studies. At the company level, the dynamic GMM 
models also show no significant relationships between the company level control 
variables and company performance. The robustness tests using the alternative 
gender diversity measure, the Blau index (Blau), yield similar results. 
 
Table 4.13 also presents the robustness check on the over-identifying issue of 
instruments and the validity of instruments. We examine the first difference 
residuals for auto-correlations using the Arellano-Bond test of second-order serial 
correlation. The results indicate the p-value for AR(2) for all four models using 
differenced GMM and system GMM are insignificant at the 10% level. This 
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suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, noting 
that there were enough lags of the instrumental variables to control for the 
dynamic relationship in the model. We also follow Roodman’s (2009b) 
recommendation in implementing dynamic GMM model and in applying Hansen J-
test of over-identifying restriction and the difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity 
of instrument subsets. The null hypothesis for Hansen J-test of over-identification 
is the instruments are valid. The results show that the chi-square test statistics for 
all four models are insignificant at the 10% level, indicating that the instruments 
are valid. For the difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity, the chi-square test 
statistics also reports an insignificant p-value at the 10% level, indicating that the 
instruments used in the model are exogenous.  
 
4.4.4 Main Findings Of Regression Results  
We note that the possible cause of the endogeneity issue in gender diversity and 
performance studies is the simultaneous causality between company financial 
performance and board gender diversity. In this instance, both current performance 
and past performance may influence boards’ gender diversity. If past performance 
influences gender diversity of the board structure, we expect that companies that 
perform better will appoint more female directors on their boards. Meanwhile, the 
self-selection bias also causes an unclear casual relationship between board gender 
diversity and company financial performance when females choose to join better-
performed companies. The feedback loops between gender-diverse boards and 
company financial performance make the relationships dynamic and complex. 
Following from previous governance and performance literatures (Schultz et al., 
2010; Wintoki et al., 2012); this study applies the more sophisticated econometric 
techniques using 2SLS instrumental variable and dynamic GMM panel regression 
estimation to address the endogeneity issue.  
 
Table 4.14 presents the comparative analysis of board gender diversity and 
company financial performance using different econometric estimators. The 
summary comparison between different econometric techniques allows us to 
compare this study with previous literatures and to demonstrate the most 
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appropriate estimations for this study. We illustrate all commonly used methods in 
corporate governance and performance studies, more particularly in board gender 
diversity and company financial performance studies.  
 
We begin with the most commonly used method, the pooled OLS estimation in our 
comparative analysis. Column 2 and 3 of Table 4.14 present OLS methods using 
random effects (OLS-RE) and fixed effects (OLS-FE) estimators respectively. The 
results suggest a highly significant negative correlation between board gender 
diversity and company financial performance at the 1% level. The magnitude of 
the coefficient is consistent with both random effects and fixed effect estimations. 
The coefficient of 0.0016 means that with every increase of one percentage point 
of the proportion of female directors on boards (PFOB), the predicted value of 
Tobin’s Q (LogQ) will decrease in average by 0.16%, with the assumption that 
every other variable remains constant and unchanged. While with other control 
variables, board size (Board), the proportion of independent directors (PIndDir), 
and total revenue (LogRev) are significantly and negatively correlated with 
company financial performance (LogQ). Market capitalisation (LogMC) and 
volatility (VROE) are positively correlated with performance. Although fixed effects 
estimators may correct for any unobserved heteroskedasticity that presents in the 
structural model, both estimations are not reliable as the significance of the 
variables and company financial performance may not fulfil the strict exogeneity 
assumptions. The endogeneity issues such as reverse causality, omitted variable 
biases, and measurement errors may be the main factor in the significant results.  
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Table 4.14: Comparison of Different Econometric Techniques - Regression Analysis Between Board Gender 
Diversity and Company Financial Performance 
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variable – Log Q 
OLS-RE OLS-FE 2SLS (IV) Diff’ GMM  Syst GMM 
Gender Diversity (GD) -0.0017*** -0.0016*** -0.0029 0.0091 0.0027 
 [3.6} [3.09] [1.13] [0.27] [0.64] 
Board Size (Board) -0.0291*** -0.0212*** -0.0211*** -0.1398 -0.1032* 
 [10.43] [6.92] [6.82] [1.28 [1.93] 
Proportion of Independent Directors (PindDir) -0.0022*** -0.0018*** -0.0016*** -0.0136 -0.0061 
 [7.87] [5.97] 3.47] [0.88] [1.38] 
CEO Tenure (CEOT) 0.0009 -0.0035 -0.0033 0.0309 0.0168 
 [0.67] [2.42] [2.15] [0.97] [1.19] 
CEO Duality (CEODua) -0.0420 -0.0636 -0.0618 0.5 0.6611 
 [1.89] [2.63] [2.52] [0.67] [1.63] 
Market Capitalisation (LogMC) 0.3115*** 0.3530*** 0.3545*** 0.4752 0.2719** 
 [30.48] [31.12] [30.26] [1.49] [2.43] 
Total Revenue (LogRev) -0.0763*** -0.0742*** -0.0742*** -0.0922 -0.0363 
 [15.62] [14.18] [14.15] [0.79] [0.73] 
Gearing Ratio (NDE) -0.00004 -0.00001 0 -0.0015 -0.0005 
 [1.46] [0.46] [0.5] [0.57] [0.60] 
Volatility (VROE) 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.004 0.0066* 
 [13.31] [12.31] [12.29] [0.69] [1.83] 
Lag 1 of Log Q    0.4198 0.267* 
    [1.40] [1.85] 
# of observations 1981 1981 1981 1393 1682 
# of instruments    13 26 
R2 0.4026 0.4138 0.4112   
AR(1) Test p-value    0.445 0.1 
AR(2) Test p-value    0.48 0.54 
Hansen Test of over-identification (p-value)    0.8 0.43 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity (p-
value)       0.41 0.25  
Note to Table 4.14: 
Table 4.14 shows the comparison between the widely used econometric techniques in governance and 
performance studies, more particularly in board gender diversity and company performance. Column 1 tabulates 
the independent and control variables used in this study in relation to the dependent variable Tobin’s Q (LogQ), 
the proxy for the performance measure of this study. Column 2 presents the regression results of OLS random 
effects (OLS-RE) estimator, column 3 presents OLS fixed effects (OLS-FE) estimator, column 4 presents 2SLS 
instrumental variable method (2SLS-IV), column 5 presents dynamic differenced GMM method, and column 6 
presents the system GMM estimator. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 299 companies with 
1981 firm-year observations for the period from 2008 to 2015. Refer to note in Table 4.11 for the description of the 
variables and Table 3.5 in chapter 3 for the definition of all variables of this study. The regression results are 
adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity using Windmeijer standard errors robustness check to correct for 
downward bias in two-step dynamic GMM estimation. The second row of each explanatory variable shows the 
absolute value of t-statistics and z-statistics in brackets for the analysis. The asterisks represent the significance 
of critical value at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (*) of Prob > |t| or Prob > |z|.  
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The Durbin-Wu-Hausman’s endogeneity test as shown in Table 4.8 of section 
4.3.4 confirms that there exists an endogeneity issue in the OLS structural model. 
This study then applies the most conventional method using 2SLS instrumental 
variable method to deal with the endogeneity concern between the endogenous 
explanatory variable and the dependent variable. The 2SLS instrumental variable 
method in column 4 of Table 4.14 allows the estimation to deal with the 
unobserved time-invariant heteroskedasticity and mitigates the issue of 
simultaneity between the endogenous explanatory variable and the dependent 
variable. The selected external instrumental variable of this study, the proportion of 
local female councillors (FC), fulfilled both the relevancy and exogeneity tests in 
applying an external instrumental variable. With the application of the carefully 
selected and valid external instrumental variable, the results in column 4 of Table 
4.14 show that the proportion of female directors has no significant correlation with 
company performance. The regression results indicate that the spurious 
correlations as presented by OLS estimations are driven by the endogeneity 
concern. The external instrumental variable has removed the confounding effects 
between board gender diversity and company financial performance as estimated 
by the OLS methods. The correlations and the magnitude of coefficients for other 
control variables remain consistent between the 2SLS instrumental variable and 
the fixed effects estimator. The 2SLS instrumental method indicates that although 
the external instrumental variable is able to remove the confounding effects of 
board gender diversity and company performance, it does not take into account 
the dynamic nature of board structure and company performance.  
 
To deal with endogeneity due to the dynamic relationship between board gender 
structure and company financial performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; T. Nguyen et 
al., 2015; Sila et al., 2016) , this study applies Arellano and Bond  (1991) two-step 
dynamic differenced GMM and Blundell and Bond  (1998) two-step dynamic system 
GMM panel regression estimators with our dataset. We include one year lagged of 
company financial performance as covariates and unobserved fixed panel-data 
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effects in the dynamic panel regression models (column 5 and 6 in Table 4.14) to 
address the endogeneity caused by the past performance that may influence the 
variables in the structural model. We also include the selected external instrumental 
variable, the proportion of local female councillors (FC), as the exogenous external 
instrumental variable to account for all potential sources of endogeneity. Following 
Windmeijer’s (2005) suggestions on small sample correction, we apply two-step 
dynamic GMM estimation to deal with the issues of a finite sample and dynamic 
nature of the dependent variable in our study. The dynamic GMM results show that 
when we include the dynamic relationship together with the external instrumental 
variable in the structural model, the direction of the correlations between board 
gender diversity reverses from negative to positive, although it is not significant at the 
10% level. This is a sharp contrast to the results presented by the OLS estimations, 
which produce biased and unreliable parameter estimates. The intuition for the sign 
reversal in dynamic GMM methods between board gender diversity and company 
financial performance can be due to unobserved heterogeneity and the dynamic 
relationship of past performance on board gender diversity.   
 
In relation to other control variables in the model specification, all the significant 
correlations as reported in the OLS and the 2SLS estimations have turned into 
insignificant parameters in the GMM model. The insignificant of board characteristics 
with company financial performance is consistent with the findings in Australian 
studies by Pham, Suchard and Zein (2011) and Schultz et al. (2010). Both studies 
find no correlation between board structure and performance after controlling for 
endogeneity using dynamic GMM method. Neither board size (Board) nor the 
proportion of independent directors (PIndDir) is significant at the 5% level. The 
significant negative correlations between CEO tenure (CEOT) and CEO duality 
(CEODua) in fixed effects and 2SLS methods have changed direction to insignificant 
positive correlations. At the company level, all control variables have no significant 
correlation with company performance. The lagged performance of Tobin’s Q also 
does not show a strong relationship with performance in differenced GMM and only 
report a weak positive correlation with the current performance at the 10% level with 
dynamic system GMM estimator. This suggests that the major endogeneity in the 
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model specification is caused by simultaneity or reverse causality and unobserved 
heterogeneity issues. Both dynamic GMM estimations, the differenced and system 
estimators are well specified as indicated in Hansen test of over-identifying restriction 
and the Arellano-Bond test of autocorrelation. Given the biased parameter estimation 
in the OLS methods and insufficient technique in the fixed effects and the 2SLS 
instrumental variable estimators, all studies that examine the relationship between 
corporate governance, and more particularly in board gender studies, and company 
financial performance should apply a dynamic GMM framework. The more important 
issue is to identify a truly exogenous external instrumental variable that is able to 
examine the main source of endogeneity. 
 
4.5 Regression Analysis Based On Critical Mass Gender Grouping 
This subsection presents the regression results obtained from the critical mass 
theory. We follow the similar presentation in section 4.4 and report the results from all 
the methodologies commonly apply to governance and board gender diversity 
studies with company performance. We then summarise the regression results and 
make a comparison of all these methodologies and conclude our main findings at the 
end of the section. The proponents of critical mass theory in board gender diversity 
studies suggest that female directors are likely to have an impact on boards’ decision 
making when they achieve a critical mass of female board representation  (Joecks et 
al., 2013; Konrald et al., 2008; Kristie, 2011; Strydom et al., 2017) . This study 
applies Kanter’s (1977a) principal of critical mass theory and classifies the sample 
set based on the original Kanter’s critical mass grouping and also the modified 
gender grouping as discussed in section 3.5.2.327. The regression analyses of each 
of the econometric techniques are presented in the following section. 
  
                                                        
27 The four gender groupings according to Kanter’s classification are: (i) K1 (uniform group) – boards consist of all male directors; (ii) 
K2 (skewed group) – boards with at least one but less than twenty percentage of female directors; (iii) K3 (tilted group) - boards 
with at least twenty percentage but less than forty percentage of female directors; and (iv) K4 (balanced group) – boards with at 
least forty percentage of female directors. The modified critical mass classifications are: (i) ACM0 – boards consist of all male 
directors; (ii) ACM20 – boards with at least twenty percentage of female directors; (iii) ACM30 – boards consist of at least thirty 
percentage of female directors; and (iv) ACM40 – boards with at least forty percentage of female directors.  
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4.5.1 Ordinary Least Square Estimation 
This study begins with the most commonly apply pooled OLS method using both 
random effects and fixed effects estimations. Based on the unbalanced panel sample 
data of 299 companies with 1981 firm-year observations for the entire period from 
2008 to 2015, Table 4.15(a) and 4.15(b) present the summary regression results 
between the gender group categories according to the critical mass classification and 
company financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q.  
 
Refer to Tables 4.15(a) and 4.15(b); both regressions report consistent parameters 
estimation regarding the direction of the relationship between gender-diverse boards 
and performance. Both OLS estimations suggest that the correlation between boards 
with all male directors and company financial performance are positive and strongly 
significant at the 1% level. However, boards with at least twenty percent of female 
directors (ACM20) have a negative and significant correlation with company financial 
performance at the 5% level. Although boards with at least thirty and forty percent 
female directors (ACM30 and ACM40) have no significant effects on company 
performance, but they remain negatively correlated. For the control variables, 
company size (LogMC) and volatility (VROE), remain positive and significantly 
correlated with company financial performance across all different groups of the 
critical mass of female directors. On the other hand, board size (Board), the 
proportion of independent directors (PIndDir) and total revenue of companies 
(LogRev) remain significant and negatively correlated with company performance.  
 
With the OLS random and fixed effects regression, there is the possibility that there 
exists an endogeneity issue in the relationship between gender-diverse-boards and 
company performance. Hence, the parameter estimations using OLS are not reliable 
and biased, even though fixed effects deal with the unobserved heterogeneity issue 
in the model. The subsequent analysis is undertaken to address these issues. 
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Table 4.15(a) Regression Analysis Between Board Gender Diversity and Company Financial Performance Based on Critical Mass Gender Grouping – OLS 
Random Effects 
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variable - Log Q Dependent Variable - Log Q 
K1 K2 K3 K4 ACM0 ACM20 ACM30 ACM40 
Gender Diversity (GD) 0.0450*** -0.0153* -0.0195** -0.0218 0.0450*** -0.0226*** -0.0052 -0.0218 
  [3.76] [1.76] [2.29] [1.4] [3.76] [2.56] [0.44] [1.4] 
Board Size (Board) -0.0273*** -0.0288*** -0.0296*** -0.0296*** -0.0273*** -0.0296*** -0.0296*** -0.0296*** 
  [7.26] [7.48] [7.62] [7.63] [7.26] [7.63] [7.62] [7.63] 
Proportion of Indep’n Directors (PIndDir) -0.0022*** -0.0025*** -0.0024*** -0.0025*** -0.0022*** -0.0024*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** 
  [5.71] [6.23] [6.07] [6.24] [5.71] [6.02] [6.24] [6.24] 
CEO Tenure (CEOT) 0.0010 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 
  [0.47] [0.45] [0.44] [0.43] [0.47] [0.43] [0.43] [0.43] 
CEO Duality (CEODua) -0.0428 -0.0424 -0.0419 -0.0423 -0.0428 -0.0421 -0.0419 -0.0423 
  [0.75] [0.74] [0.73] [0.74] [0.75] [0.74] [0.73] [0.74] 
Market Capitalisation (LogMC) 0.3115*** 0.3085*** 0.3084*** 0.3082*** 0.3115*** 0.3088*** 0.3080*** 0.3082*** 
  [15.51] [15.29] [15.25] [15.23] [15.51] [15.26] [15.2] [15.23] 
Total Revenue (LogRev) -0.0762*** -0.0767*** -0.0766* -0.0767*** -0.0762*** -0.0766* -0.0767*** -0.0767*** 
  [6.69] [6.67] [6.67] [6.66] [6.69] [6.67] [6.66] [6.66] 
Gearing Ratio (NDE) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  [0.92] [0.91] [0.92] [0.92] [0.92] [0.92] [0.91] [0.92] 
Volatility (VROE) 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 
  [2.65] [2.62] [2.62] [2.61] [2.65] [2.62] [2.61] [2.61] 
# of observations 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 
R2 0.404 0.399 0.3993 0.3981 0.404 0.3994 0.398 0.3981   
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Table 4.15(b) Regression Analysis Between Board Gender Diversity and Company Financial Performance Based on Critical Mass Gender Grouping – OLS Fixed 
Effects 
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variable - Log Q Dependent Variable - Log Q 
K1 K2 K3 K4 ACM0 ACM20 ACM30 ACM40 
Gender Diversity (GD) 0.0418*** -0.0141 -0.0163* -0.0136 0.0418*** -0.0186** 0.0013 -0.0136 
  [3.28] [1.62] [1.92] [1] [3.28] [2.1] [0.12] [1] 
Board Size (Board) -0.0197*** -0.0208*** -0.0215*** -0.0214*** -0.0197*** -0.0215*** -0.0214*** -0.0214*** 
  [4.57] [4.81] [4.88] [4.88] [4.57] [4.88] [4.87] [4.88] 
Proportion of Indep’n Directors (PIndDir) -0.0018*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0018*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** 
  [4.25] [4.68] [4.53] [4.68] [4.25] [4.5] [4.69] [4.68] 
CEO Tenure (CEOT) -0.0034 -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0038 -0.0034 -0.0037 -0.0038 -0.0038 
  [1.42] [1.53] [1.53] [1.54] [1.42] [1.52] [1.55] [1.54] 
CEO Duality (CEODua) -0.0643 -0.0658 -0.0651 -0.0658 -0.0643 -0.0651 -0.0659 -0.0658 
  [0.86] [0.87] [0.86] [0.87] [0.86] [0.86] [0.87] [0.87] 
Market Capitalisation (LogMC) 0.3526*** 0.35156*** 0.3513*** 0.3514*** 0.3526*** 0.3514*** 0.3513*** 0.3514*** 
  [14.18] [14.11] [14.09] [14.08] [14.18] [14.1] [14.06] [14.08] 
Total Revenue (LogRev) -0.0742*** -0.0742*** -0.0742*** -0.0742*** -0.0742*** -0.0742*** -0.0742*** -0.0742*** 
  [5.71] [5.68] [5.67] [5.67] [5.71] [5.67] [5.66] [5.67] 
Gearing Ratio (NDE) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  [0.27] [0.24] [0.25] [0.25] [0.27] [0.26] [0.24] [0.25] 
Volatility (VROE) 0.0021** 0.0021** 0.0021** 0.0021** 0.0021** 0.0021** 0.0021** 0.0021** 
  [2.34] [2.32] [2.31] [2.31] [2.34] [2.31] [2.31] [2.31] 
# of observations 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 
R2 0.415 0.4113 0.4113 0.4106 0.415 0.4115 0.4105 0.4106 
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Note to Table 4.15(a) and (b): 
Table 4.15(a) and (b) report the OLS random effects and fixed effects estimations regression results respectively. The gender diversity measures refer to the critical mass 
gender grouping using the proportion of female directors (PFOB). Based on Kanter’s critical mass gender classification, K1 represents the uniform group, boards with no female 
directors on boards, K2 represents the skewed group of firm-year observations with at least one female director on boards but not exceeding 20% of female directors; K3 
represents the tilted group of firm-year observations with at least 20% but not exceeding 40% of female directors. K4 represents the balanced group of firm-year observations 
with at least 40% of female directors. The groupings with the abbreviations of ACM represent the modified gender grouping based on firm-year observations with a minimum of 
proportion females in an incremental order. ACM0 represents the group of firm-year observations with no female directors on boards, while ACM20, ACM30, and ACM40 
represent the group of firm-year observations with at least 20%, 30% and 40% of female directors on boards respectively. Tobin’s Q is the measure of company performance, 
calculated from the ratio of the sum of the company’s market value of equity and book value of debt to its book value of assets. Refer notes in Table 4.11 for the description of 
other control variables and Table 3.5 in Chapter 3 for detailed definition of the variables.  
Column 1 tabulates the variable of interest and control variables used in this study in relation to the dependent variable Tobin’s Q, the proxy for the performance measure of this 
study. Column 2 to 5 with green shading tabulates the results according to Kanter’s critical mass classification. Column 6 to 9 with blue shading tabulate the results according to 
the modified critical classification. 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 299 companies with 1981 firm-year observations for the period from 2008 to 2015. The regression results are adjusted for 
potential heteroskedasticity using Windmeijer standard errors robustness check to correct for downward bias in two-step dynamic GMM estimation. The second row of each 
explanatory variable shows the absolute value of t-statistics and z-statistics in brackets for the analysis. The asterisks represent the significance of critical value at 0.01 (***), 
0.05 (**) and 0.10 (*) of Prob > |z| | or Prob > |t| for random effects estimation and fixed effects estimation respectively. 
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4.5.2 Two-Stage-Least Square Regression Analysis 
Extending from the entire dataset analysis with the 2SLS instrumental variable 
estimation, we continue to use this method with critical mass gender classification to 
examine the relationship of gender-diverse boards with company financial 
performance to mitigate the possible endogeneity issue due to simultaneity. Using 
the same external instrumental variable, the proportion of local female councillors, we 
create a dummy variable for each classification of the critical mass of the proportion 
of local female councillors28 based on the same classification of the critical mass of 
the proportion of female directors29. We then match the critical mass of local female 
councillors, as the external instrumental variable, to the critical mass of the proportion 
female directors in our analysis. Table 4.16 presents the 2SLS instrumental variable 
analysis using the critical mass gender classification.  
 
The results for category K1 and ACM0 indicate that the gender diversity measure is 
being omitted. This is because there is a multicollinearity issue with the proportion of 
local female councillors. As the dummy variable measures the proportion of local 
female councillors are all zero, indicating that all the local councils’ board are 
represented with at least one female councillor, we are unable to produce the 
parameter estimation for this category.  While for all other gender groups with critical 
mass classification, none of the groupings shows a significant relationship between 
the gender-diverse boards and company financial performance. This reaffirms that 
the significant negative correlation in OLS estimation for gender category ACM20 is 
biased due to the endogeneity concern. The results for other control variables remain 
consistent with the overall dataset, where board size, the proportion of independent 
directors and total revenue remain negatively correlated with company financial 
                                                        
28 The gender critical mass classification for the proportion of local female councillors in relation to Kanter’s classification are: (i) 
FCK1 (uniform group) – local councils that consist of all male councillors; (ii) FCK2 (skewed group) – local councils with at least one 
but less than twenty percentage of female councillors; (iii) FCK3 (tilted group) – local councils with at least twenty percentage but 
less than forty percentage of female councillors; and (iv) FCK4 (balanced group) – local councils with at least forty percentage of 
female councillors. The modified critical mass classifications for the proportion of local female councillors are: (i) FCACM0 – local 
councils consist of all male councillors; (ii) FCACM20 – local councils with at least twenty percentage of female councillors; (iii) 
FCACM30 – local councils consist of at least thirty percentage of female councillors; and (iv) FCACM40 – local councils with at least 
forty percentage of female councillors. 
29 Refer Section 3.5.2.3 for the four gender groupings according to Kanter’s  and the modified critical mass classifications.   
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performance, and company size and volatility are positively correlated with company 
financial performance. 
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Table 4.16: Regression Analysis Between Board Gender Diversity and Company Financial Performance Based on Critical Mass Grouping - 2SLS Instrumental 
Variable  
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variable - Log Q Dependent Variable - Log Q 
K1 K2 K3 K4 ACM0 ACM20 ACM30 ACM40 
Gender Diversity (GD) Omitted -0.7509 -0.0205 -2.2283 Omitted -1.8503 -1.1832 -2.2283 
    [0.77] [0.08] [0.74]   [0.33] [1.25] [0.74] 
Board Size (Board) -0.0214*** 0.0126 -0.0215*** -0.0238*** -0.0214*** -0.0304 -0.0295*** -0.0238*** 
  [4.88] [0.28] [4.94] [2.92] [4.88] [0.95] [3.03] [2.92] 
Proportion of Indep’n Directors (PIndDir) -0.0020*** -0.0009 -0.0020** -0.0013 -0.0020*** 0.0049 -0.0001 -0.0013 
  [4.69] [0.62] [1.77] [1.21] [4.69] [0.24] [0.09] [1.21] 
CEO Tenure (CEOT) -0.0038 -0.0010 -0.0037 -0.0019 -0.0038 0.0039 -0.0042 -0.0019 
  [1.55] [0.17] [1.35] [0.54] [1.55] [0.17] [1.09] [0.54] 
CEO Duality (CEODua) -0.0658 -0.0681 -0.0649 -0.0693 -0.0658 0.0046 0.0172 -0.0693 
  [0.87] [0.79] [0.87] [0.93] [0.87] [0.02] [0.13] [0.93] 
Market Capitalisation (LogMC) 0.3513*** 0.3679***  0.3513***  0.3699*** 0.3513*** 0.3686*** 0.3669*** 0.3669*** 
  [14.08] [9.04] [14.11] [9.4] [14.08] [5.2] [10.36] [9.4] 
Total Revenue (LogRev) -0.0742*** -0.0735*** -0.0742*** -0.0751*** -0.0742*** -0.0758*** -0.0703*** -0.0751*** 
  [5.67] [5.55] [5.67] [5.73] [5.67] [4.19] [4.97] [5.73] 
Gearing Ratio (NDE) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
  [0.24] [0.12] [0.25] [0.65] [0.24] [0.36] [0.68] [0.65] 
Volatility (VROE) 0.0021** 0.0023** 0.0021** 0.0020** 0.0021** 0.0023** 0.0019** 0.0020** 
  [2.31] [2.38] [2.31] [2.19] [2.31] [2.12] [1.97] [2.19] 
# of observations 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 
R2 0.4105 0.065 0.4112 0.0694 0.4105 0.0196 0.0778 0.0694 
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Note to Table 4.16: 
Table 4.16 reports the 2SLS instrumental variable estimations regression results using the critical mass gender grouping for the proportion of female directors (PFOB) and 
external instrumental variable, the proportion of local female councillors (FC). Refer to note in Table 4.15 for the detailed description of critical mass groupings. Tobin’s Q is the 
measure of company financial performance of this study, calculated from the ratio of the sum of the company’s market value of equity and book value of debt to its book value 
of assets. Refer notes in Table 4.11 for the description of other control variable and Table 3.5 in Chapter 3 for detailed definition of the variables. 
Column 1 tabulates the variable of interest and control variables used in this study in relation to the dependent variable Tobin’s Q, the proxy for the performance measure of this 
study. Column 2 to 5 with green shading tabulates the results according to Kanter’s critical mass classification. Column 6 to 9 with blue shading tabulate the results according to 
the modified critical classification. 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 299 companies with 1981 firm-year observations for the period from 2008 to 2015. The regression results are adjusted for 
potential heteroskedasticity using Windmeijer standard errors robustness check to correct for downward bias in two-step dynamic GMM estimation. The second row of each 
explanatory variable shows the absolute value of t-statistics in brackets for the analysis. The asterisks represent the significance of critical value at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 
(*) of Prob > |t|. 
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4.5.3 Dynamic GMM Estimator Regression Analysis 
In the gender critical mass classification setting, this study also deals with 
endogeneity concern arising from the dynamic nature of gender-diverse boards and 
company performance, as well as the effects of past performance on current 
performance using dynamic GMM techniques. Consistent with the entire dataset 
analysis, this study applies Arellano and Bond  (1991) two-step dynamic differenced 
GMM and Blundell and Bond  (1998) two-step dynamic system GMM panel 
regression estimator. The critical mass classification analysis also includes one year 
lagged of company’s performance as covariates to account for the dynamic nature of 
past performance. The critical mass classification of the proportion of local female 
councillors is included as the external instrumental variable to account for all other 
potential sources of endogeneity. We apply the same principal as the 2SLS 
instrumental variable’s critical mass classification of the proportion of local female 
councillors 30 and the critical mass of the proportion female directors 31. We then 
match the critical mass of local female councillors as the external instrumental 
variable, to the critical mass of the proportion of female directors in our analysis. 
Table 4.17(a) and 4.17(b) present the differenced and system dynamic GMM results 
respectively.  
 
The regression results show that all critical mass groupings of the proportion of 
female directors have no significant correlation with company performance. 
Furthermore, all board-level control variables also do not correlate with company 
performance. These results contrast with the significant negative relationship of 
board gender diversity (GD), board size (Board) and the proportion of independent 
directors (PIndDir) in the OLS method. The insignificant correlations of board gender 
diversity (GD) and other board-level control variables with company financial 
performance indicate that it is important to include past performance (L.1 LogQ) and 
external instrumental variable (FC) to control for any dynamic nature in board 
characteristics and company financial performance studies. At the company level, 
                                                        
30 Refer footnote 26 for the critical mass classification of the proportion of local female councillors groupings. 
31 Refer section 3.5.2.3 for the critical mass classification of the proportion of female directors on boards. 
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only the control variable company size, measured in market capitalisation (LogMC), 
shows a significant correlation with company performance.  
 
The dynamic GMM results in Table 4.17(a) and 4.17(b) also report the Arellano-Bond 
test of second-order serial correlation. The results suggest the p-value for AR(2) for 
both differenced GMM and system GMM are insignificant at the 10% level, 
suggesting that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
Furthermore, Hansen J-test of over-identifying restriction and the difference-in-
Hansen test of exogeneity of instrument subsets show that the chi-square test 
statistics for the dynamic GMM estimations are insignificant at the 10% level. Both 
tests for instrument’s relevancy and exogeneity indicate that the instruments are valid 
and exogenous in the dataset. We will discuss the detail findings in the next section 
by comparing all the econometric techniques employed in this study. 
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Table 4.17(a): Regression Analysis Between Board Gender Diversity and Company Financial Performance Based on Critical Mass Grouping- Dynamic 
Differenced GMM Estimation 
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variable - Log Q Dependent Variable - Log Q 
K1 K2 K3 K4 ACM0 ACM20 ACM30 ACM40 
Gender Diversity (GD) 0.0353 -0.0050 -0.2554 0.2133 0.0353 0.0027 0.1566 0.0449 
  [0.11] [0.06] [0.74] [1.03] [0.11] [0.64] [0.05] [0.16] 
Board Size (Board) -0.0893 -0.1330 -0.0570 -0.0238 -0.0893 -0.1032* -0.1167 -0.0873 
  [0.6] [1.69] [0.75] [0.38] [0.6] [1.93] [0.91] [1.62] 
Proportion of Indep’n Directors (PIndDir) 0.0009 -0.0107 -0.0138 0.0048 0.0009 -0.0061 -0.0100 -0.0047 
  [0.04] [1.11] [2.21] [0.62] [0.04] [1.38] [0.68] [1.08] 
CEO Tenure (CEOT) 0.0587 0.0424 -0.0073 -0.0130 0.0587 0.0168 0.0297 0.0185 
  [1.19] [1.3] [0.3] [0.18] [1.19] [1.19] [0.73] [1.28] 
CEO Duality (CEODua) 0.9974 -0.4673 -0.4750 0.6424 0.9974 0.6611 0.4115 0.6046 
  [1.15] [0.53] [0.67] [0.59] [1.15] [1.63] [0.53] [1.65] 
Market Capitalisation (LogMC) 0.2968 0.8752*** 0.6714** 0.3532 0.2968 0.2719** 0.4987* 0.2517** 
  [1.39] [2.53] [2.18] [0.83] [1.39] [2.43] [1.65] [2.23] 
Total Revenue (LogRev) -0.1298 -0.0795 -0.0216 -0.0604 -0.1298 -0.0363 -0.0790 -0.0369 
  [1.12] [0.83] [0.23] [0.45] [1.12] [0.73] [0.51] [0.71] 
Gearing Ratio (NDE) -0.0010 0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0028 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0004 
  [0.76] [0.31] [1.16] [1.04] [0.76] [0.6] [0.38] [0.59] 
Volatility (VROE) 0.0051 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0056 0.0051 0.0066* 0.0027 0.0060 
  [1.5] [0.07] [0.15] [1.05] [1.5] [1.83] [0.42] [1.82] 
L1. of Tobin's Q 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.267* 0.4712 0.3084** 
  [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [1.85] [1.56] [2.26] 
# of observations 1393 1393 1393 1393 1393 1682 1393 1682 
No of Instruments 12 13 13 12 12 26 13 26 
AR(1) Test p-value 0.107 0.315 0.134 0.359 0.107 0.1 0.559 0.005 
AR(2) Test p-value 0.47 0.51 0.28 0.43 0.47 0.54 0.60 0.69 
Hansen Test of over-identification (p-value) 1.00 0.64 0.92 0.97 1.00 0.43 0.72 0.26 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity (p-
value) 0.41 0.343 0.82 0.82 0.41 0.246 0.857 0.442 
  174 
Table 4.17(b): Regression Analysis Between Board Gender Diversity and Company Financial Performance Based on Critical Mass Grouping - Dynamic System 
GMM Estimation 
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variable - Log Q Dependent Variable - Log Q 
K1 K2 K3 K4 ACM0 ACM20 ACM30 ACM40 
Gender Diversity (GD) 0.1005 -0.0622 0.0596 0.3506 0.1005 0.0571 0.1630 0.3506 
  [1.62] [1.51] [0.81] [1.13] [1.62] [0.81] [1.51] [1.13] 
Board Size (Boards) -0.1096 -0.0382 -0.0653 0.0237 -0.1096 -0.0885 -0.0627 0.0237 
  [3.23] [1.43] [1.35] [0.31] [3.23] [1.86] [1.06] [0.31] 
Proportion of Indep’n Directors (PIndDir) -0.0075 -0.0027 -0.0020 0.0082 -0.0075 -0.0053 0.0005 0.0082 
  [1.88] [1.2] [0.52] [1.12] [1.88] [1.58] [0.08] [1.12] 
CEO Tenure (CEOT) 0.0045 0.0091 0.0085 -0.0265 0.0045 -0.0058 -0.0015 -0.0265 
  [0.24] [0.75] [0.38] [0.49] [0.24] [0.23] [0.07] [0.49] 
CEO Duality (CEODua) 0.2577 0.3888 0.4377 1.5020 0.2577 0.5197 0.7655 1.5020 
  [0.85] [1.35] [1.49] [1.45] [0.85] [1.53] [1.5] [1.45] 
Market Capitalisation (LogMC) 0.3660*** 0.2713 0.1690 -0.1066 0.3660*** 0.3106** 0.1715 -0.1066 
  [3.16] [2.74] [1.24] [0.42] [3.16] [2.38] [1.02] [0.42] 
Total Revenue (LogRev) 0.0131 -0.0156 -0.0212 0.0489 0.0131 0.0014 -0.0102 0.0489 
  [0.43] [0.31] [0.3] [0.47] [0.43] [0.02] [0.14] [0.47] 
Gearing Ratio (NDE) -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0064 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0064 
  [0.37] [0.68] [0.6] [1.32] [0.37] [0] [1.25] [1.32] 
Volatility (VROE) 0.0052 0.0031 0.0039 0.0065 0.0052 0.0054 0.0077 0.0065 
  [2.07] [0.92] [1.13] [1.29] [2.07] [1.4] [1.8] [1.29] 
L1. of Tobin's Q 0.2893 0.4303*** 0.4232** 0.4125 0.2893 0.2451 0.3326* 0.4125 
  [1.58] [2.86] [2.34] [1.34] [1.58] [1.11] [1.7] [1.34] 
# of observations 1682 1682 1682 1682 1682 1682 1682 1682 
No of Instruments 25 26 26 25 25 26 26 25 
AR(1) Test p-value 0 0.016 0.004 0.274 0 0.006 0.066 0.274 
AR(2) Test p-value 0.44 0.96 0.92 0.40 0.44 0.73 0.56 0.40 
Hansen Test of over-identification (p-value) 0.73 0.17 0.14 1.00 0.73 0.63 0.90 1.00 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity (p-
value) 0.25 0.557 0.153 0.86 0.25 0.57 0.715 0.86 
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Note to Table 4.17 (a) and (b): 
Table 4.17 (a) and (b) report the two-step dynamic GMM estimations regression results using to the critical mass gender grouping for the proportion of female directors (PFOB). 
We include one-year lag of dependent variable Tobin’s Q and external instrumental variable, the proportion of local female councillors in the structural model. Refer to note in 
Table 4.15 for the detailed description of critical mass groupings. Tobin’s Q is the measure of market performance, calculated from the ratio of the sum of the company’s market 
value of equity and book value of debt to its book value of assets. Refer notes in Table 4.11 for the description of other control variable and Table 3.5 in Chapter 3 for detailed 
definition of the variables.  
Column 1 tabulates the variable of interest and control variables used in this study in relation to the dependent variable Tobin’s Q, the proxy for the performance measure of this 
study. Column 2 to 5 with green shading tabulates the results according to Kanter’s critical mass classification. Column 6 to 9 with blue shading tabulate the results according to 
the modified critical classification. 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 299 companies with 1981 firm-year observations for the period from 2008 to 2015. The regression results are adjusted for 
potential heteroskedasticity using Windmeijer standard errors robustness check to correct for downward bias in two-step dynamic GMM estimation. The second row of each 
explanatory variable shows the absolute value of t-statistics in brackets for the analysis. The asterisks represent the significance of critical value at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 
(*) of Prob > |t|. 
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4.5.4 Key Findings Of Critical Mass Analysis 
Table 4.18 presents the comparative regression results of board gender diversity and 
company financial performance for all econometric techniques employed in this study 
using the critical mass groupings.  
 
The critical mass theory suggests that the real influence of female directors on 
boards’ decision and company financial performance are likely to have significant 
impacts only when there are sufficient number or representation of female directors 
as a group on the board of directors (Joecks et al., 2013; Konrald et al., 2008; T. 
Nguyen et al., 2015; Torchia et al., 2011) . This section analyses the effects of 
different proportion of female board representation on company financial 
performance based on this theory. Using the OLS method with random and fixed 
effects estimators as shown in Panel A and Panel B of Table 4.18, these estimations 
suggest that Kanter’s classification of tilted groups of female directors (K3) and 
boards with at least thirty percent of female directors (ACM30) have a significant 
negative correlation with company financial performance. The negative bias effect is 
expected when we estimate the relationships in a structural model without taking into 
consideration of the endogeneity problems between the variables and the possibility 
of dynamic relationships of past performance on the explanatory variables (Wintoki et 
al., 2012). On the other hand, the results also show that boards with all-male 
directors have significant positive correlations with company financial performance. 
These results contrast with previous research that supports the theory of critical 
mass of female directors and positive correlation with company performance (Joecks 
et al., 2013; Konrad et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2014; Nguyen et al., 2015; Torchia et al., 
2011).  
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Table 4.18: Comparison of Regression Analysis Between Board Gender Diversity and Company Financial Performance- Critical Mass Grouping  
  Dependent Variable - Log Q Dependent Variable - Log Q 
Panel A: Estimation Method: OLS - RE 
Critical mass classification K1 K2 K3 K4 ACM0 ACM20 ACM30 ACM40 
Coefficient of Gender Diversity (GD) 
0.0450*** -0.0153* -0.0195** -0.0218 0.0450*** -0.0226*** -0.0052 -0.0218 
[3.76] [1.76] [2.29] [1.4] [3.76] [2.56] [0.44] [1.4] 
Panel B: Estimation Method: OLS-FE 
Coefficient of Gender Diversity (GD) 
0.0418*** -0.0141 -0.0163* -0.0136 0.0418*** -0.0186** 0.0013 -0.0136 
[3.28] [1.62] [1.92] [1] [3.28] [2.1] [0.12] [1] 
Panel C: Estimation Method: 2SLS(IV) 
Coefficient of Gender Diversity (GD) 
Omitted -0.7509 -0.0205 -2.2283 Omitted -1.8503 -1.1832 -2.2283 
 [0.77] [0.08] [0.74]  [0.33] [1.25] [0.74] 
Panel D: Estimation Method: Diff'n GMM - Two step (FC) 
Coefficient of Gender Diversity (GD) 
0.0353 -0.005 -0.2554 0.2133 0.0353 0.0027 0.1566 0.0449 
[0.11] [0.06] [0.74] [1.03] [0.11] [0.64] [0.05] [0.16] 
Panel E: Estimation Method: System GMM - Two Step (FC) 
Coefficient of Gender Diversity (GD) 
0.1005 -0.0622 0.0596 0.3506 0.1005 0.0571 0.163 0.3506 
[1.62] [1.51] [0.81] [1.13] [1.62] [0.81] [1.51] [1.13]  
Note to table 4.18: 
The sample set consists of unbalanced panel data of 299 companies with 1981 firm-year observations for the period from 2008 to 2015. Panel A and B 
present the OLS method using random effects (OLS-RE) and Fixed effects (OLS-FE) respectively. Panel C, D and E presents the application of external 
instrumental method using different techniques of 2SLS, differenced GMM and system GMM. This table only focuses on board gender diversity (GD) 
measure as it is the main focus variable of this study. Refer to note in Table 4.15 for the gender critical mass groupings and classification of the proportion of 
female directors. The first row shows the correlation between the board gender diversity (GD) and company financial performance (LogQ), and the second 
row shows the absolute value of t/z-statistics in brackets. The asterisks represent the significance of critical value at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (*) of Prob 
> |t| or Prob > |z|. 
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To deal with the unobserved time-invariant heteroskedasticity and mitigates the 
simultaneity issue between the explanatory variable and the dependent variable, we 
apply the 2SLS instrumental variable method using the critical mass classification of 
the proportion of local female councillors as the external instrumental variable. The 
results in Panel C of Table 4.18 show that the 2SLS instrumental variable technique 
manages to remove the confounding effects between gender-diverse boards and 
company financial performance for the tilted group of female directors (K3) and 
boards with at least thirty percent of female directors (ACM30). The significant 
negative correlations between these two groups of female directors with company 
financial performance have disappeared. Overall, the 2SLS instrumental variable 
estimation reports the critical mass of female directors has no significant correlation 
with company performance.  
 
This study applies both Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step dynamic differenced 
GMM and the Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step dynamic system GMM panel 
regression estimator to overcome the short-coming in the 2SLS instrumental variable 
method in addressing the more advanced endogeneity issues. These techniques 
enable us to include both past performance and fixed effects of company-level 
characteristics to account for the complex and dynamic relationships of 
governance/diversity and company financial performance in the model. We also 
classify the exogenous external instrumental variable, the proportion of local female 
councillors, into the critical mass classification as the endogenous variable, the 
proportion of female directors, to account for all potential sources of endogeneity. 
 
Using the more advanced econometric techniques with dynamic GMM estimations, 
as contrast to the regression results in the OLS, the regression results in Panel D 
and E of Table 4.18 indicate that the boards with all male directors have no positive 
significant correlation with company performance. This suggests that the significant 
positive correlations in the OLS estimations (OLS-RE and OLS-FE) are biased and 
unreliable. More interestingly, the change in direction of the relationship for tilted 
group (K3) and balanced group (K4), and boards with at least twenty (ACM20), thirty 
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(ACM30) and forty (ACM40) percent of female directors suggest the biased 
parameter estimates in the OLS methods are due to the unobserved heterogeneity 
and the dynamic relationships between board gender diversity and company 
performance.  
 
The study suggests that the change in the direction of the relationship between board 
gender diversity and company financial performance is potentially due to some 
unobserved heterogeneity of past performance and simultaneous causality between 
board gender diversity and past performance. As suggested by Adams and Ferreira 
(2009), gender-diverse boards may allocate more effort in monitoring. Hence, 
imposing gender quotas in well-governed boards may reduce company performance. 
In this instance, well-governed companies may improve company financial 
performance but over monitored companies may have negative implications on 
company performance. In addition, past performance may be another attribute that 
determines board structure where females choose to join a better-performed 
company, or good governance practice companies simply have gender diversity 
measure on the boards. The OLS estimations in Panel A and B of Table 4.18 indeed 
report a significant negative correlation between gender-diverse boards and 
company financial performance due to ignoring the past performance and 
unobserved company characteristics. The results show that gender-diverse boards, 
with the critical mass classification of the proportion of female directors, show no 
relationship with company performance. In addition, there is no sign of any adverse 
correlation between board gender diversity and company financial performance as 
suggested by the OLS estimations. 
 
Both dynamic GMM estimations, the differenced and system methods, are well 
specified as indicated by Arellano-Bond test of second-order serial correlation, 
Hansen J-test of over-identifying restriction and the difference-in-Hansen test of 
exogeneity of instrument subsets. The analysis for serial correlation indicates that the 
differenced unobserved time-invariant component is uncorrelated to the second-order 
of the dependent variable. This addresses the endogeneity concern caused by the 
unobserved heterogeneity in the system. Hansen J-test of the over-identifying test 
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also suggests that the instruments used in the model are valid. The difference-in-
Hansen test of exogeneity of instrument subsets indicates that the external 
instrument applied in this study is exogenous. In view of the biased parameter 
estimation in the OLS and insufficient technique in the fixed effects and the 2SLS 
instrumental variable estimators, all studies examining the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance studies, and more particularly in boards 
gender diversity studies, should apply the dynamic GMM framework. Most important 
is the identification of a truly exogenous and valid external instrumental variable that 
is able to examine the main source of endogeneity. 
 
4.6 Chapter Summary And Conclusion of the Findings 
The findings of this study suggest that female board representation has neither 
positive nor negative implications on company performance, as measured by Tobin’s 
Q. This indicates previous findings of significant negative implications as suggested 
in the OLS random effects and fixed effects estimations are due to spurious 
correlation caused by endogeneity issues. The change of direction of the relationship 
from significant negative correlations in the OLS methods to insignificant positive 
correlations in the GMM methods used in this study indicates that female board 
representation does not lead to poor performance after accounting for the 
endogeneity concerns. Although females board representation has no significant 
positive impacts on company performance, board gender diversity will not cause the 
decrease in the company’s capacity to create value with the existing use of 
company’s resources, measured by Tobin’s Q. The summary statistics show that 
female board representation has increased in an upward trend after The Australian 
Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Councils’ gender diversity 
recommendations. However the statistics show that only five percent of the firm-year 
observations have at least thirty percent of female directors on boards. Only two 
percent of the firm-year observations in this sample have at least forty percent female 
directors on their boards. The low proportion of female directors on boards could be 
one of the reasons for the insignificant relationship between gender-diverse boards 
and company performance. Despite the insignificant results, the extension of this 
study using critical mass classification reveals that the magnitude of the positive 
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implications of gender-diverse boards is greater when there are more female 
directors on boards. The coefficient of boards with at least forty percent of female 
directors is higher than the coefficient of boards with at least thirty and twenty percent 
of female directors on boards.  
 
The OLS estimations of this study contrast with the Australian empirical evidences on 
the relationship between board gender diversity and company performance. As 
shown in Bonn (2004)  and Nguyen and Faff’s  (2007)  OLS analysis, both studies 
report a significant positive correlation between board gender diversity and company 
value. Theoretically, the study also suggests contradicting results to resource 
dependency theory. Resource dependency theory predicts positive correlations 
between female board representation and company financial performance because 
female directors contribute the diverse perspectives and knowledge into the board 
decision-making process. The contradicting results may be due to biases caused by 
unobserved board-level or company-level characteristics. For example, shareholders 
respond positively to company’s gender diversity policy and good governance 
measures, which improve the market value of the company  (Campbell & Minguez 
Vera, 2010; Kang et al., 2010) , and subsequently the measure of Tobin’s Q. Post 
and Byron (2015) in their meta-analysis of 140 studies also suggest that countries 
with stronger shareholders protections motivate boards to use different experience 
and knowledge, and gender-diverse boards are positively associated with company 
performance. As the OLS estimations fail to control for simultaneous causality, 
unobserved company-level heterogeneity (Sila et al., 2016) and the dynamic 
relationships amongst the variables in the structural model (Wintoki et al., 2012), it 
can lead to spurious negative correlation and biased parameter estimates.  
 
To overcome the endogeneity issues, then we apply an exogenous external 
instrumental variable using the 2SLS instrumental variable method to estimate the 
model parameters. The significant negative correlations between boards gender 
diversity and company financial performance in the OLS estimations disappear. 
Theoretically, this is in line with the agency theory where gender-diverse boards 
improve boards’ monitoring function and reduce agency cost (Jurkus et al., 2011). 
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However, over monitoring in well-governed companies may increase agency cost  
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009)   and be detrimental to management’s performance. The 
external instrumental variable manages to remove the confounding effects between 
the gender-diverse boards and company performance, and results in a negative but 
insignificant correlation.  
 
Empirically, when using more advanced econometric techniques such as dynamic 
GMM panel regression and an external instrumental variable, the correlations 
between board gender diversity and company financial performance are not 
statistically significant although the sign changes from negative to positive, after 
accounting for dynamic endogeneity, simultaneous causality and unobserved 
heterogeneity. Furthermore, the significant correlations between board 
characteristics, board size and board independence, and company financial 
performance disappear. This suggests that the significant relationships between 
board structure and company financial performance using the OLS and fixed effects 
estimations are spurious. This also indicates that any changes in the board structure 
and composition will have no impact on company performance. The results of the 
dynamic GMM estimation are consistent with the corporate governance studies 
suggesting that there is no significant relationship between corporate governance 
measures and company financial performance(Pham et al., 2011; Schultz et al., 
2010; Wintoki et al., 2012). The insignificant results in Tobin’s Q also suggest that 
there may be other influences on this performance measure. Further research is 
needed to determine the true impact of board gender diversity and board structure on 
company financial performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. 
 
In lieu to tokenism and critical mass theory, the proponents of the critical mass of 
female board representation suggest that boards with three female directors 
perform better than boards with a token female or boards with all male directors 
(Liu et al., 2014; T. Nguyen et al., 2015). This supports Kristie (2011) argument 
that one woman is a ‘token’, two is a ‘presence’ and three is a ‘voice’. However, 
the results of this study do not suggest any significant correlation between boards 
with the different critical mass groupings as suggested by Kanter (1977b) as well 
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as the amended critical mass grouping as suggested in this study. Although we 
are unable to support the critical mass of female board representation, our results 
do not demonstrate negative signs or any adverse correlation with the increment 
of female board representation and company performance. That is increasing 
number of female board members does not reduce company performance.  
 
The biased positive and significant coefficient estimates between all male boards 
(K1 and ACM0) and company financial performance in the OLS regression have 
changed to insignificant when we apply the GMM method. This indicates that 
boards with all male directors do not perform better than other heterogeneous 
boards that contain female directors. Furthermore, the significant negative 
correlations of boards that consist of at least twenty percent female directors 
(ACM20) in the OLS estimations have reversed sign to positively correlated but 
insignificant in the GMM method. The change of direction of the relationship also 
occurs in boards consisting of at least thirty (ACM30) and forty (ACM40) percent 
female directors. However, the relationships remain insignificant. These results 
suggest that the biased parameter estimates in the OLS estimations are due to 
simultaneity, unobserved heterogeneity and the dynamic relationship between 
board gender diversity and company performance. This indicates that the OLS 
method leads to the reporting of a spurious causal relationship.  
 
In addition to the reverse sign of the relationship between board gender diversity 
and company financial performance in the dynamic GMM estimations, the 
magnitude of the correlations has increased from boards consisting of at least 
twenty percent (ACM20) to thirty percent (ACM30), and further increased in 
boards with forty percent (ACM40) female directors. We posit that the increment of 
female directors on boards may improve company performance; despite the 
insignificant correlations which could be the results of low female board 
representation as presented in descriptive analysis. Only 5.5% of the observations 
consist at least thirty percent (ACM30) female board representation and 2% 
observations consist forty percent (ACM40) female directors. This argument is in 
line with Marinova et al. (2016)  and Joecks et al. (2013) , suggesting that the 
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insignificant correlation of board gender diversity and company financial 
performance is affected by overall low female board representation that invalidates 
the results.        
 
Extending Kanter’s critical mass (1977b) classification in board gender diversity 
analysis, we posit that the relationship between board gender diversity and 
company financial performance could be non-linear. This is because the 
insignificant positive correlation of boards with all male directors (K1) turns to a 
negative correlation in the skewed boards (K2), indicating that there is a possibility 
of tokenism in boards with only one or two female directors that lead to the 
negative impacts on company financial performance. However, this negative 
correlation has reversed to positively correlated in the tilted boards (K3) and more 
so in the balanced boards (K4). The magnitude of the positive correlation in the 
balanced boards (K4) is higher than boards with all male directors (K1), 
suggesting that the positive impact of the balanced boards is greater than all male 
boards on company financial performance. We posit that the relationship between 
gender-diverse boards and company financial performance could be non-linear; 
despite the insignificant correlations which could be the results of low female 
board representation on boards as presented in the descriptive analysis.  
 
Figure 4.3 demonstrates that the relationship between the proportion of female 
directors on boards and company financial performance is non-linear and follows a 
U-shaped curvilinear relationship based on the sample of this study. The results of 
Kanter’s critical mass classification also reveals that the tipping point for female 
directors to make a positive contribution on company financial performance is 
when there are at least twenty percent female directors on boards. This impact is 
of greater magnitude when females board representation reaches at least thirty 
percent representation. We are unable to draw conclusive findings on the non-
linear relationship and the exact tipping point of female board representation due 
to the insignificant results. 
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Figure 4.3 presents the relationship between board gender diversity and 
company financial performance based on critical mass classification 32 . It 
indicates that boards with all male directors (K1) are positively correlated with 
company performance. However, this positive correlation turns into negatively 
correlated with company financial performance in boards comprise of at least one 
female director on boards but not more than twenty percent of female directors 
(K2). The figure shows that female directors only contribute positively to company 
financial performance when there is at least twenty percent of female directors on 
boards, which are the tilted and the balanced boards (K3 and K4). This contrasts 
with the expectation of a positive linear relationship between female participation 
and company financial performance.                                                                
32 K1 (Uniform boards) equals one when the board consists of all male directors and zero otherwise; K2 (Skewed 
boards) equals one when there is at least one female director but less than twenty percent female directors on 
boards, and zero otherwise; K3 (Tilted boards) equals one when there is at least twenty percent but not more than 
forty percent of female directors on boards, and zero otherwise; K4 (Balanced boards) equals one when there are 
at least forty percent of female directors on boards, and zero otherwise.    
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Chapter 5: Conclusions, Contributions, Implications and 
Limitations 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This study examines the relationship between gender-diverse boards and 
company financial performance by addressing the most serious endogeneity 
concerns in diversity-performance studies. The existing theoretical frameworks 
that relate to board gender diversity do not give a clear prediction between board 
gender diversity and company performance. Our intuitive belief is there are 
positive impacts from gender-diverse boards on company overall performance. 
The theoretical framework of gender diversity can be observed as both having 
positive or negative implications. As yet we have no complete understanding on 
how, why and when board gender diversity affects board processes and outcomes 
that lead to overall company performance. The main issue of corporate 
governance characteristics and performance studies is the presence of 
endogeneity that undermines causal inference. This study addresses the 
endogeneity issues from applying the most up-to-date econometric methods with 
an improved and novel external instrumental variable that is both relevant and 
valid. However we are unable to explain the logic and direction of the variable 
interactions.  
 
This chapter presents the conclusion of this study and the summary discussions 
between board gender diversity and company performance. The results of the 
study are highlighted to demonstrate the contributions for this area of research. 
We also discuss the implications of this study from the methodological, theoretical 
and practical aspects. The final section presents the limitations of this study and 
provides suggestions for future research on board gender diversity and company 
performance. 
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5.2 The Conclusions On Board Gender Diversity And Company 
Financial Performance 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010)  argue that theory development is critical, but on the 
other hand theory is never likely to be a complete solution (Van Lent, 2007). Given 
the complexity in determining the causal relationship in governance and 
performance studies; Gippel, Smith and Zhu  (2015)  suggest that researchers to 
look beyond the textbook solutions by utilising a natural experiment method in 
studying the causal relationship of the interested variables. Although this is an 
excellent suggestion, it can be very challenging in the corporate board setting.  
This suggests that unless there is a comprehensive theoretical framework that 
explains and predicts the relationship between gender-diverse boards and 
company there is a necessity for continued empirical research in this area.  
 
The current economic models in the literature are insufficient to capture the 
complexity of human interactions and the dynamics of group processes, especially 
in a corporate board context. The difficulty in developing a comprehensive model 
is that many variables both company specific and external to company that may 
influence the company financial performance and its choice of directors. If the 
relationship between gender-diverse boards and company financial performance is 
due to omitted variables or only partially explained by the variable of interest, 
being female representation on boards, then the endogeneity issue may exist. In 
this case, the coefficient of the proportion of female directors on boards (PFOB) 
cannot be interpreted in the simple correlation manner. The coefficient of PFOB 
has no meaning in explaining company financial performance, and the magnitude 
of the relationship, as well as the direction of the relationship, can be 
misinterpreted. It is impossible to determine the endogenous relationship between 
board gender diversity with the application of simple economic models, more 
specifically, using the principal-agent models to determine the concept of board 
gender diversity (Rose, 2007).  
 
  188 
To address the endogeneity issue that has plagued the governance-performance 
research, this study provides a comparative detailed analysis of various 
econometric estimations and methods. We conclude that the endogeneity concern 
in board gender diversity and company financial performance studies lies in three 
factors. First, there exists a simultaneous or causal relationship between the 
proportion of female directors on boards and other board structures and company 
financial performance measures. Second, the endogeneity may exist due to 
unobserved company-level heterogeneity that influences company financial 
performance but is not specified in the model specification. Third, the dynamic 
endogeneity of past performance measure (Tobin’s Q at t-1) need to be 
incorporated on the governance structure in the dynamic GMM specification. We 
conclude that the major sources of endogeneity are caused by all three 
possibilities of simultaneous causality, unobserved heterogeneity and the dynamic 
relationship of past performance of this study. 
 
Our results suggest that the presence of female directors on boards has no 
significant impact on company performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. At the 
same time, female board representation does not exhibit any negative implications 
for company performance. The subsequent analysis based on the critical mass of 
female directors indicates that there is no significant impact of the different 
groupings of female directors on company performance. The results reveal that 
boards with all male directors do not perform better than gender-diverse boards. 
While the coefficients of boards with at least thirty percent and forty percent of 
female directors report a greater positive magnitude than boards with all male 
directors to company financial performance, although the results is not significant. 
 
The results of this study highlight that we do not know the exact relationship 
between gender-diverse boards and company financial performance. The 
hypotheses of this study were based on the conceptual framework as discussed in 
chapter two that links board gender diversity and company financial performance. 
The positive implications of gender-diverse boards as supported by the resource 
dependence theory and the human capital theory may have been offset by the 
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other theories. The negative impact of over-monitoring of gender-diverse boards in 
agency theory and compromising of group effectiveness due to group conflict may 
have nullified the value of female contributions, such as innovations and creativity, 
diverse perspectives and knowledge. A possible explanation of the insignificant 
relationship we observe in this study between board gender diversity and company 
financial performance may come from contingency theory  (Fiedler, 1968; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) . This theory suggests that under different 
circumstances and different organisation structures, there exists a complex 
relationship between board gender diversity and company performance. For some 
companies, board gender diversity may enhance company value due to the 
diverse perspectives and knowledge gained from the different backgrounds of 
directors. For some the diversity of opinions and conflict within the board structure 
may adversely affect company value. It should be noted that the overall female 
representation on boards of this study is relatively low, with forty-three percent of 
the firm-year observations having no female directors on boards.  Boards with at 
least thirty and forty percent of female directors remain low over the entire study 
period. This could be the possible reason that invalidates the significant positive 
correlation between board gender diversity and company financial performance as 
suggested by Marinova et al. (2016)  and Joecks et al. (2013) . As previously 
noted, the relationship between board gender diversity and company financial 
performance is endogenously determined. This results in simultaneous causality, 
unobserved heterogeneity and the dynamic relationship between past 
performances on current board structure. Supporting that dynamic estimation with 
instrumental variable method tends to find no correlation between board structure 
and company financial performance (Gippel et al., 2015).  
 
5.3 Contributions And Implications 
The main contribution of this study is to highlight the importance of addressing the 
endogeneity issues existing in board gender diversity and company financial 
performance studies. Using various econometric estimation methods, this study 
illustrates that both the OLS random effects and fixed effects estimations, based 
on the strict exogeneity assumptions, produce a spurious correlation between 
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board gender diversity and company financial performance. While the 2SLS 
instrumental variable method is able to remove the confounding effects of board 
gender diversity and company performance, it is not robust enough to account for 
the dynamic nature of board structure and company performance. Once we apply 
the dynamic GMM estimation that is robust to all forms of endogeneity concerns 
and well-specified based on Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions and the 
Arellano-Bond test of auto-correlation, the results demonstrate that not only do the 
spurious negative correlation as suggested with the OLS estimations disappear, 
the sign reverse from negative to positive. This key finding suggests that we 
cannot draw any inference from any specifications that do not address the 
endogeneity issues in board gender diversity and company financial performance 
studies.  
 
Another significant contribution of this study is the introduction of a novel external 
instrumental variable that is relevant to female board representation. We believe 
that the institutional environment co-evolves with corporate gender policies and 
the geographical influence of local female councillors transpose the experienced 
female executives to excel to the leadership level of corporate boards. This study 
provides both theoretical support and statistical tests in the selection of the novel 
external instrument variable of this study, the proportion of local female 
councillors. The theory of economic ramification of distance as suggested by 
Bouwman (2012) and the influence of political science in corporate governance by 
Terjesen et al. (2015) supports the selection of the external instrumental variable. 
More importantly, this external instrumental variable fulfils both the relevancy and 
exogeneity tests to confirm the validity of the instrumental variable.  
 
The results of this study reveal that board gender diversity has no significant 
impact on company financial performance in the Australian public listed company’s 
context. However, the results also do not reveal any adverse impact on company 
financial performance for the increment of female board representation. Despite 
the insignificant findings of this study, we believe that this study has some 
implications for methodological, theoretical and practical aspects.    
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From the methodological perspective, this study shows that the relationship 
between gender-diverse boards and company financial performance is 
complicated due to the endogenous relationship. This study applies various 
econometric techniques and demonstrates the importance of addressing the 
endogeneity concerns in board gender diversity and company financial 
performance studies. This allows this study to explicitly recognises all three 
sources of endogeneity that lead to biased estimates of how board gender 
diversity affects company performance. Unobservable heterogeneity arises when 
there are unobservable company-level or board-level characteristics that affect 
both the board gender diversity policy or company performance. Simultaneity 
arises when board gender diversity is the function of company financial 
performance or vice versa. Dynamic endogeneity arises due to the relationship 
between company current performance that affects board gender diversity policy, 
which will in turn also affect company future performance. The application of the 
more advanced and appropriate dynamic GMM estimation used in this study is 
well specified to all specification tests. It also demonstrates that board gender 
diversity is not exogenous and not a determinant of company performance. This 
suggests that the negative significant relationship between board gender diversity 
and company financial performance as indicated in the OLS estimations may be 
spurious and unreliable. In contrast, dynamic estimation with instrumental variable 
method tends to yield insignificant and no relationship between board gender 
diversity and company financial performance(Gippel et al., 2015). The comparative 
analysis using various econometric methods demonstrates that using econometric 
estimations that do not deal with endogeneity issues in board gender diversity and 
company financial performance studies may produce biased findings and suggest 
a spurious correlation.    
 
From the theoretical perspective, this study recognises the importance of gender-
diverse boards by referring to resource dependence theory and human capital 
theory. These two theories suggest that female directors with different 
perspectives, skills, knowledge, experiences and backgrounds contribute to board 
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dynamics, decision-making process and ultimately company financial 
performance. This study recognises the possibility of negative impacts of board 
gender diversity on company financial performance due to agency conflicts of 
over-monitoring as suggested by Adams and Ferreira (2009). The overall low 
female representation on boards could be the possible reason that invalidates the 
significant positive correlation between board gender diversity and company 
financial performance as suggested by Marinova et al. (2016)  and Joecks et al. 
(2013) . This study also demonstrates that the relationship between board gender 
diversity and company financial performance could be non-linear based on 
Kanter’s critical mass theory. The further break down of the proportion of female 
directors on boards based on critical mass classification indicates that the 
relationship of board gender diversity and company financial performance follows 
a U-shape curvilinear correlation33. This supports the initial argument of this study 
that proposes a non-linear relationship between gender-diverse boards and 
company performance. Further, this study also posits that the incremental positive 
impacts of female board representation on company financial performance may 
eventually achieve the optimal level and at some point further increased female 
participation may become value decreasing as male participation decreases and 
the benefits of diversity are diminished. Figure 5.1 illustrates the prediction of the 
relationship between board gender diversity and company financial performance 
once the board gender diversity structure goes beyond its optimal level. 
 
                                                        
33 Refer Figure 4.3 for the non-linear correlation between board gender diversity and company financial 
performancebased on Kanter’s critical mass classification.  
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Figure 5.1 illustrates the prediction of the non-linear relationship between board 
gender diversity and company financial performance. The sample data of this 
study does not have any observations that go beyond the balanced boards 
classification, which is boards with more than sixty percent of female directors. 
Hence, we can only provide a prediction of the relationship based on Demsetz’s 
(1983) theory of firm and economic theory. This study argues that logically the 
relationship between gender-diverse boards and company financial performance 
should be non-linear. The positive impact of female board representation upon is 
achieved at the minimum tipping point of at least twenty percent of female 
directors. The positive relationship between gender-diverse boards and company 
financial performance will eventually achieve the optimal level.  Beyond this 
optimal level of board gender diversity structure, the increased of female 
participation may become value decreasing as male participation decreases and 
the benefits of diversity are diminished. 
 
The practical implication of increasing female board representation is evidenced in 
the intervention of government policy. This is either by way of hard law to legislate 
board gender quotas or the soft approach using “comply or explain” gender 
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Co
m
pa
ny
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
The number / proportion of female directors on boards
Figure 5.1: Prediction of Non-linear Relationship Between Board Gender 
Diversity and Company Financial Performance at the Optimal and beyond 
Optimal Level
Current Data
Prediction
Optimal Level
  194 
diversity recommendations. Generally, counties with mandatory gender quotas34 
seem to have more gender-diverse boards while countries with diversity 
compliance provisions 35  tend to have lower female representation on boards  
(Azar, Martens, Popolis, & Sancho, 2017) . In the absence of the hard law and soft 
law, countries that are resistant to adopting any regulations are lacking behind in 
promoting female board representation36. It is obvious that mandating minimum 
gender quotas is an effective way to advance female participation at the board 
level. However, the absence of a significant positive relationship between gender-
diverse boards and company financial performance of this study does not provide 
support for the initiative to impose gender quotas in the public listed companies 
based on economic argument. This is based on the contingency theory (Fiedler, 
1968; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967)  argument where each company’s internal 
optimal equilibrium differs from others, and each company chooses the 
governance structure that maximise their value. In this instance, implementing 
gender quotas may lead to adverse effects on company value and performance. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the scenario where mandating gender quotas may lead to 
companies operate at a sub-optimal level.  
 
                                                        
34 Countries wit mandating gender quotas are Norway, Germany, Belgium, Italy, France, the Netherland, Spain, 
Malaysia and India. 
35 Countries with diversity compliance provision are the U.K., Australia, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Austria, and 
Switzerland. 
36 Countries with no gender diversity regulations and with low female representation on boards are China, Russia, 
Greece, South Korea and Japan. 
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With reference to the graphic example as shown in Gippel et al. (2015), this study 
replicates the concept of company internal optimisation of insider ownership and 
performance relation as shown in Figure 5.2 using gender quotas and company 
financial performance relationship. The graphic presents three companies with 
different internal equilibrium points between board gender diversity and company 
performance. Company A optimises its board gender diversity and performance at 
about 22%, while companies B and C’ s internal equilibrium is achieved at 30% 
and 48% level respectively. If gender quotas is legislated at the thirty percent level, 
company A is forced to increase the proportion female directors beyond its optimal 
level of 22%, while company B is forced to reduce the proportion of female 
directors and no longer remain at its optimal level of 48%. In this instance, only 
company C is at an equilibrium optimal level that satisfies the gender quotas 
requirement. This shows that each company operates under different 
circumstances with different organisation structure that has its performance 
maximising governance choice. Therefore, company should choose board gender 
diversity structure that maximise the talent of the directors to enhance the 
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company value and its objectives. In this sense, mandating gender quotas can be 
detrimental to company financial performance where company A and B are at their 
sub-optimal performance level.  
 
If mandating board gender quotas can be detrimental to company and may lead to 
sub-optimal performance level, gender quotas legislation on corporate board 
should be motivated by other reasons. For example, social norms and community 
culture are the crucial factors that influence the acceptance of female 
leadership/directorship role. The real change in social norms and attitudes towards 
female leadership or directorship is fundamentally crucial to promote female 
representation on boards in some jurisdictions, for example Norway and Germany. 
However, it is not reflected in most of the Nordic countries. Sweden and Finland 
have no mandatory law that governs the regulatory framework of gender quotas, 
but both countries have a relatively high female board participation in the world. 
On the other hand, in countries where there are mandated regulation to govern the 
gender policy, female directors are only being appointed to fulfil the mandated 
requirement. For example, India’s regulatory framework requires a gender quota of 
at least one female director on boards and Malaysian’s public listed companies are 
required to have thirty percent of female directors. Under this legislation, 
companies that are subjected to the law have no other choice but to appoint 
female directors on boards to fulfil the minimum law requirements. This can lead to 
appointment based on celebrity status or family relationships and not on the ability 
and qualifications.  
 
In the Australian current climate, there is increasing demand for corporate boards’ 
responsibility and board of directors are facing with increasing due diligent checks. 
As the corporate governance roles shift from shareholders centric to stakeholder 
focus, the topic of board gender diversity is more relevant as females have 
different perspectives, knowledge and life practices relative to males. It is logical to 
expect board diversity becomes more socially compelling and may add values to 
the company. Australian social norms imply that it is the right thing to do in 
achieving equality and giving female an equal chance of participating on corporate 
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boards. It is also unethical to deny access to potential and capable females onto 
corporate boards solely based on gender. Furthermore, excluding a segment of 
society talent due to gender may lead to suboptimal board composition. As the 
findings of this study do not find any adverse effect of board gender diversity, this 
study supports the argument for improvement of female representation on boards 
based on social and moral justifications. However, as shown in Figure 5.2, forcing 
companies to comply with legislative gender quotas under the pressure of the 
authorities may be costly, and in some cases, it may alter the optimal board 
structure. Therefore, the soft approach with gender diversity recommendations is 
more desirable on the assumption that companies choose their optimal board 
structure and the characteristics of the directors to suit the company structure.  
 
5.4 Limitations And Suggestions For Improvement Of Future Studies 
Like all other studies, this study does have several limitations like all other studies. 
These limitations have implications and provide some avenues for future research 
for interpreting the findings. First, the sample is based on the ASX200 companies 
listed, which impact the external validity of the findings. In addition, by comparison 
with other countries, the Australian market is smaller relative to the U.S., the U.K. 
and other European countries. There are also differences between Australian 
market and other nations in legislation, corporate governance system, cultural 
backgrounds; board structure and gender diversity practice.  To address the 
external validity concerns, studies based on multi-country or meta-analysis of 
several countries are needed. In the Australian context, the sample is not 
randomly selected from the top two hundred largest publicly listed companies, 
excluding companies in the financial sector. This may suffer from sample selection 
bias that hinders the generalisation of the results to all companies across 
Australia. This is a limitation shared with most governance studies. 
 
Second, the diversity measure of this study was based on gender. There are other 
dimensions of diversity that need to be explored and may be beneficial to the 
board structure. For example ethnicity, age, backgrounds and education 
attainment of directors may be just as important to boards composition and 
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relevant to the current global economy setting. Future studies might integrate 
these diversity dimensions and be more relevant to the mainstream society. In 
addition, as this study also applies the critical mass theory in gender groupings, 
future studies might explore the critical mass theory based on other diversity 
aspects.       
 
Third, Tobin’s Q has shortcoming as a performance measure. Other performance 
measures that may be equally used are market performance (such as market-to-
book value and stock liquidity), accounting measures (e.g., return on equity, return 
on assets, profitability, earning quality, etc.) and operational performance (e.g., 
customer satisfactory and service, productivity time spam, delivery time). This 
study’s conceptual framework indicates that board gender diversity also 
contributes to other non-economic aspects such as sustainable environmental 
practices, social impacts, corporate social responsibility, board dynamic and 
processes, transparency and accountability of financial reporting, innovation and 
creativity. Future studies might explore other areas that link board gender diversity 
to other aspects that could be beneficial to the company as well as society as a 
whole, rather than the narrow measure of economic outcomes. Furthermore, the 
results from these other dimensions could be the moderating or mediating effects 
on the performance measure.  
 
5.5 Final Remarks 
The major contribution of this study is its contribution to the endogeneity concerns 
in diversity-performance studies. We discuss the theory behind each econometric 
technique and explain why the dynamic GMM estimation is the appropriate 
method in examining board gender diversity and performance studies. Because 
there are different sources of endogeneity between board gender diversity and 
company performance, this study shows the advantages of applying the dynamic 
GMM method over the OLS fixed effects and the 2SLS estimations. These 
endogeneity concerns lead to spurious negative correlation between board gender 
diversity and company financial performance in the OLS estimations. The results 
of this study based on the dynamic GMM estimations conclude that there is no 
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causal relationship between board gender diversity or other board characteristics 
and company performance. This indicates that previous studies that ignore any of 
the three sources of endogeneity between board gender diversity and company 
financial performance may lead to bias estimates.   
 
Given the findings and the fact that the world is made up of an almost equal 
proportion of the male and female population, having equal representation of each 
gender should be a common sense in all aspects of a business establishment. 
However, females are under-represented in the corporate boards of almost all 
public listed companies in the world. It is important for companies to commit to 
equal opportunity with the conventional wisdom of gender diversity is a good thing 
to do. Board gender diversity is also the right thing to do in achieving equality and 
giving experienced and skilled females an equal chance of participating on 
corporate boards. The appointment of female directors on boards should base on 
merit and fairness rather than economic outcomes. The absent of significant 
positive correlation between gender-diverse boards and company financial 
performance of this study does not imply that gender diversity on corporate boards 
is less desirable. On the other hand, upon addressing the endogeneity concern in 
this study, the presence of female directors on boards also does not lead to 
negative impact on company performance. Hence, this study supports both 
societal moral justification and economic justification to improve female 
representation on corporate boards. 
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Appendix 1: Boardroom Gender Quota Laws And Corporate Governance 
Recommendations By Country37 
 
Country Passage 
Year 
Requirement 
type 
Compliance 
Year 
Provision of 
gender 
diversity Code 
Norway 2003 40% 2008  
Spain 2007 40% 2015  
Iceland 2010 40% 2013  
Finland 2005 At least 1 female 
director 
2010  
France 2011 40% 2017  
Belgium 2011 33% 2017  
Netherlands 2011 30% 2013  
Germany 2015 30% 2016  
Italy 2011 33% 2015  
Canada 2006 50% 2011  
Israel 2007 
 
50% 2010  
India 2013 At least 1 female 
director 
2015  
Malaysia 2013 30% 2016  
Sweden    2004 
U.K.    2010 
Denmark    2005 
Luxembourg    2009 
Australia    2010 
U.S.A.    2009 
Austria    2010 
Poland    2010 
 
 
  
                                                        
37 Source: Catalyst – Legislative Board Diversity. http://www.catalyst.org/legislative-board-diversity 
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Appendix 2: Global Board Gender Diversity Report 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 2016 Global Board Diversity Analysis – EgonZehnder. Extract from 
https://www.egonzehnder.com/gbda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  227 
Appendix 3: Six Gender Equality Indicators According To The Workplace 
Gender Equality Act (2012) 
 
GEI 1: gender composition of the workplace 
GEI 2: gender composition of governing bodies of relevant employers 
GEI 3: equal remuneration between women and men 
GEI 4: availability and utility of employment terms, conditions and practices 
relating to flexible working arrangements for employees and to working 
arrangements supporting employees with family or caring responsibilities 
GEI 5: consultation with employees on issue concerning gender equality in the 
workplace 
GEI 6: sex-based harassment and discrimination. 
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Appendix 4: Females In leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Workplace Gender Equality Agency – Australia’s gender equality scorecard (Novermber 2017). 
Extract from: https://www.wgea.gov.au/fact-sheets-and-research-reports/fact-sheets-and-statistics 
 
 
  
  229 
Appendix 5: Extract Of The Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council's Diversity Recommendations: Principle 3 
 
Principle 3 - Recommendation 3.2 
"Companies should establish a diversity policy and disclose the policy or a 
summary of that policy. The policy should include requirements for the board to 
establish measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity and for the board to 
assess annually both the objectives and progress in achieving them." 
 
Principle 3 - Recommendation 3.3 
"Entities should disclose in each annual report the measurable objectives for 
achieving gender diversity set by the board in accordance with the diversity policy 
and progress towards achieving them." 
 
Principle 3 - Recommendation 3.4 
 "Entities should disclose in each annual report the proportion of: 
 • women employees in the whole organisation 
 • women in senior executive positions, and  
 • women on the board" 
 
Principle 3 - Recommendation 3.5  
"The diversity policy or a summary of its main provisions should be made publicly 
available, ideally by posting it to the company's web site in a clearly marked 
corporate governance section."  
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Appendix 6: Extract Of The Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council's Diversity Recommendations: Principle 1 
 
Principle 1 - Recommendation 1.5 
A listed entity should: 
(a) Gave a diversity policy which includes requirements for the board: 
1) to set measureable objectives for achieving gender diversity; and  
2) to assess annually both the objectives and the entity’s progress in 
achieving them. 
(b) Disclose that policy or a summary of it; and 
(c) Disclose as at the end of each reporting period: 
1) the measureable objectives for achieving gender diversity set by the 
board in accordance with the entity’s diversity policy and it’s progress 
towards achieving them; and  
2) either: 
A. the respective proportions of men and women on the boards, in 
senior executive positions and across the whole organization 
(including how the entity has defined “senior executive” for 
these purpose); or  
B. the entity’s “ Gender Equality Indicators”, as defined in the 
Workplace Gender Equality Act 201238. 
 
  
                                                        
38 The Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 applies to non-public sector employers with 100 or more employees in 
Australia. The act requires such employers to make annual filings with the Workplace Gender Equality Agency 
disclosing their “Gender Equality Indicators”. 
For those entities which choose to follow recommendation 1.5(c)(2)(B) and publish their “Gender Equality Indicators” 
in preference to the statistics on diversity mentioned in recommendation 1.5(c)(2)(A), publication of their “Gender 
Equality Indicators” by the Workplace Gender Equality Agency on its website will be taken to meet the 
recommendation.  
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Appendix 7: Extract Of The Australian Human Rights Commission’s 
Recommendations On Gender Diversity And Equality – June 2010. 
 
Overall Recommendations 
The Gender Equality Blueprint 2010 sets out recommendations in five priority 
areas which significantly affect both the public and private lives of women and 
men:  
• Balancing paid work and family and caring responsibilities 
• Ensuring women’s lifetime economic security 
• Promoting women in leadership 
• Preventing violence against women and sexual harassment 
• Strengthening national gender equality laws, agencies and monitoring 
Recommendation 7 
To strengthen the representation of women at decision-making levels: 
• a minimum target of 40% representation of each gender on all Australian 
Government Boards within three years should be set, publicly announced 
and progress should be reported annually 
• a minimum gender equality target in the Senior Executive Service in the 
Australian Public Service should be set, publicly announced and progress 
should be reported annually  
• all publicly listed companies providing goods or services to the Australian 
Government should be certified by the Equal Opportunity in the Workplace 
Agency 
• a target of 40% representation of each gender on all publically listed boards 
in Australia, to be achieved over five years should be promoted. If progress is 
not made, the Australian Government should consider legislating to require 
publicly listed companies and other large employers to achieve a mandatory 
gender diversity quota of a minimum of 40% of both genders within a 
specified timeframe, failing which penalties will be imposed. 
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Appendix 8(a): Studies with the Australian Sample in relation to Board Gender 
Diversity and Performance. 
 
Author/(s) Journal Study Period Findings Methodology 
Ali, Kulik & 
Metz (2011) 
The Int'l Jr of 
Human 
Resource 
Management 
2001-2007 
Boardroom gender diversity 
and performance relationship 
is inverted U-Shaped 
curvilinear based on 
integration of resource based 
views and self-categorisation & 
social identity theories 
Hierarchical 
Multiple 
regression 
Ali, Ng & Kulik 
(2014) 
Jr of Business 
Ethics 2011-2012 
Boardroom gender diversity 
and performance relationship 
is inverted U-Shaped 
curvilinear based on 
integration of resource based 
views and self-categorisation & 
social identity theories 
Hierarchical 
Multiple 
regression 
Bonn (2004) 
Journal of the 
Australia and 
New Zealand 
Academy and 
Management 
1999 for 
2003 
Outsider ratio and female 
directors ratio were positively 
associated with firm 
performance. Board size and 
directors’ age had no influence 
on firm performance. 1999 Ind 
var with 2003 Dep Var for 4 
year-time lag 
OLS 
Chapple & 
Humprey 
(2014) 
Journal of 
Business Ethics 2004-2011 
Boards with at least 1FOB are 
less likely to receive a going 
concern opinion. No 
correlation between having 
multiple WOB and 
performance. 
Logistic 
Regression 
Nguyen & Faff 
(2007) 
Corporate 
Ownership & 
Control 
2000-2001 
Gender diversity promotes 
shareholder's value and 
positively associated with firm 
value 
OLS 
Strydom, Au 
Yong & Rankin 
(2017) 
Australian Jr of 
Management 2005-2013 
Tilted & Balanced boards have 
higher earning quality than all 
male and skewed boards. 
Critical mass is achieved at 
30% FOB. Relationship of GD 
and earnings quality is U-
shaped. 
OLS, Cluster Ses 
& 2-step 
treatment effect 
model 
Wang & Cliff 
(2009) 
Pacific 
Accountng 
Reviews 
2003 
Gender diversity-no 
association with return (ROA, 
ROE). Gender and racial 
diversity do not have 
significant influence on 
performance. Greater diversity 
does not lead to poor 
performance; suggest that 
gender and racial diversity 
could be achieved without a 
negative effect on shareholder 
wealth. 
OLS 
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Appendix 8(b): Studies With The Australian Sample With Other Corporate 
Governance Measures 
Author/(s) Journal Study Period Findings Methodology 
Ahmed & Ali 
(2017) 
Jr of 
Contemporary 
Accounting & 
Economics 
2008-2013 
Gender diversity - Positive 
with stock liquidity. Reject 
token women and support 
critical mass theory.  
Pooled OLS (Main), 
2SLS (using gender 
reform as IV)  and 
propensity score 
matching (PSM) to 
address endogeneity. 
Capezio & 
Mavisakalyan 
(2016) 
Australian Jr of 
Management 2002-2007 
Gender diversity - 
associated with decreased 
probability in fraud. No 
evidence of endogeneity, 
suggest unobserved 
confounding variables is 
not robust 
Probit Regression, IV: 
CEO's first name 
femininity as proxy for 
gender awareness 
issues  
Christensen, 
Kent & Stewart 
(2010) 
Australian 
Accounting 
Review 
2004 
Board Characteristics: 
Board Independence has a 
negative impact on ROA & 
Q.  CEO dua & large Board 
size has negative impact 
on ROA but enhance Q. 
Meeting frequency has no 
significant on ROA but 
negatively related to Q. 
  
Kiel & 
Nicholson 
(2003) 
Board 
Composition & 
Corporate 
Performance 
1996 
Board Characteristics: 
Board size is positively 
correlated to firm value; 
proportion of inside director 
is positive to market-based 
performance 
ANOVA, OLS 
Monem 
Working Paper:  
Journal of 
Contemporary 
Accounting and 
Economics 
  
Determinants of Board 
Structure: Board size and 
board independence are 
increasing in firm size;  
CEO duality decrease in 
firm size. High ownership 
concentration increase 
board size, decrease board 
independence and 
increase CEO duality.  
OLS, Binary logistic 
regression 
Nadeem, 
Zaman & 
Saleem (2017) 
Journal of 
Cleaner 
Production 
2010-2014 
Significant positive 
relationship between WOB 
and corporate 
sustainability practices. 
Dynamic GMM. Static 
OLS & FE are not 
robust.  
Pham, 
Suchard & 
Zein (2011) 
Australian Jr of 
Management 1994-2003 
Do not find a significant 
relationship between 
performance (Q & EVA) 
and corporate governance 
measures (board 
independence and size, 
insider & outsider 
shareholdings)  
OLS, FE, GMM 
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Appendix 8(b): Studies With The Australian Sample With Other Corporate 
Governance Measures (Continued) 
 
Author/(s) Journal Study Period Findings Methodology 
Richardson, 
Taylor & Lanis 
(2016) 
Accounting 
Research Jr 2006-2010 
Gender diversity reduces 
the likelihood of tax 
aggressiveness 
Probit Regression 
Analysis, 2-stage 
Heckman procedures 
Schultz, Tan & 
Walsh (2010) 
Australian Jr of 
Management 2000-2007 
No significant relationship 
between corporate 
governance variable and 
performance 
GMM 
Sheridan, 
Ross-Smith, & 
Lord (2014) 
Equality, 
Diversity and 
Inclusion: An 
International 
Journal 
2009-2012 
Descriptive study: Draw 
attention to how the 
organisational factors may 
be shaped by changing 
institutional rules 
- 
Sinclair (2013) Melbourne Business School   
Descriptive study: Examine 
the construct of leadership 
in Australia’s women 
leaders.  
- 
Spender 
(2012) 
Australian 
Journal of 
Corporate Law 
  
A review of quotas 
discussion and 
implementation 
- 
Wang & Oliver 
(2009) 
Accounting 
Research 
Journal 
2003-2006 
Board Composition: 
Negative impact of 
executive directors on 
subsequent risk; Affiliate 
and independent directors 
have no significant effect 
on the level of performance 
variance; Block-holders 
give a positive influence of 
firm risk; Companies with 
poor dividend payout or 
low managerial 
shareholdings tend to be 
riskier. 
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Appendix 9: Financial Variables And Definition (Morningstar DatAnalysis 
Premium) 
Financial 
Variables 
Definition 
Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
Net profit after tax before abnormal / (shareholders equity - 
outside equity interests). ROE is an evaluation of profit 
earned in relation to equity resources invested (the viewpoint 
of equity holders). It is calculated by dividing net profit before 
abnormal by shareholders equity. In the cases where 
shareholders equity is less than zero, we have set the value 
of ROE to null. Return on Equity is a key indication of the 
company’s performance as it provides information on how 
well managers are employing funds invested by the 
shareholders to generate returns. Long run value of a 
company can be determined by the relationship between 
ROE and the cost of equity capital. ROE is affected by two 
factors, how profitability the company employs assets and the 
size of the firm’s asset base relative to the shareholder’s 
investment. 
 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
[Net Income + Interest Expense*(1-Corporate Tax 
Rate)]/[Total Assets - Outside Equity Interests]. ROA is a key 
measure of a company's profitability, equal to a fiscal year's 
earnings divided by its total assets. Return on assets 
essentially shows how much profit a company is making on 
the assets used in its business. 
 
Net Gearing (Short term debt + long term debt - cash) / shareholders 
equity 
 
Gross Gearing (Short term debt + long term debt) / shareholders equity 
 
Market 
Capitalisation ($m) 
The market value of the company's equity capital. This is 
calculated by multiplying the number of common shares by 
the current price. Other classes of equity such as preference 
shares are normally not included. Closing share price on the 
last day of the company's financial year * number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the period 
 
Total Assets The total (current and non-current) assets as reported in the 
annual report. 
 
Total Liabilities Total current and non-current Liabilities. 
 
Total Revenue Total revenue excluding interest income. 
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Appendix 10: SIRCA’s Board Of Directors And Corporate Governance 
Variables And Definition 
Description Definition 
Chairman  The person is the chairman of the board of directors at the 
balance date. 
 
CEO  The director is the chief executive officer of the company at 
the balance date. 
 
CEO tenure YTD The number of years that a person has been the CEO of the 
company. 
 
Independent 
Director 
A director is independent if he/she is declared to be 
independent in Corporation Governance Statement and does 
not have any of the relationships in Box 2.1 of Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations 2nd Edition 
(ASX Corporate Governance Council); this concept applies 
only to directors. 
 
Qualification 
details 
Qualifications a director/executive has; please note this is 
field has been updated over time (e.g. if T Smith received his 
PhD in 2010, his existing qualification would be updated to 
include it. PhD would appear in post-2010 years as well as 
pre-2010 years. 
 
Year of birth 
 
Financial year deducted by an individual's age. 
 
Date of 
appointment 
The appointment date for an individual's first role in a 
company; where exact appointment date is accurate to a 
month or year, the first day of the month or year is used; 
where no appointment date has been reported, 1/1/1901 is 
the default date. 
 
Date of resignation The resignation date for an individual's last position in a 
company; where exact resignation date is accurate to a 
month or year, the first day of the month or year is used; 
where no resignation date has been reported, the field is left 
blank 
 
Board Meetings 
attended while as 
a Director 
 
The number of board meetings attended while this person 
has been a director, in the current annual report. Can include 
some records where executives or incoming directors have 
been invited. 
 
Gender Gender of the director. 
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Appendix 11: Detail Analysis Of The First Stage Regression Results Of Two-
Stage Least Square Estimation 
 
Note to Appendix 11: 
Appendix 11 presents the first stage regression results using the selected external instrumental variable as the 
dependent variable. Column 1 tabulates the variable of interest and control variables to examine the relationship 
between the endogenous variable with the selected instrumental variable, the proportion of local female councillors 
(FC). The first stage regression and the second stage regression are:  
1st stage regression: GDit = α0 + α1FC + αkCVit + νit 
2nd stage regression: Pit = β0 + β𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺�  it + βkCVit + εit 
Where: 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺�  is the predicted value of the gender diversity measure after taking into consideration of the external 
instrumental variable. 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 299 companies with 1981 firm-year observations for the period 
from 2008 to 2015. The regression results are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity with variance robustness 
check. The asterisks represent the significance of critical value at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (*) of Prob > |t| or Prob 
> |z| for the first stage instrumental regression of 2SLS fixed effects estimation. 
 
Regressor 
 Dependent Variable: PFOB  
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf.] 
Board  0.086   0.208   0.41   0.68   -0.32  
PIndDir  0.126   0.022   5.54   0   0.081  
CEOT  0.153   0.109   1.4   0.162   -0.06  
CEODua  1.517   2.111   0.72   0.473   -2.63  
LogMC  0.835   0.736   1.13   0.257   -0.61  
LogRev  -0.00   0.230   -0.04   0.97   -0.46  
NDE  -0.00   0.001   -1.01   0.312   -0.00  
VROE  0.004   0.007   0.59   0.553   -0.01  
FC  0.136   0.025   5.32   0   0.085  
      
#of Observation 1981    
R2 0.1019    
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Appendix 12: Comparison of Regression Analysis Between Dataset Without Winsorising and Dataset With Winsorising at 1% Level 
 Regression Analysis without Winsorising of Dataset Regression Analysis with Winsorising of 1% Dataset 
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variable - Log Q Dependent Variable - Log Q 
OLS-RE OLS-FE 2SLS (IV) Diff’ GMM  Syst GMM OLS-RE OLS-FE 2SLS (IV) Diff’ GMM  Syst GMM 
Gender Diversity (GD) -0.0017*** -0.0016*** -0.0029 0.0091 0.0027 -0.0166*** -0.0016*** -0.0029 -0.0097 0.0017 
Board Size (LogQ) -0.0291*** -0.0212*** -0.0211*** -0.1398 -0.1032* -0.0289*** -0.0212*** -0.0211*** -0.0912 -0.109* 
Proportion of Independent 
Directors (PIndDir) -0.0022*** -0.0018*** -0.0016*** -0.0136 -0.0061 -0.0022*** -0.0018*** -0.0016*** -0.0051 -0.0065 
CEO Tenure (CEOT) 0.0009 -0.0035 -0.0033 0.0309 0.0168 0.0009 -0.0034 -0.0032 0.0221 0.0181 
CEO Duality (CEODua) -0.042 -0.0636 -0.0618 0.5 0.6611 -0.0433 -0.0647 -0.0629 0.4396 0.5602 
Market Capitalisation (LogMC) 0.3115*** 0.3530*** 0.3545*** 0.4752 0.2719** 0.3092*** 0.3518*** 0.3545*** 0.4927** 0.2799** 
Total Revenue (LogRev) -0.0763*** -0.0742*** -0.0742*** -0.0922 -0.0363 -0.0745*** -0.0734*** -0.0742*** -0.0706 -0.0354 
Gearing Ratio (NDE) -0.00004 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0002** -0.00001 0.0001 -0.00006 0.0001 
Volatility (VROE) 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.004 0.0066* 0.0022*** 0.0021** 0.0021** 0.0022 0.0066* 
Lag 1 of Log Q       0.4198 0.267*       0.3902 0.2809* 
# of observations 1981 1981 1981 1393 1682 1981 1981 1981 1393 1682 
# of instruments       13 26       13 26 
R^2 0.4026 0.4138 0.4112     0.4043 0.415 0.4125     
AR(1) Test p-value       0.445 0.1       0.06 0.002 
AR(2) Test p-value       0.48 0.54       0.3 0.65 
Hansen Test of over-
identification (p-value)       0.8 0.43       0.26 0.42 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of 
exogeneity (p-value)       0.41 0.25       0.66 0.19 
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Note to Appendix 12: 
Appendix 12 presents the comparison of regression analysis between the dataset without winsorising and the dataset with winsorising at 1% level. Column (2) to (6) 
presents the analysis results of OLS random effects, fixed effects, 2SLS, differenced GMM and system GMM estimations based on original dataset without 
winsorising. Column (7) to (11) presents the analysis results of OLS random effects, fixed effects, 2SLS, differenced GMM and system GMM estimations based on 1% 
winsorising of dataset. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 299 companies with 1981 firm-year observations for the period from 2008 to 2015. The 
regression results are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity with variance robustness check. The asterisks represent the significance of critical value at 0.01 (***), 
0.05 (**) and 0.10 (*) of Prob > |t| or Prob > |z|. The comparison results show no significant difference between the two sets of data. 
 
  240 
Appendix 13: Sample of GMM Stata Output 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step difference GMM   
       
Group variable: Companynum                       Number of obs      =    1393  
Time variable : Yearnum                          Number of groups   =  273      
Number of instruments = 13                       Obs per group: min =         0  
F(10, 273)    =      2.90                                       avg =      5.10   
Prob > F      =     0.002                                     max =         6   
       
    Corrected         
LogQ Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
L1. 0.4198126 0.3004654 1.4 0.163 -0.171711 1.011336 
PFOB 0.0091069 0.0342343 0.27 0.79 -0.05829 0.0765037 
Board -0.1398422 0.1094769 -1.28 0.203 -0.355368 0.075684 
PIndDir -0.0136321 0.0155202 -0.88 0.381 -0.044186 0.0169223 
CEOT 0.0308632 0.0317184 0.97 0.331 -0.031580 0.0933069 
CEODua 0.4999584 0.7496023 0.67 0.505 -0.975777 1.975694 
LogMC 0.4752049 0.3183938 1.49 0.137 -0.151614 1.102024 
LogRev -0.0922438 0.1173336 -0.79 0.432 -0.323237 0.1387499 
NDE -0.0015105 0.0026428 -0.57 0.568 -0.006713 0.0036924 
VROE 0.0040269 0.0057967 0.69 0.488 -0.007385 0.0154388 
       
Instruments for first differences equation    
  Standard      D.FC     
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.(LogQ PFOB)      
              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -0.76  Pr > z =  0.445  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.71  Pr > z =  0.476  
              
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(3)    =   0.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.959  
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)   
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(3)    =   1.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.795  
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)    
       
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: IV(FC)  
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.838  
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.412  
               
 
 
